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Abstract 
 
NGOs have arguably become the most prominent actors in development, managing 
increasing volumes of funding and becoming important interlocutors to government and 
international agencies. This thesis contributes to the increasing body of academic literature on 
NGOs. It presents a case study, namely Lebanon, in recent historical perspective and in the context 
of changing funding frameworks in overseas development aid.  
 
It is examined how country context as well as donor frameworks shape NGO operations. 
Project implementation by NGOs is judged as highly context specific. That is to say NGO 
characteristics change with historical, political and social context. NGO operations are shaped by 
regulatory framework, international development discourse and donor demands. This dissertation 
addresses how country context, donor preferences and funding frameworks affect project 
implementation by NGOs  
 
Two data sources are used to address this question firstly a large NGO survey, covering 
more than 3000 non-governmental organisations and secondly a qualitative study consisting of 
firstly a small database of 197 projects and secondly records of semi-structured interviews with 
NGO staff and experts. The qualitative data focuses rural development projects.  
 
Descriptive analysis of the NGO survey is used to build a historical analysis of the 
Lebanese NGO sector in various periods. The focus of activity as well as staffing and funding 
patterns are found to vary across activity and time. Following an analysis of country specific 
influences on NGO operations is an analysis of donor preferences.  
 
Multi-variate logistic regression analysis is used to analyse which donors fund what type of 
NGOs. Empirical manifestations of donor preferences indicate that Lebanese third sector, 
governmental and international donors have specific preferences of certain NGO characteristics, 
such as institutional sophistication, access to networks or sectarian affiliation.  
 
Thematic analysis of qualitative data of rural development projects shows that, though 
donor influence is not articulated directly by NGO staff, it can be revealed through an analysis of 
implemented projects and a critical appraisal of their impact. Through funding frameworks donors 
are found to define from the outset a significant share of NGO project implementation 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
Heartfelt thanks to Dr. Jane Harrigan for her supervision.  
I am indebted to Drs. Jad Chaaban and Rami Zurayk from the American University of Beirut who 
opened doors for me and generously introduced me to their contacts. 
I owe thanks to innumerable NGO staff who agreed to meet me repeatedly but asked to remain 
anonymous.  
I am thankful for the invaluable insights gleaned from conversations with fellows and researchers at 
the German Orient Institute in Beirut. 
I am very grateful for the financial support of the University of London’s Central Research Fund 
and the German Orient Institute in Beirut.  
Originally, a personal element was not planned in the acknowledgments, since a forthcoming poetry 
anthology in my name would be better suited to pay emotional tribute. But since I am not a very 
talented poet I feel I should pay credit to the support I received from those I hold dear.  
The merit of this thesis does not even come close to the never-ending patience and forbearance of 
parents and family in this seemingly eternal project. 
This thesis would have been impossible to complete without the regular supply of food, shelter and 
furry shoulders to cry on of Hector, Spacedog and Hecterito’s rotating owners.  
Many thanks to the party people of Beirut for making my thesis seem extra dry. No olive.  
 
 
  v 
Contents 
CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................. V 
TABLE OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. VIII 
TABLE OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... IX 
ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................... XI 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 NGOs: A residual category between state and market ................................................. 2 
1.2 Donor NGO relations ................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Introducing the case study: Lebanon ............................................................................ 4 
1.4 Research questions and methodological approach ...................................................... 5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SHORT INTRODUCTION TO LEBANON ........... 7 
1 NGO CHARACTERISTICS ................................................................................................... 8 
1.1 NGOs’ rise to prominence ............................................................................................ 8 
1.2 NGO activities .............................................................................................................. 9 
1.3 Discussing the comparative advantage of NGOs ....................................................... 12 
2 HOW DO NGOS ACQUIRE THEIR AGENCY? ...................................................................... 14 
2.1 Economic models ........................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 NGOs’ agency: embedded rather than autonomous ................................................... 16 
3 HOW DONOR OVERSIGHT INFLUENCES NGO OPERATIONS ............................................... 17 
3.1 The impact of monitoring and evaluation on NGO operations .................................. 18 
4 NGO STAFF ..................................................................................................................... 23 
4.1 Voluntarism and staff motivation in NGOs ................................................................ 23 
4.2 The casualisation of staff under project funding ........................................................ 24 
5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 26 
6 INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDY: LEBANON ..................................................................... 28 
6.1 Economic history ........................................................................................................ 28 
6.2 Government institutions.............................................................................................. 30 
6.3 Clientelism .................................................................................................................. 31 
6.4 Social service provision .............................................................................................. 32 
6.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 33 
III. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 34 
1 DEFINITIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................................................................ 35 
1.1 An attempt at defining and classifying NGOs............................................................. 35 
1.2 Research questions ..................................................................................................... 36 
2 RESEARCH DESIGN .......................................................................................................... 37 
  vi 
2.1 From ontological assumptions to research methodology ........................................... 37 
3 DATA .............................................................................................................................. 40 
3.1 Previously used methodologies .................................................................................. 41 
3.2 The survey project ...................................................................................................... 42 
3.3 Qualitative methodology ............................................................................................ 48 
3.4 Data use throughout this study ................................................................................... 54 
IV. LEBANESE NGOS: ANALYSIS OF A SECTOR ............................................................ 55 
1 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ........................................................................ 56 
1.1 De jure regulation ...................................................................................................... 56 
1.2 De facto application ................................................................................................... 57 
2 NGO ACTIVITY SECTORS ................................................................................................ 58 
2.1 A note on self-declared religious affiliation of NGOs ................................................ 60 
3 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE LEBANESE NGO LANDSCAPE ....................................... 63 
3.1 NGO activities ............................................................................................................ 64 
3.2 A brief note on labour- and other social movements .................................................. 69 
4 NGO LOCATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATIONS OF POVERTY ........................... 70 
4.1 NGO location ............................................................................................................. 70 
5 NGO STAFFING ............................................................................................................... 74 
5.1 Paid staff and volunteers ............................................................................................ 74 
5.2 Women in Lebanese NGOs ......................................................................................... 76 
6 NGO REVENUE - BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND ODA ..................................................... 79 
6.1 NGO budgets .............................................................................................................. 79 
6.2 NGO funding sources: the government and overseas development aid ..................... 80 
6.3 NGOs and ODA .......................................................................................................... 84 
7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 87 
V. DONOR-NGO MATCHING ............................................................................................. 90 
1 NGO FUNDING SOURCES ................................................................................................. 91 
2 NGO CHARACTERISTICS AS PREDICTORS OF FUNDING SOURCE ....................................... 93 
2.1 NGO activities ............................................................................................................ 93 
2.2 Location ...................................................................................................................... 94 
2.3 Institutional sophistication, budget size and inter-agency cooperation ..................... 95 
2.4 Beneficiary committees and self-declared sectarian affiliation.................................. 97 
3 ESTIMATION OF DONOR CHOICE ...................................................................................... 98 
3.1 The model ................................................................................................................... 98 
3.2 Fitting the model ........................................................................................................ 99 
3.3 Sample size and internal validity .............................................................................. 101 
3.4 Results ...................................................................................................................... 102 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND MODEL FIT ....................................................................... 108 
VI. RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: A QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT ............... 111 
4.1 Data sources and themes – an outline ...................................................................... 112 
  vii 
4.2 A focus on rural and agricultural development projects .......................................... 113 
5 THEME 1: DONOR FUNDING FRAMEWORKS AND NGO PROJECTS .................................. 115 
5.1 Donors and their funding frameworks ...................................................................... 115 
5.2 Projects implemented by NGOs – the danger of isomorphism ................................. 118 
5.3 Limitations of implemented projects ......................................................................... 120 
5.4 The scale problem .................................................................................................... 125 
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 127 
6 THEME 2: STRUCTURING DYNAMICS OF DONOR REQUIREMENTS ................................... 128 
6.1 Geopolitical interests of donors and project location .............................................. 128 
6.2 Project implementation timeframes .......................................................................... 130 
6.3 Reporting and budgeting requirements .................................................................... 133 
6.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 134 
7 COROLLARY: NGOS AS JOB CREATORS ......................................................................... 135 
8 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 136 
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 139 
VIII. APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. 148 
1 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................. 148 
1.1 Important political families ...................................................................................... 148 
2 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 .............................................................................................. 150 
2.1 First Questionnaire .................................................................................................. 150 
2.2 Second Questionnaire ............................................................................................... 154 
2.3 Comparing NGO response across cazas .................................................................. 162 
2.4 NGO registrations in the sample frame and survey ................................................. 163 
2.5 Respondent details for qualitative interviews ........................................................... 164 
3 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 .............................................................................................. 166 
3.1 NGO activities in detail ............................................................................................ 166 
3.2 Lebanese government expenditure ........................................................................... 167 
3.3 Share of NGOs hiring paid employees ..................................................................... 168 
4 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 .............................................................................................. 169 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 178 
 
 
 
  viii 
Table of Figures 
Figure IV.1: NGO activities ............................................................................................................................................. 58 
Figure IV.2: Founding dates of self declared denominational affiliation of NGOs (1942-2004) (five-year 
moving average) ........................................................................................................................................... 62 
Figure IV.3: NGO founding dates .................................................................................................................................. 63 
Figure IV.4: Poverty and NGO density ......................................................................................................................... 73 
Figure IV.5: NGO employees covered by the National Social Security Fund ........................................................ 75 
Figure IV.6: Average NGO paid staff and volunteers ................................................................................................ 76 
Figure IV.7: The share and position of women in NGOs ......................................................................................... 77 
Figure IV.8: Share of exclusively male/female NGO boards (share of women on mixed NGO boards) ........ 78 
Figure IV.9: Average NGO budget in US Dollars ....................................................................................................... 79 
Figure IV.10: Scatter plot of NGO registrations and ODA ...................................................................................... 86 
Figure V.1: Sources of funding used by Lebanese NGOs.......................................................................................... 92 
Figure VI.1: Number of projects funded by each donor .......................................................................................... 115 
Figure VI.2: Main disbursement channels of bi- and multilateral aid ..................................................................... 116 
Figure VI.3: Rural development projects by NGOs .................................................................................................. 118 
Figure VI.4: Beneficiary groups ..................................................................................................................................... 119 
Figure VI.5: Average project duration by donor ........................................................................................................ 130 
Figure VIII.1: Comparison of NGO registrations in the sample frame and survey ............................................ 163 
Figure VIII.2: Lebanese government expenditure (in constant 1972 prices) ........................................................ 168 
Figure VIII.3: Uni-variate Analysis of predictors ....................................................................................................... 177 
  ix 
Table of Tables 
Table III.1: Number of NGO respondents by geographical district ....................................................................... 46 
Table III.2: Number of interviews carried out with various NGOs and donors ................................................... 49 
Table III.3: Number of expert interviews carried out ................................................................................................. 50 
Table III.4: Semi-structured interview guide ................................................................................................................. 52 
Table III.5: Themes identified ......................................................................................................................................... 53 
Table IV.1: Average establishment year by activity group .......................................................................................... 65 
Table IV.2:  Geographical location of NGOs ............................................................................................................... 70 
Table IV.3: Per cent of NGOs activities by muhafaza ................................................................................................. 72 
Table IV.4: Government contributions to NGOs ....................................................................................................... 81 
Table IV.5: Partial correlation between NGO location and public service provision (controlling for 
population) .................................................................................................................................................... 82 
Table IV.6: Correlation coefficients for ODA and government expenditure with NGO registrations ............ 83 
Table V.1: Revenue structure of 130 Lebanese NGOs ............................................................................................... 93 
Table V.2: Minimum required sample size .................................................................................................................. 101 
Table V.3: Regression results (Odds ratios with confidence intervals in parenthesis) ........................................ 104 
Table V.4: Model fit ......................................................................................................................................................... 109 
Table VI.1: Themes identified during qualitative interviews .................................................................................... 113 
Table VI.2: The role and capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture in rural development ..................................... 114 
Table VI.3: NGO comments on project strategies .................................................................................................... 117 
Table VI.4: NGO assessments of development challenges ..................................................................................... 121 
Table VI.5: NGO assessment of project timeframe .................................................................................................. 132 
Table VI.6: NGO comments on donor reporting guidelines and donor conceptualisation of success ........... 133 
Table VI.7: NGOs as employment generators ........................................................................................................... 135 
Table VIII.1: Expected and Observed Responses across cazas ............................................................................... 162 
Table VIII.2: Detailed break-down of NGO and donor respondents ................................................................... 164 
Table VIII.3: Detailed break-down of respondents to expert interviews .............................................................. 165 
Table VIII.4: NGO classification in detail .................................................................................................................. 166 
Table VIII.5: Detailed NGO activities ......................................................................................................................... 167 
Table VIII.6:Share of NGOs hiring paid employees ................................................................................................. 168 
Table VIII.7: NGO activities by funding source ........................................................................................................ 169 
Table VIII.8: NGO age, geographic location, and targeted area by funding source ........................................... 170 
Table VIII.9: NGO institutional sophistication by funding source ........................................................................ 171 
Table VIII.10: NGO budget by funding source ......................................................................................................... 172 
Table VIII.11: Paid staff and NSSF contributions by funding source ................................................................... 173 
Table VIII.12: NGO branches by funding source ..................................................................................................... 174 
Table VIII.13: Cooperation with the government and other NGOs by funding source .................................... 174 
Table VIII.14: NGO funders and problems in performing key activities ............................................................. 175 
  x 
Table VIII.15: NGO funder and beneficiary committees ........................................................................................ 175 
Table VIII.16: Sectarian affiliation by funder ............................................................................................................. 176 
  xi 
Acronyms and Glossary 
ACDI/VOCA Agricultural Cooperative Development International / Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative 
Assistance 
ADR Association for the Development of Rural capacities 
AECID Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Spanish governmental 
agency for international development agency) 
AFD Agence Française de Développement (French governmental agency for international 
development agency) 
AKF/NOVIB  Aga Khan Foundation/Dutch Affiliate of Oxfam 
AUB  American University of Beirut 
BRAC formerly Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee and later as the Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee. Currently, BRAC does not stand for an acronym. 
CHF Cooperative Housing Foundation now Global Communities 
CDP  Community Development Projects 
CDR  Council for Development and Reconstruction, Republic of Lebanon 
CI  Confidence Interval 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
ESFD  Economic and Social Fund for Development 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation 
giz  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German governmental agency 
for international development) 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation 
INMA  Social and Cultural Development Association 
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation 
MoA  Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Lebanon 
MoSA  Ministry of Social Affairs, Republic of Lebanon 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
ODA  Overseas Development Assistance 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OR  Odds ratio 
QUANGO Quasi-Governmental Organisation 
RMF  René Moawad Foundation 
ROSS  Emergency Initiative for Rehabilitation, Occupation, Services and Development 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
  xii 
WRF  World Rehabilitation Fund 
YMCA  Young Men's Christian Association 
 
 
 
caza  Lebanese administrative unit, a district 
iftar   Evening meal to break fast during Ramadan 
muhafaza  Lebanese administrative region, a governorate (larger than caza) 
Tanzimat Literally reorganisation, the term refers to a period of modernising reforms taking place in 
the Ottoman Empire during the mid-19th century. 
wasta Intercession, using contacts to intervene on ones behalf to produce a favourable outcome 
outside formal administrative structures. 
za’im, zu’ama (pl.) local strongman/patron 
  1 
I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the presence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in development 
has become ubiquitous. NGOs have become most familiar as actors in either advocacy or social service 
delivery (Lewis and Kanji 2009). Still, their function and nature varies over time as well as contemporaneously 
from place to place. NGOs are involved in international advocacy, such as Human Rights Watch 
documenting war crimes in Syria to lobby for the international community to act against the Assad regime 
(Human Rights Watch 2012), and local advocacy, such as Paraguay’s Totobiegosode Support Group lobbying 
against deforestation on behalf of the Ayoreos-Totobiegosode Indians (AFP 2011). NGOs provide social 
services, such as the Lebanese organization Skoun’s treatment services for young drug users, or the British 
NGO Barnardo’s educational support services. NGOs are not a recent phenomenon. Charitable 
organisations have provided social services to the sick and vulnerable throughout history (Bishop and Green 
2010), while the formation of guilds, arguably the pre-cursors of contemporary advocacy organisations, dates 
back to early modernity (Van Leeuwen 2012) and may even date to 16th century in China (Ma 2002) or 
ancient Rome (Liu 2009). Though largely concerned with regulating trade as well as forms of burial and 
sickness insurance (Van Leeuwen 2012), Chalcraft (2004) argues that in early Ottoman Egypt, guilds also 
negotiated and petitioned with state authorities.  
Analyses of NGOs reflect historical circumstances, in particular changing views on the relationships 
with donors, the state, markets and society. The NGO category encompasses a variety of organisations with 
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numerous functions.  Hence, key terms are discussed below, especially the definition and functions of NGOs, 
so as to more clearly formulate my research questions and relate them to Lebanon, the present case study.  
1.1 NGOs: A residual category between state and market 
Though the term NGO is frequently used by development practitioners and despite the seemingly 
self-defining nature of the non-governmental organisation category there is little agreement on where the 
boundaries of the category are and what criteria make one organisation an NGO but not another. Lewis and 
Kanji (2009:9) add to an inventory first put together by Najam (1996:206), listing 46 different acronyms for 
various types of NGOs. DeMars (2005:2) comments that the NGO category has ‘become so irresistible that a 
broad assortment of notables, missionaries and miscreants are creating their own’.  
NGOs are commonly located in the ‘third’ - non-profit, voluntary - sector (the ‘first’ being the 
public sector and the second the private for-profit sector) (Lewis and Kanji 2009:7–8). This makes NGOs 
something of a residual category, defined by what they are not, capturing anything that is neither of the state 
nor the market (Abdelrahman 2004; Paul and Israel 1991:20). Salamon and Anheier (1992) list five  oft-cited 
frequently observed characteristics of NGOs: They are (1) formal with institutional permanence, (2) 
institutionally separate from the state, (3) non-profit-distributing, (4) self-governing, with own rules and 
procedures, (5) voluntary, even if the only voluntary work is small or a small fraction of income comes from 
voluntary contributions. 
Some contestation of these characteristics exist, relating to the financing of NGOs, their 
institutional set-up and their independence from either state or market. The World Bank’s definition (1996), 
excludes organisations that derive a majority of their operating budget from governments, while including 
some for-profit organisations. Brown and Korten (1991:49-50) argue that NGOs are distinguished from 
other organisations because they mobilise resources through shared values. Kidd (2002) points out that 
Salamon and Anheier’s characterisation does not include less institutionalised forms of associational life or 
social movements. Lewis and Kanji (2009:15) advocate that NGOs may become end points of social 
movements when they have become institutionalised. Analysing NGOs in Africa, Igoe and Kelsall (2005) find 
that rural NGO projects are not always distinguishable from projects run by the state. Tvedt (1998) notes that 
some formally independent international NGOs are dependent on government support for institutional 
survival. Placing NGOs firmly outside the realm of government might understate their sometimes close 
relationship with the state. In addition, NGOs acting as public service contractors could be seen as part of the 
private market sector.  
1.2 Donor NGO relations 
While the involvement of NGOs in development initiatives may not be recent, such involvement 
rose to particular prominence in the 1980s (Tvedt 1998), when in addition to private charitable donations, 
NGOs began to compete for international government funding, hitherto the prerogative of state. After that 
point, international funding for NGOs increased substantially, though it remains dwarfed by 
intergovernmental transfers (Lewis and Kanji 2009). International funding bodies now support service 
delivery or advocacy campaigns in other countries. This leads Tvedt (1998) and Abdelrahman (2004) to state 
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that NGOs and donors have their own political or ideological ambitions. This implies that NGOs reflect the 
socio-historical conditions of the locale in which they operate.  
International aid became an important part of international relations after World War II. NGOs are 
more flexible funding channels than governments. (Lewis and Kanji 2009) Governments have political 
preferences that impact their NGO funding decisions (Fowler 1992; Edwards 1993). Governments may even 
make an NGO’s adherence to a certain policy objective a condition of funding (Howell 2006). Development 
initiatives run by NGOs attempt to shape target societies in ways desirable to the NGO’s donors. This 
process may lead to a widening rift between well-resourced service providers and poorly-funded social 
mobilization organizations (Pearce 1993; cited in Edwards and Hulme 1996). Fowler (1992) predicts that 
NGOs will increasingly function as a component of an international system of social welfare. Control over 
funds and decision-making remains unequal, with donors setting agendas of projects (Edwards 1999). 
Institutionally, greater control by donors over project outcomes has been achieved by a shift from 
program- or core-financing to project-based funding (Gibson, O’Donnell, and Rideout 2007; Scott 2003). As 
the name suggests, the former financially supports NGO core operations, and can be used to fund overheads 
such as salaries or rent. Project funding on the other hand is obtained via writing a proposal to a donor, 
frequently in response to a call for bids. Projects generally have to address issues proposed by the donor, be 
run within a set timeframe and follow a number of reporting requirements. Project funds can often be used 
only to finance direct project costs and not overheads beyond a certain percentage. Since official aid is almost 
always allocated on the basis of specific pre-planned project agendas (Edwards 2008), NGOs face the 
constant challenge of understanding the latest policy fashions or pre-occupations among donors (Igoe and 
Kelsall 2005). Hence, fashions in development discourse are reproduced by NGOs responding to donors’ 
funding priorities. This limits an NGO’s discretion in responding to local needs. Comprehensive reporting 
requirements are a response to calls for greater accountability of NGOs, which emerged after public instances 
of mismanagement (Ebrahim 2009). Fowler (1993:335) points out that donors favour rigid reporting 
frameworks based on quantifiable indicators, placing greater emphasis on tangible results rather than slower 
structural change. Short-term project time-frames are preferred to the detriment of work that requires long-
term investments with fewer opportunities for quantifiable results. An outcome of project based funding, is 
the loss of infrastructure, primarily staff, between project periods. While salary scale of NGO staff and their 
potentially fraudulent objectives are frequently discussed in the literature (Ebrahim 2003; Barr, Fafchamps, 
and Owens 2005; Weisbrod 2000); the often casual working conditions and high turnover of NGO staff, 
resulting from project finance, have received comparatively less but more recent attention (Clark and Michuki 
2009; Abdelrahman 2007; Siddique and Ahmad 2012).   
Presumed power relationships between donors and NGOs are not always clear-cut. Ebrahim (2003), in 
his analysis of Indian NGOs, questions that donor-NGO relationships are necessarily unequal by stating that 
funders depend on NGOs for information and the creation of success narratives. Donors structure and 
attempt to control NGO output and emphasis on project rather than program funding is critical to this 
consolidation of decision-making power by donors. As shown in the following pages, this is true in particular 
for international donors, which, due to geographical distance between donor agency and recipient NGO 
information flows less easily and oversight is less straightforward. Local donors on the other hand may put 
less emphasis on monitoring and evaluation but use alternative accountability regimes. 
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1.3 Introducing the case study: Lebanon 
The context of the present dissertation is Lebanon. Lebanon has a lively non-governmental sector that 
includes large domestic organisations, some independent of international donor funding. The strong presence 
of NGOs in social and relief service provision, as well as advocacy, makes them a ubiquitous feature of the 
Lebanese political economy. The NGO-Unit run by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) has 
more than 6,000 NGOs in its registers.1  NGOs in Lebanon have been active well before the emergence of 
international development aid. Muslim religious endowments, waqf, date at least as far back as the mediaeval 
period. Jewish and Christian communities in the Middle East also have a tradition of endowments for 
charitable purposes, even adopting the waqf system from the Middle Ages until the end of the Ottoman state 
(Shaham 1991). The organisation of tradesmen and merchants into guilds dates back at to the Ottoman 
period. Comparable to contemporary NGOs, the nature and function of Ottoman guilds varied considerably 
across time and place. The term for guild (ta’ifa) refers to organisations or associations of social groups with 
various identifying features, such as a religious affiliation or a profession (Chalcraft 2004). The advent of 
foreign NGOs and international funding for domestic NGOs in Lebanon came with the end of the Civil War 
in the 1990s and has since seen a number of fluctuations in response to internal conflict and violence.  
Lebanon is dominated by sectarian policy-making, and access to power, jobs, contracts or other 
resources is distributed across sectarian lines through influential intermediaries in return for political support. 
In effect, much opposition and government work, especially related to welfare, runs through NGOs as 
intermediary institutions, either in the form of sub-contracting by the state or private charity dispensed by 
wealthy politicians. Furthermore, the state does not hold a monopoly over either social control or violence. 
Lebanese institutions are governed by identity politics, where undemocratically chosen representatives of each 
sect are given access to government to defend their communities’ interests. Consequently, Lebanese 
politicians strive to provide benefits for the community they represent rather than for all Lebanese and there 
is little political interest in the universal provision of social services. The government is a locus for elite 
competition and resource appropriation, not one of re-distribution. In this context, as observed by DeMars 
(2005), elites use NGOs for competition and reproduction. Since benefits are bestowed on the basis of 
contacts and favours, NGOs may be the institutional intermediaries of this distribution. Zurayk (2011) refers 
to NGOs affiliated to, and largely financed by, Lebanese elites with political ambitions as ‘ruling class NGOs’. 
These ruling class NGOs are not held accountable through monitoring and evaluation but through socially 
constructed mechanisms of accountability such as social control. Migdal (1988:32) argues that if affiliates, in 
this case NGOs and their staff,  consent with donor authority and endorsing it as legitimate as well as 
voluntarily contribute time or labour to it, donors can be said to exert social control over NGOs. Migdal 
argues that strategies vis-à-vis organisations that hold social control is influenced by material incentives, 
coercion and the manipulation of symbols. In the case of NGOs the material incentives can obviously be 
access to funds.  
                                                          
1 Interview with Sawsan al-Masri from MoSA. 
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1.4 Research questions and methodological approach 
Lewis and Opokuh-Mensah (2006:669) state that scholarly works on NGOs are often “insufficiently 
contextualised”. As a counterpoint to the prevailing focus on the evolution of the non-profit sector in the 
global North, the evolution of the modern Lebanese NGO sector from the mid-19th century to the mid-
2000s will be charted. The Lebanese NGO sector, focussing on local NGOs’ engagement with foreign and 
local aid and their spheres of activities will then be analysed and the size of the NGO sector in terms of 
funding and employment estimated. In Lebanon, as elsewhere, donor preferences structure NGOs. Different 
donors, be they institutional or individual, governmental or private, shape NGOs by virtue of their financial 
contributions. This thesis argues that donors look for certain characteristics in NGOs, such as the degree of 
beneficiary participation, sectarian affiliation, budget size or activity focus. This allows to distinguish 
characteristics of NGOs that are government-funded from NGOs that receive international funds or service 
fees.  
The second research question follows from the above; the processes used by donors to structure NGO 
behaviour will be analysed. In particular how funding frameworks and reporting requirements impact project 
implementation. This research question will be analysed with a particular focus on agriculture. Government-
led support has almost entirely disappeared from the agriculture sector2, which is managed almost entirely by 
NGOs. An assessment of a World Bank-funded Community Development Project (Srour 2008) indicates 
that projects in agriculture were the most successful out of the projects analysed. By analysing one sector in 
depth, interactions between NGOs and their donors can be better teased out. A theme addressed throughout 
is a discussion of NGOs as employers. The degree of casualisation of NGO employment, access to benefits 
and education levels of staff is examined. 
Two sets of data are used to address these questions. To chart the evolution of the NGO sector in 
Lebanon, a large NGO survey, comprising 3,353 NGOs, carried out in 2006 is used. This is complemented 
with secondary data collected in Lebanon. Using the same dataset, it is identified what NGO characteristics 
are associated with what types of donors. A positivist approach is used to investigate the phenomenon of 
preferred funding of some NGOs by certain donors. Donor preferences for certain NGOs are explained by 
observable factors, such as organisation size, degree of beneficiary participation, or fundraising practices. 
However, this does not explain certain underlying characteristics of donor NGO relationships. For example, 
why international donors are more likely to give funds to NGOs with bank accounts, independent auditing 
practices and dedicated fundraising personnel? The second research question, by focussing on funding 
frameworks, analyses the mechanisms that underlie donor preferences. Using data from semi-structured 
interviews with NGO personnel as well as outside stakeholders such as local donors, academics, former staff 
and contactors, it is analysed what processes donors use to shape project outcomes.  
This dissertation is structured as follows: The second chapter will discuss literature on NGOs with a 
particular focus on NGO-donor relations and accountability. This review will include a short introduction to 
Lebanon. The third chapter presents the data collection methodology of the quantitative NGO survey as well 
as eth qualitative data. It will discuss sampling, the survey instrument, statistical techniques used in the 
analysis and point to shortcomings in the data. The fourth chapter addresses the first part of the first research 
question and contains a description and historical overview of the Lebanese NGO sector. It will include 
largely uni-variate descriptive statistics. The fifth chapter tackles NGO donor relations in Lebanon and the 
                                                          
2 Though this has changed slightly since the new Mikati cabinet of June 2011 with Hussein Hajj Hassan as Minister of Agriculture. 
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second part of the first research question, analysing what kind of NGOs receive funding from what kind of 
donors. It includes bi-variate and regression analyses. The sixth chapter tackles the second research question. 
It features a thematic analysis of the interview protocols, and describes how Lebanese NGOs implementing 
rural development projects are influenced by donor requirements. The seventh chapter concludes.  
  7 
II. Literature Review and Short 
Introduction to Lebanon 
NGOs have become ubiquitous on the international development scene. This chapter charts their 
rise to prominence. As hinted at in the Introduction, NGOs are not easily defined. This chapter will discuss 
literature that discusses what influences NGO operations and structure as well as examine how legislators 
have dealt with the challenge that NGOs may be to government legitimacy. Two approaches to NGOs are 
contrasted, one assuming their agency is autonomous and constituted from intrinsically motivated agents and 
another conceptualising NGO agency as embedded in context and donor-NGO relations. Donors are 
isolated as a particularity powerful actor in shaping NGO operations. Specifically this chapter analyses how 
donors use project funding as well as monitoring and evaluation requirements to assert control over NGO 
project implementation and even mission. Project based funding also affects NGO staff in making their 
employment more precarious. This chapter concludes with a brief overview of Lebanon, a country with a 
vibrant NGO landscape, which will constitute the case study of this thesis.  
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1 NGO characteristics 
1.1 NGOs’ rise to prominence 
At the national level, not-for-profit organisations have a long history of, supplying social services or 
organising members into advocacy groups. Not-for-profit organisations operating on an international level 
are comparatively more recent. Referring to Anderson and Rieff (2005:31), Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 
(2006:668) argue that western European churches, within a missionary or colonial framework, are the 
predecessors of today’s internationally operating NGOs Tvedt (1998:44) notes that Norwegian missions had 
operated in locations as diverse as Madagascar, South Africa, and China since the mid-19th century. Many 
contemporary internationally operating NGOs have religious roots. Chabbot (1999:228) points out that over 
two-thirds of international NGOs founded before 1900 and surviving into the 1990s mention religion in their 
title.  
Aid in the postcolonial era was dominated by state-building ideologies, privileging large-scale 
industry and agriculture programmes (Tvedt 1998:166; Ebrahim 2003:34), coordinated at the governmental 
level. A number of interventions throughout the 1960s were seen as slow and ineffectual. This was attributed 
to failures by governments perceived as corrupt, and prompted the desire for a smaller state and more 
decentralised intervention (Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Paul & Israel, 1991).  Consequently the 1970s and 1980s saw 
the rise of locally-driven and participatory approaches to development (Ebrahim 2003:38). NGOs were 
interpreted as signs of indigenous social organisations independent of the state. They were seen as benefiting 
directly those who needed help most while previous state-led approaches were labelled as too top down and 
bureaucratic (Igoe and Kelsall 2005:10-11) In this period, the 1970s and 1980s, buzz-words such as 
‘sustainability’ and ‘gender-equality’, now ubiquitous in funding proposals, were coined (Ebrahim 2003:43-
44). Meanwhile, the ‘new policy agenda’ of the Washington Consensus stipulated that macro-economic 
stability and good governance would allow for the efficient functioning of markets, increased growth and 
prosperity (Ebrahim 2003:47). Kidd (2002:239) adds that the rediscovery of private service provision is 
another symptom of the loss in faith in the state. As a consequence, NGOs received growing attention after 
the Cold War due to a neo-liberal climate hostile to large governments (Ebrahim 2003: 1). The number and 
size of NGOs in Africa, for instance, increased substantially in the 1980s (Fowler 1991).  
In contrast, Tvedt (1998:44), argues that the shift from government to NGOs, as the primary 
purveyors of development projects and programs, pre-dates the end of the Cold War by a few decades.  
Using the Norwegian example he illustrates that before 1963, 20 private Norwegian organisations worked in 
developing countries. In 1963, government development aid funds were for the first time channelled through 
seven private organisations. State aid to NGOs was institutionalised in 1978, with the creation of the NGO 
Office. By 1981 the number of NORAD (Norwegian Development Agency) supported organisations had 
more than doubled to 70 organisations. Some NGOs received 100% of their income from the state, carrying 
out mainly contract work. This example of shifts in Norwegian development aid funding towards NGOs 
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from the 1960s onwards, indicates that the rise to prominence of NGOs is not merely a neo-liberal project 
but also chimed well with radical ideologies of the 1960s.  
Chabbot (1999:237) adds that the growth of NGOs is closely related to the mandates and initiatives 
of international organisations, such as various UN institutions or the World Bank.  Paul and Israel (1991:ix) 
point out that formal World Bank cooperation with NGOs began in 1981. Davis (2006) argues that the role 
of NGOs was institutionalised under former World Bank President James Wolfensohn, who required 
developing countries to include advocacy groups and NGOs in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, as 
insurance that aid actually reaches target groups. Direct budgetary support to government ministries by the 
World Bank and other donors frequently requires the drawing up of these Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006:667). Today, NGOs are invited through various UN and World Bank 
forums to contribute ideas and perspectives on needs of the poor, and to maintain a watchdog role on the 
performance of governments in implementing anti-poverty policies. Lewis (2006:182) states that “globally, 
the non-governmental sector is believed to command around US$ 5.5 billion annually, forming a third of 
multilateral aid flows.” 
Though dwarfed by governmental transfers in terms of volume, private charitable donations have a 
longer history than government aid (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Eckel, Grossman, and Johnston (2005) found that 
private giving depends on a multitude of motivations such as preferences for certain charitable causes, 
information about the charity, and the respondents’ own financial standing. Similarly Andreoni and Payne 
(2003) find that individual’s charitable giving is influenced by factors such as education, income and age of 
donors. Individual contributions to NGOs could also be considered an expression of preference for certain 
questions of public concern, such as the level of supply of public services. By making a donation or 
participating in an NGO an individual can increase the weight of his or her preferences.3 Theoretical papers 
hold that if government and private contributions are substitutes, public spending crowds out private 
donations, (Andreoni 1988; Gruber and Hungerman 2007; Warr 1982) or leads to a reduction in fundraising 
efforts from NGOs (Andreoni and Payne 2003). However, empirical literature from the US reviewed by 
Hungerman (2005), or work in the UK by Posnett and Sandler (1989) find contradictory results, with private 
donations increasing or decreasing or not responding at all to variations in government spending on welfare.  
1.2 NGO activities 
Tvedt (1998:77) argues that the increased availability of funds motivated an increasing number of 
organisations to apply for funds. Roessler (2005) and Hilhorst (2003) point out that cooperative organisations 
that existed prior to the increase in international aid to NGOs as well as so-called grassroots movements saw 
international donor bodies as an opportune source of finance. It is through this process of applying for funds 
and thereby accepting certain rules and procedures, Tvedt (1998:77) argues, that small, local groups were 
included in what he calls the International Aid System. As for Africa, Igoe and Kelsall (2005:2) point out that 
“African NGOs became a growth industry in a time where most other African sectors were in decline”. A 
                                                          
3Individual citizens are likely to disagree on what the optimal level or quality of social services provision should be. The transfer of 
individual preferences into a collectively chosen level of social services provision is problematic. One of the most famous results of 
public choice theory is Arrow’s impossibility theorem that no aggregation rule of individual preferences can be found for a society of at 
least two members over at least three choices that will satisfy reasonable requirements such as non-dictatorship, unrestricted domain or 
universality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and pareto efficiency. 
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side effect of the abundance of finance to NGOs in the early 1990s was the emergence of the “briefcase 
NGO”, which only existed on paper with the sole purpose of raising funds (Igoe and Kelsall 2005:7). 
NGOs are active in a variety of sectors, linked to either public service delivery or advocacy, 
sometimes both. Edwards and Fowler (2002:2) observed that certain sectors favour certain structures: most 
NGOs working in development services are hierarchically organised, connecting grassroots or community 
organisations with governments and donors. Lewis and Kanji (2009) call these intermediary NGOs, made up 
of people working on behalf of another, marginalised group. In contrast, grassroots and membership NGOs, 
Lewis and Kanji continue, are generally composed of people working for the advancement of their own 
interests. These can be trade unions or organisations concerned with arts or sports and professional 
associations. Edwards and Fowler (2002:2) add that membership-based organizations are more common in 
human rights and advocacy NGOs.  
Service delivery and advocacy NGOs 
The relationship between grassroots or membership associations and the state can be conceptualised 
in various different ways. Putnam linked the ensemble of civic associations, he conceptualised as Social 
Capital, to economic growth. His work on participation in community life in Italy and the United States 
(Putnam 1993, 2000) spawned a huge literature on Social Capital and is a key rationale behind much 
development finance directed at citizenship-building. The associational school, inspired by Tocqueville, thinks 
of these civic associations as scrutinising the state (Mohan 2002). Khan (1998b) points out that this is in 
contrast to classical and Marxian analyses of civic organisations. Marxist theory, in particular Gramsci, 
conceptualises Civil Society as the set of private organisations and institutions that underpin the capitalist 
state. Dominant classes use associations to legitimise and strengthen their position. (Gramsci 1971; cited by 
Khan 1998b; Mohan 2002) Khan argues that the shift of emphasis from Civil Society as underpinning the 
state to scrutinising it was concomitant to changing political conditions in developed countries in the 1980s, 
favouring conservative ideologies that came to see the state as inefficient and rent-seeking.  
The relationship between service delivery NGOs and the state is somewhat different. Scott and 
Hopkins (1999:4) point out that many developing countries are poor and lack the resources to supply a 
sufficient level of welfare, even if they would like to. The wake of Structural Adjustment Programmes, has led 
to a delegation of many welfare tasks to NGOs (Farrington and Bebbington 1993; Gideon 1998). NGOs are 
seen in a contractor relationship to the state (in Lewis 2006:184). Gideon (1998) points out that in Latin 
America, NGOs are invited to compete for government contracts alongside private for profit companies. 
Igoe and Kelsall (2005) found that NGOs stepped up service delivery following the demise of state provision 
in Africa in the 1980s.  Barr et al.(2005) concur that Uganda has seen an upsurge in NGO-provided social 
services the 1970s and 80s following the collapse of the government. Perouse de Montclos (2005) argues that 
in Somalia NGOs are replacing the missing state. Similarly, Ben Néfissa (2005) links the lively NGO presence 
in Lebanon to a weak state. This implies that countries with governments unable to provide a sufficient 
amount of developmental services are likely to have a higher presence of NGOs. Conversely, NGOs might 
scale down their services in response to an increase in government involvement. Deeb (2006:174) found that 
in Lebanon Hizbullah scaled down its garbage collection following government take-over of this service, by 
subcontracting it to a private company, Sukleen. A shortfall in government-sponsored public service 
provision could lead to the re-emergence of NGO provision.  
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Kidd (2002:328-329) argues that the provision of welfare services has always been a mixed economy 
with the state, market and voluntary, not-for-profit, philanthropic, mutual aid or informal networks of kin co-
existing. He points out that presumptions that the voluntary sector is superior to the state is a reversal of 
earlier perceptions as the state as the best provider. He argues that the expansion of the state in the early 20 th 
century was seen as the rational solution to social problems.  
NGO service provision can undermine state structures. Tvedt (1998:190-191) cites the Sudanese 
case where NGOs progressively assumed more and more responsibility throughout the late 1980s. NGOs 
supplied social services that were in need and that the state did not supply. The organisations collected fees, 
which affected tax collection negatively, and no lasting administrative government structures were built. 
Mohan (2002) adds, with respect to northern Ghana, that NGOs set up parallel institutions running alongside 
underfunded local government. NGOs in this case are key pillars of strategies that allow for the rolling back 
the state. Edwards and Hulme (1996) raise concerns about the impact of NGO service provision on universal 
coverage, access as well as quality. 
National legal frameworks 
As suppliers of social services, often against the background of insufficient government supply, or as 
campaigners for a certain cause, NGOs have the potential ability to undermine government capacity or to 
rally a support base against governments. Hence, most countries regulate NGO operations. Legislation 
affects NGO operation through the distribution of licenses or permits as well as benefits such as tax breaks. 
Criteria according to which countries legally define NGOs can relate to the organisation’s structural set up as 
well as its objectives or finances.  
A common financial criterion is the so-called distribution constraint, which prevents NGOs from 
distributing profits to their members. Frequently, legislation attempts to prescribe NGOs’ scope of activities 
or location of operation by defining different categories that NGOs must fit into, if they want to operate. 
These classifications often mirror political or national considerations (Tvedt 1998:25-27). British legislation, 
for instance, bars ‘charities’ (which qualify for certain tax exemptions) from political partisanship or political 
lobbying. Thus, NGOs such as Amnesty International have a different legal status in the UK than Oxfam or 
Save the Children. Tvedt expresses concern that NGO criticism of government policy is chilled in order to 
avoid potential conflict with charity law (Tvedt 1998: 220 cites Robinson 1991:176). In Bangladesh the 
government is keen to maintain oversight of internationally funded NGOs and classifies NGOs as ‘without 
foreign support’, ‘local but with foreign support’ and ‘international’. In Ethiopia, by contrast, distribution of 
public funds along religious lines is an important political consideration so NGOs are grouped according to 
Muslim or Christian affiliation (Tvedt 1998:27). Abdelrahman (2004) adds to this the Egyptian case, where 
NGOs are either allowed to operate nationally in a single subject domain (e.g., women’s education), or locally 
across several domains. The author argues that this limits the ability of government opposition to organise on 
a national scale. Wiktorowicz and Farouki (2000:686) observe that Jordanian NGOs are barred from 
operating for “political gains”; those that do engage in formal politics face government sanctions. NGO 
activities in Jordan are hence phrased in terms of charitable or religious obligations. Political organisation may 
have hence to take place under the veil of charitable activity. 
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1.3 Discussing the comparative advantage of NGOs 
Over the past three decades, NGOs have become increasingly prominent actors in international 
development. They have acted independently or as government sub-contractors to supply services including, 
but not limited to: health care, education, drinking water supply, solid waste collection and disposal, forest 
management, agricultural extension, irrigation and watershed management, and microfinance (Abdelrahman 
2004; Farrington and Bebbington 1993; Ghatak 2005; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Tvedt 1998). Increased funding 
and institutional inclusion provided the material context facilitating the rise to prominence of NGOs. In 
addition, it has been argued that NGOs are also superior in providing public services when compared to 
government or private providers. This argument rests on three key assumptions: NGOs are assumed to be 
more cost effective, to be better at targeting and to provide higher quality services. 
Assumption #1: NGOs are more cost-effective 
Service delivery NGOs have often been described as operating more cost-effectively in the 
provision of services than government and private providers. Edwards and Hulme (1996) point to evidence 
from sanitation system development in Pakistan and education and credit schemes in Bangladesh, where large 
NGOs, the Orangi Project in Pakistan and BRAC in Bangladesh, provided services at lower cost than the 
government or commercial ventures (Hasan, 1993, and AKF/NOVIB,  1993 cited in Edwards and Hulme 
1996). However, the authors point out that no general case can be made for cost effectiveness, citing research 
from Brazil, Africa and Asia by Tendler (1989; 1983) and Riddell and Robinson (1992). Cost-effective NGOs 
tended to be large and have highly developed bureaucracies, working in a similar fashion to government 
agencies. Referring to BRAC’s activities in primary education, the authors add that the cost-advantage 
enjoyed by NGOs over government schools may be self-reinforcing, if increasingly effective NGO school 
programs are rewarded with corresponding greater funding, leading to greater economies of scale, and in the 
process eclipsing increasingly unfunded and inefficient government schools. With respect to agriculture 
development projects in Asia, Farrington and Lewis (1993:35-36) argue that NGOs and governments excel in 
different projects. While governments do well in extension services for high productivity areas and Green 
Revolution-type measures such as large-scale irrigation projects or the introduction of fertilisers and new 
seeds and crops, government-run projects do less well in more complex areas. NGOs seemed to be more 
successful in applying participatory strategies; however these only have a local impact and can sometimes lead 
to accusations that the NGO is creating patronage relationships. The authors add that in countries included 
in their analysis, high productivity areas often are cropped by powerful and vocal farmers, and generate a 
majority of the national agricultural surplus.  
Assumption #2: NGOs are better at targeting the poor and working with grassroots organisations 
Paul and Israel (1991:4) argue that since NGOs work with local communities, they are better 
positioned to articulate the preferences of minorities, or special needs of the poor. However, Tvedt 
(1998:130) states that NGOs tend to miss the poorest 5-10% of the population, ratios similar to that of state 
led programmes. Edwards and Hulme (1996) cite research on credit schemes, (Hulme  and Mosley, 1995, 
Farrington and Lewis, 1993:55) and other forms of economic support (Hashemi, 1992; Riddel & Robinson, 
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1992) to argue that NGOs do not reach the most destitute of the beneficiary population. Abdelrahman 
(2004:67) adds that services provided by NGOs are often captured by the upper echelons of the group the 
NGO is meant to help. Clark (2004) argues that the material benefits of religious educational NGOs in 
Jordan are skewed in favour of the middle class. Examining school records from the Charity Society of the 
Jordanian Islamic Center, she found that less than one percent of the organisation’s student population were 
poor students on scholarships, while the remainder were fee paying middle class students. Poor families in 
Jordan receive less help from this charity than from state-run equivalents. On the national level, Dreher el al. 
(2010) find that Swedish NGOs are no better at targeting the poor than Swedish government agencies. The 
assumption that NGOs are close to grassroots has also been questioned since NGOs eschew remote, rural 
areas and prefer to locate in proximity of paved roads and urban centres, creating “development hotspots” 
(Bebbington 2004:728 cites Mercer 2002: 13 and Chambers 1983). With respect to projects of Dutch NGOs 
in Peru and Bolivia, Bebbington (2004) notes that preliminary poverty analyses did not appear to be a primary 
factor in locating projects. Still, a recent large study of NGOs in Kenya found that while convenient access to 
beneficiaries did play a role, NGO locations did correspond to geographical areas most in need of social 
services (Brass, 2012). Bebbington (2004) argues that networks and personal contacts are vital in shaping 
NGO project location, since NGO staff identify and implement projects. Personal contacts may outweigh 
considerations of need, in particular when NGOs do not have the time or means to carry out needs 
assessments.  
Donors themselves do not target the neediest countries. With respect to large, multilateral donor 
agencies, applied literature on aid flows (Collier and Dollar 2002; Harrigan et al. 2006) finds that aid does not 
necessarily or even typically go to the neediest countries, as would be implied by altruist donors, but is 
strongly influenced by political and strategic considerations. Siddique and Ahmad (2012) observe in Pakistan 
that donors’ religious preferences match those of NGOs. Secular NGOs receive donations from international 
secular donors (albeit some of Christian origin), whereas religious, Muslim NGOs usually receive donations 
from Muslim donors. The latter are largely domestic and regional.  
Assumption #3: NGOs provide better quality service 
NGOs are meant to act out of altruistic motives rather than with the aim to accumulate and 
distribute profit. If quality of service is difficult to observe NGOs will commit to high quality since staff is 
assumed to be altruistically motivated and care for the service itself. Beseley and Ghatak (2001:1365) suggest 
that NGOs might be preferred over for-profit sub-contractors to deliver public services because NGOs “are 
perceived to be committed to high quality or serve better some groups due to their religious or ideological 
orientation” (emphasis added). Barr and Fafchamps (2006) found that if an NGO leader has a religious title 
in Uganda, the NGO was more likely to be perceived as altruistic. Unlike private companies, NGOs are not 
maximising profit. Hence, it is assumed since NGOs will not shirk on quality in situations where doing so 
would maximize profits, (Rowat and Seabright 2006). Citing surveys from the UK and the United States, 
Edwards  (2008:63) points out that the public associates non-profits with “authenticity” more than with 
“professionalism”.4 Malani and David (2006) cite research by Schlesinger et. al. (2004) which found that 
between 1985 and 2000 two-thirds of US residents believed that not-for-profit hospital providers were more 
trustworthy but that for-profit hospitals provide better quality. The authors conclude that not-for-profit 
                                                          
4 The UK survey is: ‘Update public view on charity’ from www.thirdsector.co.uk (June 26th 2002) the US American National surveys of 
Giving and Volunteering are run bi-annually and available on www.IndependentSector.org 
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status is not perceived by users as a good indicator of quality. In Uganda, Barr, Fafchamps and Owens’ (2005) 
question the importance of not-for-profit status as a signal for quality on different grounds. They point out 
that while NGOs in developed countries have to prove their non-profit status to avoid corporate taxation, tax 
collection in developing countries is less vigorous, making non-profit status in some developing countries less 
relevant in practice as a signal for quality. Ebrahim (2009) even points to a decline in confidence in NGOs, 
citing evidence that in Brazil, Russia, and India private businesses are more trusted and perceived as less 
corrupt than NGOs. He attributes this to highly visible instances of non-profit failures in those countries. 
Hence, none of the three assumptions discussed seems to apply universally, indicating that there is 
little in NGOs themselves that would make them always more cost effective, better at targeting or more able 
to provide quality services than the government or private sector. 
2 How do NGOs acquire their agency? 
In the preceding discussion, NGO attributes have been discussed without examining how they have 
been acquired by the organisation. NGOs are composed of individuals, whose supposed intrinsic altruistic or 
ideological motivation shapes NGOs’ collective agency. Some authors (Besley and Ghatak 2004; Martens 
2002; Murshed 2006; Rowat and Seabright 2006; Scott and Hopkins 1999) believe that this is the most 
important element shaping NGO agency, which is hence the autonomous expression of staff motivations, 
either self-interested or altruistic. Others (Gulrajani, 2010; Hilhorst 2003; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Lewis and 
Opoku-Mensah 2006) argue that NGOs’ collective agency is the product of context (Abdelrahman 2004:4); as 
well as the underlying agendas that motivate their constituting partners; namely donors and beneficiaries as 
well as NGO staff (DeMars 2005:43). The former are economists, applying economic models developed for 
varying contexts to NGO operations. The latter are anthropologists (Hilhorst, Igoe, Kelsall), political 
scientists (DeMars) or work in the field of development studies (Abdelrahman, Gulrajani, Lewis, Opoku-
Mensah). They favour analyses of specific contexts and narratives of specific NGO projects over models 
applicable to a general case.  Hence the divide in approach is methodological as well as related to the subject 
matter itself.   
Below economic models of NGOs are first reviewed, conceptualising NGO agency as autonomous, 
before reviewing a critique of this approach pointing to the embeddedness of NGOs in host societies as well 
as development aid structures.  
2.1 Economic models 
Economists’ attempts at modelling the internal workings of NGOs have often resulted in an 
application of economic models developed for not entirely analogous contexts. Public choice models of 
collective action argue that if neither the state nor markets supply a desired good or service, an entity 
providing it might be set up through voluntary contributions from potential beneficiaries. The success of 
collective action is then analysed with respect to group characteristics such as size or composition (Baland 
and Platteau 1997; Olson 1965). Industrial Organisation, in particular Principal Agent models have been 
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adapted to represent NGOs offering public services (Besley 2006; Besley and Ghatak 2001). NGOs are seen 
as social enterprises competing for funding from donors. This requires NGOs to file performance reports 
with standardised data similar to for profit companies. As is the case in micro-economic theories of firms, 
NGOs maximise an objective function subject to a budget constraint. The key difference stems from NGOs 
pursuing a goal– selected by management or donors – as an end in itself rather than as a means to maximize 
profits (Glaeser 2003). These models can be situated in “new political economy” or “new welfare 
economics”, which include factors such as asymmetric information into agents’ objective functions previously 
only based on self-interest. They merge considerations of welfare and public economics.  
The new political economy model proposed by Besley (2006) investigates whether the government 
should provide a public service or whether it should subcontract it to an NGO. The model features three 
actors: (1) an NGO, (2) either a government or a donor, and (3) a class of beneficiaries. The decision-making 
process is modelled as a several-stage game played between an NGO5 and either a government or a donor 
(Besley 2006). Crucially, both the government or donor and the NGO value the public service that is to be 
provided. The benefit the NGO and the government derive is intrinsic to the service they provide rather than 
material benefits. It has been termed a “warm glow” feeling in models of altruism (Andreoni 1990; Laffont 
1975) The focus of non-pecuniary objectives drives the conclusions, which stipulate that the agent 
(government or NGO) which values the public service more is also willing to devote most resources to it, and 
should provide it. This argument is essentially the same as a leading argument in favour of privatisation or 
outsourcing, but with intrinsic motivation replacing efficiency.   
In another model, Besley and Ghatak (2001) assume that NGOs are chosen from a pool of honest 
and dishonest NGOs with an exogenously given fraction of dishonest ones. Dishonest NGOs can chose to 
take an initial transfer for a project and be fired once the donor discovers they spent the funds on private 
consumption or can mimic an honest NGO at some cost and spend the rest. The latter strategy generally 
provides maximum fraudulent ‘profits’ if the dishonest NGO is somewhat patient. A mimicking NGO will 
provide some of the public good. The only way of sanctioning an NGO is for the donor to fire it once it is 
revealed that it does not do its job properly. The final outcome depends on the cost of mimicking and the 
fraction of honest versus dishonest NGOs. The authors also assume that religion can be “a proxy for project 
valuation” by the NGO (Besley and Ghatak 2001:1365). If the public service is provided by an NGO with a 
certain ideology or religion, this lessens the government’s valuation of the public service but does not affect 
the valuation of the service by the beneficiaries. In this model, ideological or religious preferences make the 
government less likely to cooperate with the NGO and decrease the possibility of a public-NGO partnership. 
The latter conclusion is inspired by results from empirical studies (Sen 1993), which find that beneficiaries are 
indifferent about an NGO’s ideology However, as the case of a Bangladeshi NGO shows, beneficiaries may 
sometimes value an NGO’s ideology (Farrington and Lewis 1993) or decrease beneficiaries’ valuation. Fawaz 
(2005) for instance points out that some inhabitants of the Shi’a dominated suburbs of Beirut resent 
Hizbullah’s ideological outlook and prefer not to take up services provided by it.  
                                                          
5 The model assumes that this NGO is chosen at random in the first stage of the game. This presumes that the civil servant or 
donor faces a set of NGOs that, to his eye, is constituted of identical organisations. Frequently NGOs are not chosen at random but 
through tendering or application procedure, which leads to NGOs underbidding each other in terms of project costs. Frequently 
NGOs and for-profit contactors have pre-existing contacts in donor circles, which may influence which organisation is awarded the 
project. 
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2.2 NGOs’ agency: embedded rather than autonomous 
Principal Agent or Public Choice models assume that actors’ agency is autonomous, that is to say 
constituted independently of social context. Arguing from a sociological institutionalism standpoint, Gulrajani 
(2010) rejects this assumption and states that agency is embedded in standards of behaviour and norms that 
are based on a collective understanding of what is the correct and right thing to do. Ebrahim (2009) adds that 
agents’ opportunism is also reined in by the actor’s context, which exerts some measure of social control. 
According to Migdal (1988:32) social control can be assessed according to the following three criteria: 
 
 Compliance with sanctions  
 Voluntary participation in institutions  
 Legitimisation: the acceptance of rules from the conviction that they are right 
 
For many NGOs there is an overlap between the organisation’s objective and what constitutes 
morally appropriate behaviour. Jawad (2009:93) found that for the Lebanese NGOs Emdad and Quard el 
Hassan, both affiliated with Hizbullah,  political and human solidarity discourse overlapped: social services 
are part of the resistance, the social is the political. Concurrent with Deeb (2006), Clark points out that in 
Jordan volunteer participants are motivated by a sense of charity, but also by the desire to demonstrate the 
feasibility or even superiority of the Islamic alternative in a political sense (Clark 2004:964). El-Said and 
Harrigan (2009) make a similar point about hospitals run by religious NGOs in Egypt and service provision 
by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.   Hence NGO staff motivation is not completely exogenous but also 
embedded in the organisation itself. 
In addition Abdelrahman (2004:4) points out that political, historical and sociological context 
influence and define the behaviour of NGOs. Instead, factors such as an NGO’s financial clout, political 
power, or an area’s ongoing conflict are eschewed in the models. Investment volumes and ownership 
structures of a service provider may have more to do with country-specific social, political or historical 
contexts than considerations of motivation. What is gained through causal and internally logical deductions is 
associated with other losses in specificity. This approach fails to address “issues of power and conflict, let 
alone those pertaining to development and poverty alleviation”(Bayliss and Fine 2007:3). Indeed one of the 
key concerns for organisational sustainability, the availability of funds is omitted in the models reviewed 
above. Besley and Ghatak (2001: 1345) assume “that the NGO has cash”. However, government resource 
constraints, more than government disinterest in the provision of services, drove instances of pure NGO 
provision of public services in Bebbington and Farrington’s (1993) study of NGOs working in agricultural 
development. In fact, the power to disperse and withdraw funds is donor’s single most powerful tool in 
shaping NGO operations (Ebrahim 2009; Jad 2004). 
The debate between the autonomy or embeddedness of NGO agency is not unlike the sociological 
debate of whether structure or agency is the key determinant of human action. In the present context, 
economists take the capacity of NGO staff to act independently on their intrinsic motivations as the key 
determinant in shaping NGO agency while their critics emphasise that structural context of the organisation 
itself as well as social and political context shape NGO agency. As suggested by Giddens (1984) with respect 
to individuals in his theory of structuration, NGO staff may consciously alter their own motivations and 
objectives as well as their organisation’s operations to fit or resist ambient social and financial structures.  
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This tension between staff mission and donor preferences is discussed by Wallace, Bornstein and 
Chapman (2007:6) who refer to Giddens to define agency not as intention but as the capacity to do 
something. The authors analyse how conditions attached to donor funding shape NGOs and how they 
interact with commitment of NGO staff. 
3 How donor oversight influences NGO operations 
Wallace at al. (2007:35, 111) point out that in response to challenges to their legitimacy and from a 
point of anxiety about impact donors attempt to increase control by introducing funding conditions using 
standardised management procedures, specifically logical frameworks. They point out that, though in use 
since the 1990s, they became ubiquitous throughout the 2000s. Using a theory of change these logical 
frameworks stimulate a series of inputs and activities that would lead to certain outputs. Success is measured 
against a series of indicators and NGOs are required to report on inputs, activities and outcomes as well as 
evolution of indicators. It tightly accounts for spending but not for complex social processes. 
Scott (2003) and Gibson et al. (2007) describe similar changes in funding regimes. They concur that 
donors interpret NGO failures as a failure of oversight. The authors observe a shift from what they call 
‘program’ or ‘core’ funding to ‘project’ funding. Core funding supports organisations in the pursuit of their 
mission, covering basic administration and organisational costs as well as program-related costs. The 
organisation’s program or mission would usually predate the onset of funding. In contrast, project funding, as 
its name suggests, is targeted at specific projects with limits on what the funds can be used for. Core costs, 
such as rent or salaries are often not covered (Carroll, 1992). In addition, funding horizons are shorter and 
renewal is less predictable. Scott (2003) argues that the intention behind the funding shift is to increase donor 
oversight over NGOs. This new funding regime appears to put into practice the repeated interaction game 
developed by Besley and Ghatak (2001) while funders eschew more context specific analyses of success and 
failure. If donor NGO relations are seen as principal-agent problems, in which principals employ agents to 
accomplish a set goal, accounting for project success or failure becomes an oversight problem to constrain 
opportunistic behaviour by agents (Ebrahim 2009). Gulrajani (2010) adds that, if NGO agency is 
conceptualised as autonomous, and either self-interested or altruistically motivated, its control or oversight 
inspires a number of administration practices associated with constant verification, transparency evaluation 
and reporting, with the ultimate threat of loss of funding.  
Ebrahim (2009) calls this a technocratic accountability regime. Wallace at al. (2007) use the term 
rational management. It centres on monitoring and performance-based evaluation, quantifying performance 
so as to demonstrate success. It is technocratic since it relies on skills related to performance measurements, 
evaluations and the measuring of progress towards pre-determined targets. It is coercive in that funders 
condition continued support on adequate reporting and set reporting standards and frameworks, sometimes 
ill-adapted to the idiosyncrasies of projects. Accordingly the key issue to delivering successful development 
projects is reduced from the puzzle of how to improve human and social development to a question of 
oversight and meeting targets. 
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3.1 The impact of monitoring and evaluation on NGO operations 
This technocratic or rational management accountability regime affects project implementation and 
development practice. Wallace et al. (2007:91) argue that donors set the following funding conditions:  
 Design and implementation 
 Funding modalities and accountability systems 
 Content and development purpose 
 Role to be played by the NGO in the process 
Scott (2003) outlines the consequences of project-based funding and donor specified monitoring 
practices at the NGO level. She argues that NGOs experience mission drift, reporting overload, advocacy 
chill, and loss of infrastructure. To this Ebrahim (2009) adds reduced opportunities for learning and 
innovation. Each, except for the loss of infrastructure, will be discussed in more detail below. Infrastructure 
loss is a consequence of short-term funding schedules and refers to NGOs shedding staff and physical capital 
between project periods. This can make the impact of NGOs transitory (Jad 2004) and is the outcome of 
donor reluctance to support long term projects (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Abdelrahman (2004:58) adds that 
short-term funding horizons do not address long-term problems of violence, political instability or chronic 
food shortages. Infrastructure loss with respect to staff will be discussed at the end of the chapter. 
Mission drift, isomorphism and visibility 
Ebrahim (2003:12) argues that due to their funding volume and rigid grant frameworks, centres of 
development expertise such as the IMF and World Bank have the power to define what methodologies to use 
to foster economic and social development. Since large international donors frequently follow international 
development discourse, funds shift over time between areas more or less fashionable. Donors consider an 
NGOs mission in selecting which organisation to fund (Ebrahim, 2009). This offers incentives for NGO 
management to adapt their missions to donor preferences. Wallace et al. (2007:82) find that NGOs develop 
of proposals in response to donor calls even though they may have in house competencies for it. Tvedt 
(1998:82) argues that funds are not distributed to where need is greatest but where NGOs’ mission and 
donors’ interests overlap. Tvedt (1998) adds that by virtue of their common funding resources and 
responding to donor calls for proposals, NGOs tend to exhibit isomorphism. Edwards and Hulme (1996) 
add that large NGOs might displace smaller agencies by dominating resources, which produces a 
monoculture of ideas rather than diversity of opinions, which is supposed to be a feature of a vibrant civil 
society. Instead of building up expertise in an area of local relevance, an NGO’s mission may drift over time, 
while projects implemented concomitantly tend to be very similar. By abiding to demands made by donors, 
such NGOs could begin to resemble “new forms of cultural and economic colonialism” (Lewis and Opoku-
Mensah 2006:670), and rather than being “a sign of vibrant Civil Society”, NGOs become the agents of “a 
changing international aid agenda” (Abdelrahman 2004:25; cites Chabal and Daloz 1999:23) Ebrahim (2003) 
outlines how familiarity with development discourse is key to successful funding applications. This creates a 
role for an expert who can interpret the technical knowledge as well as reproduce the core of development 
language. If NGO workers’ values are embedded within the NGO and its social context, they cannot be 
aligned with project funding since the process takes time and NGO mission thus constituted cannot be 
changed with ever-varying development discourse. Clark and Michuki (2009) find that key complaints by staff 
are related to impediments to the NGO fulfilling its mission, such as tied funding, unreliable funding, donor 
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manipulation, grant competition and lack of coordination between NGOs. Wallace et al. (2007:71) point out 
that funding is increasingly concentrated among fewer larger NGOs with higher capacity, leading to increased 
competition despite on paper cooperation. In fact, donor demands are likely to have a negative impact on 
voluntarism since it restricts volunteers’ ability to participate in shaping an NGO’s agency. Hence, donor 
driven project design may run counter intrinsic motivation of staff. 
Donors seek visibility for the projects they fund and volume of donations is sometimes linked more 
to image and media attention than to actual needs. Emergency activities are more rewarding for an NGO in 
terms of media attention and are less risky since implementation is straightforward and uncontroversial 
(Tvedt 1998:90). Referring to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital, Ebrahim (2003:52) argues that ‘money 
talks’ but is not the only capital that is exchanged between donors and NGOs. Symbolic and reputational 
capital is also transferred between the two. Donors introduce new techniques and concepts that enable 
NGOs to articulate the latest discourse and look good further up the aid chain as well as to other NGOs. 
Donors, on the other hand, rely on NGOs for long running, successful and well-reputed projects. Donor 
demands for visibility in successful projects vary. Ebrahim (2003:66-67) cites the European Commission as a 
donor who wanted unique publicity for a certain project and did not allow the NGO to raise funds from 
other donors without prior (cumbersome and time-consuming) approval. 
Reporting overload 
Ebrahim (2003:99) observes that similar to proposal writing, NGOs hire professionals, graduates 
and PhDs to articulate donor discourse and legitimise NGO work in reporting. Wallace at al. (2007:70) add 
that large NGOs have a significant number of specialist staff who understood the language. Local NGO staff 
consists of those that are familiar with donor rhetoric and know how to link up international and other actors 
rather than those familiar with local problems (Dijkzeul 2006:1140). Further, donors want to make sure their 
donations are used effectively. However, evaluation reports are often written by the same employees who 
implement the projects and wrote its funding proposal. These employees are aware that negative evaluations 
might result in less funding (Ebrahim 2003).  
Edwards and Hulme (1996) state that reporting requirements are increasingly complex and that 
donors expect projected outputs to be achieved or threaten to withdraw funding. Ebrahim (2003:64-65, 67) 
refers to NGO managers frustration with the fact that successful projects for donors are those with auditable, 
quantifiable outcomes that can spend the budget, but that non-auditable positive outcomes will be considered 
failures. They are also aware that projects successful in this respect will make future funding more secure. 
Ebrahim points out that, as a consequence, NGOs are especially reluctant to share criticism. Consequently 
the flow of information between NGOs and donors is tightly controlled. Tvedt (1998:90) argues that 
evaluations are typically more of a reproducing ritual than actual evaluation. Edwards and Fowler (2002) add 
that NGO performance is a construct rather than an ‘objective’ observation. 
Wallace et al. (2007:113) point out that heavy reporting requirements are a concern of NGO staff 
and that it squeezes out time for other types of accountability towards participants. Donors may thus be 
handicapping NGOs comparative advantage by keeping staff away from people they work with. They may 
also push through agendas that NGO staff themselves do not believe in. The authors add that, though 
proposals and paper plans are used to raise funds, they are often ignored during implementation and returned 
to only for reporting purposes. Ebrahim (2009) states that this may be because metrics used in evaluation 
forms are inappropriate for the NGO’s context, or metrics may mask ambiguity or complexity of 
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development projects. In addition, monitoring does not guarantee that an NGO will not find ways to give the 
appearance of satisfying the principal interests while pursuing others, or that an NGO will mimic success. 
Small NGOs with limited staff and resources are especially stretched by evaluation and reporting requests. 
Evidence from Egypt and Jordan shows that donors favour larger, well-established organisations because 
they are more likely to be professional and have a track record of delivered projects (Abdelrahman, 2007; 
Clark & Michuki, 2009).  
Tangible results and little learning and innovation 
Easterly (2002) argues that reporting pressures can prevent NGOs from learning from mistakes. 
Wallace et al. (2007: 113, 114)add that editorial control from NGO management makes sure the ‘right’ kind 
of story reaches the donor and cites NGO staff concerns that eth discussion of problems may lead to a loss 
of fundng. Ebrahim (2003:1) also links systems of reporting to learning; he argues that reporting shapes how 
NGOs think about what they do. He points out that donor requirements promote positivist, quantifiable 
measures of success. He refers to these as product rather than process data, the latter of which evaluates how 
projects are carried out. He argues that this focus on product data has a de-politicising effect since outcomes 
are assumed to be simple and discreet. This makes for easy comparability but ignores social and political 
environments. Indeed, Edwards (1999) points out that the difficulty involved in evaluations is compounded 
by different environments. In his study of NGOs in India and Bangladesh, projects which did worse had to 
operate in a more difficult environment with higher poverty rates, higher infant mortality and a lack of natural 
resources. Field-level process data, which contains information on how objectives were achieved or what 
problems or unintended consequences were encountered, are generally not transferred, nor systematically 
collected or evaluated. Edwards (1999) adds that the focus of donors on success stories leads to the use of 
euphemisms where, for example, project implementation is described as slow rather than fundamentally 
flawed.  
Easterly (2002) argues that this likely leads to the excessive production of glossy reports for donors. 
The author continues to point out that development workers are rewarded, in the form of continued 
donations, for reports that feed back to donors rather than reflect the experience of recipients. Easterly 
further mentions that aid organisations often continue pouring money into projects even if they are 
unsuccessful, because an admission of failure would halt donations. ALNAP (2004) states that this incentive 
structure promotes defensive behaviour by NGOs and an optimistic bias by those compiling reports. 
Consequently, output is re-defined as money disbursed and little effort is spent on true ex-post evaluation of 
projects (Easterly 2002). For example, the Center for Effective Philanthropy in the United Sates and New 
Philanthropy Capital in the UK collect and publicise standardised data on management, experience, and 
funding volume, but not on social changes and transformations (Edwards 2008:69).  
Similar concerns have been raised about the ability of NGOs to innovate. Particular situations 
require specific  ideas to tackle them (Edwards 1999; Easterly 2002). Paul and Israel (1991) see NGOs as 
able to adapt and innovate effectively since they are unhindered by standardised, bureaucratic procedures. 
However, Fowler (1993:335) points out that flexibility on the ground is hindered by donors’ emphasis on 
measurable outcomes set before the start of a project. This runs counter to NGOs supposed institutional 
advantage. The greater emphasis on tangible results forecloses diversity and vibrancy in the NGO sector. 
Performance assessments imply that funding goes to successful projects only, rewarding NGOs that stick to 
discrete data reporting and proven approaches, while potentially punishing those that are more innovative. 
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Wallace at al. (2007:118) add that working with communities takes time while funding cycles are short 
making NGO work more transient and less sustainable.  
Advocacy chill 
Paul and Israel (1991:7) point out that an understanding of development as rectifying skewed 
distribution of power and resources implies a role for NGOs as organisers and campaigners for a more 
equitable allocation of resources, increased participation and the protection of the rights of the marginalised. 
Abdelrahman (2004) and Jad (2004) point out that this conceptualisation of NGOs is necessarily political. 
Referencing his study in India and Bangladesh, Edwards (1999) underlines that institutionalised inequalities 
linked to, for instance, land ownership and gender are changed only with difficulty and meet with fierce 
opposition. He notes that governments, in his case the Bangladeshi government, discourage NGOs from 
organizing their clients into a grassroots membership organisation that could eventually levy political power 
(Edwards 1999:368). NGOs with a radical agenda can be co-opted into mere sub-contractors for projects 
tendered by large international NGOs(Abdelrahman 2004).  
Working for change, without measurable outcomes that can be produced in a short time becomes 
impossible under a project framework and NGO services increasingly favour a technocratic approach to 
development over a political one. Edwards and Hulme (1996) suggest that NGO service provision can thus 
dull more fundamental struggles for changes in ownership structures which require  significant economic and 
political changes. Analysing project proposals of two Gujarati NGOs, Ebrahim (2003:8-11, 17) shows how 
problems of development and poverty are described in terms of natural and environmental constraints while 
avoiding issues of structural disempowerment. He continues that unequal distribution of resources is linked 
to unequal power relationships and that poverty is a political condition and a result of asymmetry in power 
between different classes, not just a resource gap. Edwards (2008:74) points out that tackling these problems 
requires systemic change, which addresses the question of how property is owned and controlled and how 
resources and opportunities are distributed.  
Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006:667) add that employing NGOs generates the perception that the 
policies are “participatory and ‘owned’ by a wider section of the population”. Edwards and Hulme (1996) 
state that wholly pre-planned development projects cannot be truly participatory. Furthermore, NGOs 
formed in response to increased funding will have weak connections to, and support from, a grassroots 
support base. The desire for donor control can lead to conflict with NGOs’ desire to maintain legitimacy with 
their recipients by trying to demonstrate a degree of independence and commitment to their cause. The 
legitimising effort often involves advocacy and lobbying, which might be restricted by donors (Tvedt 
1998:83). The affirmation of an NGO’s authenticity can be crucial for the NGO’s survival, since the 
legitimate claim to the NGO label permits NGOs to claim public representation and achieve cooperation 
with recipients. Without legitimacy NGOs will be ineffectual (Hilhorst 2003:4-8). Due to their dependence on 
donors, NGOs can become “co-opted” (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006:668). Jad (2004) points out that 
with the need to raise funds from international donors, NGOs may come to see their constituents as abstract 
target groups, while their main focus is towards donors, communication with whom is almost exclusively in 
English, increasing international connections at the expense of local ones.  
Thus by framing problems of inequality and poverty as poor coordination or resource allocation, 
requiring better management so as to be able to report positive project outcomes, NGOs may pay little to 
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social relations and political economy (Ebrahim 2003:37). NGOs might even stifle local activism by 
monopolising finance and expertise and have a ‘chilling’ effect on advocacy.  
Clientelism 
Davis (2006) points out that the bypassing of governments to work directly with NGOs gives 
donors a direct presence in developing countries through the intermediary of NGOs. Edwards and Hulme 
(1996) point out that USAID’s funding of NGOs in Central American in the 1980s to various opposed 
political organisations seemed to be an attempt at shaping the NGO landscape. Foreign funding may even 
underpin donor countries’ foreign and domestic interests. International aid plays an important role in 
Lebanon, which receives large sums through the Paris I-III frameworks as well as through bilateral aid, most 
of which is channelled through quasi-governmental offices or NGOs. Similarily, DeMars (2005) observes that 
local elites might use NGOs for competition and reproduction. In Lebanon, Rieger’s (2003) analysis of large 
NGOs linked to specific sectarian factions, lends support to this argument. These funds are often also 
distributed with political affiliations in mind. Alternatively, NGOs may attempt to work outside existing, 
clientelist distribution channels or attempt to independently run their own projects. Donors with political 
ambitions seeking to recruit clients are likely to use social and embedded proceses to hold their clients 
accountable.  
NGOs carry out projects that have been negotiated with their donors’ ideological preferences. 
Donors’ ideological preferences can be reproduced with recipients. This requires time and is hence unlikely to 
be a consequence of project-based funding. However, if the relationship between a donor and an NGO 
endures over a considerable period of time, donors may recruit clients with the funded NGO acting as 
intermediary. Bebbington (2004) argues that the presence or absence of an NGO is linked to social and 
political economic interests. NGOs can be vehicles of patronage and institutionalise vertical power 
relationships between patrons and their clients.  
In his edited volume on patron-client relationships in the Eastern Mediterranean, Gellner (1977) 
describes patronage as informal, unequal and personalised relationships, which are long-term rather than 
limited to a single transaction. Patron and client relationships reflect the participants’ respective differing 
wealth and power. The patron can supply basic means of subsistence such as: access to land, employment and 
inputs, as well as provide insurance in a crisis, or offer protection from violence and competition by 
intervening on behalf of the client. These can be provided through the intermediary of a local charity and 
public services. In exchange the client, in eth present case the NGO, is expected to provide services, other 
than labour these can include organising and mobilising beneficiaries and promote the patrons interest 
(Gellner 1977). In the same volume, Scott (1977) points out that the legitimacy of the patronage relationship 
depends on the perception by the client of how much he benefits from the relationship in relation to what he 
contributes. Khan (1998a) states that clients readily re-negotiate allegiance if another patron offers better 
terms. Historical studies from modern Italy (Cavallo 1995), nineteenth-century Manchester (Shapely 2000), 
and twentieth-century India (Caplan 1998; Haynes 1987; Kidd 2002:338) suggest that philanthropic donations 
can have tangible returns to their donors consisting of political patronage or the acquisition of public office.  
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Resistance to and subversion of donor requirements 
However, while donors demand tightly structured project implementation, Chhotray (2005) argues 
that dichotomous perceptions of NGOs resisting, or acquiescing to, donors are of limited utility. In her study 
of an NGO in Madhya Pradesh she describes how NGO interventions at once resisted government practices 
and delivered services to local communities that were deemed legitimate by the government. Ebrahim 
(2003:95-98) continues to show how NGOs resist donors by seeking to insulate key activities and decision 
processes from donor influence. He notes that NGO managers resent funders’ priorities and what is 
perceived to be their interference. In fact, some NGOs may have considerable independence in the field with 
respect to day-to-day operations of projects due to distance from donors (Chabbott 1999:223). NGOs are 
unwilling to pass on narratives on how they go about development, presumably also to insulate themselves 
from interference (Ebrahim 2003:102). Wallace at al. (2007:173) add that late reporting by NGOs or poor 
accounting can be interpreted as silent resistance or subversion of donor requirements. 
In addition, beneficiaries may suspend co-operation with an NGO, which might harm recipients 
more than NGOs. Edwards (1999:367) cites such a case in his study of four NGOs, two in India and two in 
Bangladesh, where recipients of an Indian charity’s services ceased to work with volunteer staff when they 
were dissatisfied with the staff’s performance. Similarly, Hilhorst (2003) underlines that if recipients do not 
perceive the NGO as legitimate they will not cooperate, while an understanding between NGO staff and their 
recipients can improve NGO work. Recipients are little involved in the decision-making process of the 
NGO; similarly they rarely give direct feedback to donors. Still, if they feel not represented or helped by the 
NGO they might suspend co-operation.  
4 NGO staff 
As a corollary to observations made above, this section reviews the importance of first, NGO staff 
motivation and second donor funding structures, on NGO operations. In particular, empirical evidence is 
reviewed examining the varying motivations of NGO staff and how NGO staff fare under project based 
funding cycles and donor specified monitoring and evaluation requirements. 
4.1 Voluntarism and staff motivation in NGOs 
As noted above, voluntary involvement in NGO work is an important aspect of NGOs. Edwards 
and Hulme (1996) note that volunteers contribute time and effort out of a personal sense of responsibility. 
Principal-agent models assume that NGO work does attract motivated staff who care about the work of the 
NGO, and are willing to accept lower remuneration in exchange for being personally involved in the NGO’s 
mission (Besley and Ghatak 2004; Martens 2002; Murshed 2006; Rowat and Seabright 2006; Scott and 
Hopkins 1999). Therefore NGOs need not offer financial incentives to staff on a similar scale to the private 
sector and are willing to accept lower wages. Empirical evidence on this assumption is contradictory. In 
Pakistan microfinance fieldworkers earn less than employees in the corporate sector and it is the aspiration of 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Introduction to Lebanon 
 24 
many to change jobs in the future (Siddique an Ahmad 2012). However, NGO staff expressed gratitude to 
have a job against the backdrop of high unemployment. In Jordan, too, NGO managers complained about 
low salaries (Clark and Michuki 2009), while in Egypt salaries paid by NGOs are often higher than those paid 
by the private sector (Abdelrahman, 2007). Salary comparisons should be made with caution since all three 
authors collected data from different ranks within NGOs, Siddique an Ahmad (2012) collected data from 
fieldworkers while Clark and Michuki (2009) interviewed managers. Tvedt (1998) found that in Sudan NGOs 
had few staffing problems not because they paid more but because they paid reliably and offered fringe 
benefits such as access to cars and motorcycles. In the Ugandan context, Barr et al.(2005) found that NGO 
staff are better paid for a similar job than government employees. Bayat (1998:164) found that for many 
employees, NGOs simply provided a career opportunity rather than the chance to work for a public spirited 
organisation. 
The conceptualisation of NGO staff motivation as intrinsically altruistic may be overly simplistic 
since workers might be motivated by a variety of factors affecting their performance, including the NGOs’ 
mission but also building a career and networks within the sector. In the case of Islamic women’s 
organisations in Yemen, Clark (2004) points out that participants gain a variety of benefits, such as 
friendships, confidence and skills. Another important factor she points out in particular for the Yemeni 
women’s organisations is the chance to take part in public life in a way that conforms to conservative values. 
In Egypt, NGO workers chose NGO employment due to the varying and intellectually challenging character 
of the work as well as ideological satisfaction from the NGOs mission (Abdelrahman, 2007). Indeed, salary 
and mission considerations need not be mutually exclusive. Siddique and Ahmad (2012) find that for 
Pakistani micro-finance fieldworkers serving their countrymen while also earning a salary is a major incentive. 
In Jordan two-thirds of woman staff interviewed by Clark and Michuki (2009) said they work for NGOs 
because they care about its objective and enjoy having a professional career.  
Fowler (1991) argues that NGO staff might value the continuation of their salaries and the 
institutional survival of the NGO over the well-being of beneficiaries. He adds that, at management level, 
NGOs are often staffed by career professionals from affluent sections of the population who have little 
knowledge of the conditions of the poor. A closer examination of the ranks of NGOs, indicates that NGOs 
are means for the upwardly mobile middle class to gain employment, even a career and make contacts. In 
addition, professional middle classes, dominate moderate Islamist charities in Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and 
Lebanon (Clark 2004; Deeb 2006). Abdelrahman (2007) found that NGOs seem to offer the best job 
prospects for middle class professionals, since basic technical skills (English and computer literacy) are 
required. The lower middle class is excluded by poor state education. By implication, she argues that 
Egyptians working in NGOs are privately educated.  Jad (2004) even speaks of a globalised elite with shared 
values and aspirations.  
Clark (2004) states that a significant portion of private donors and supportive civil servants also 
come from the middle class. Clark (2004) and Abdelrahman (2007) found that in Jordan and Egypt the large 
majority of NGO staff are hired through informal processes, such as personal contacts or recommendations.  
4.2 The casualisation of staff under project funding 
As argued previously, donors are unwilling to fund core costs of NGOs such as salaries. Another 
consequence of project funding, alluded to above as ‘infrastructure shedding’ is the loss of staff between 
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projects and the casual character of NGO employment throughout projects. Siddique and Ahmad (2012) 
observed high staff turnover among Pakistani fieldworkers, hardly a worker had been with any one 
organisation for three years. Abdelrahman (2007) has similar observations for NGO managers in Egypt: most 
jobs were limited to the duration of the project and most contracts ranged from two to three years at a time. 
There are generally no assurances that a contract will be extended, and staff are constantly changing jobs 
within the same NGO as well as between NGOs. The project-based nature of most NGO jobs means that 
there is no space for promotion within the same contract. The heavy reliance of Egyptian NGOs on external 
donors implies that NGOs are not capable of providing secure sustainable careers. Job insecurity is cited as 
the single biggest disadvantage of employment within the third sector. Clark and Michuki (2009) interviewed 
NGO managers in Jordan and found that job insecurity was a frequently mentioned impediment to job 
satisfaction.  
Contract duration is not the only source of job insecurity. Very few NGO staff receive health or 
social security coverage, often in violation of labour laws. None of the Pakistani microfinance fieldworkers 
interviewed by Siddique and Ahmad (2012) receive health insurance, though some nationally operating 
NGOs reimburse bills. Less than 10% of women workers had access to maternity leave. There is no childcare 
allowance and only national NGOs have retirement pension plans. Abdelrahman (2007) and Clark and 
Michuki (2009) observe similar conditions in Egypt and Jordan, where many NGOs have no health care or 
pension scheme for their staff. Abdelrahman (2007) found that health or pension benefits were especially rare 
among NGOs with fewer than 20 staff. Siddique and Ahmad (2012) also found better working conditions at 
larger nationally operating NGOs. Abdelrahman (2007) notes that most staff report not minding the lack of 
medical or social insurance since they would rather not have social security deducted from their salaries. The 
short-term contracts do not allow for significant pension contributions, and personal savings need to be 
accumulated to bridge future periods between contracts.  
Evidence from Pakistan (Siddique and Ahmad 2012) and Egypt (Abdelrahman 2007) shows that 
NGO employees work long hours without overtime pay, in contravention of labour laws, and sometimes 
work in dangerous environments. In Pakistan, fieldworkers felt insecure, owing to the current security 
situation and found the logistics support offered by the NGO, in particular transport, was insufficient. The 
authors note that these working conditions are rarely mentioned in the reporting of most NGOs. Women are 
occasionally subject to harassment without NGOs taking action. In Egypt, NGO staff reported working most 
weekends as well as long hours and going on frequent fieldtrips. Despite being aware of the fact that their 
working conditions do not comport with regulation, none complained or reported this to superiors or 
donors. Abdelrahman (2007) notes that the draconian oversight of NGOs by the state is conspicuously 
absent with respect to labour law compliance. 
While Siddique an Ahmad (2012) report no preference or aversion by NGOs in employing women 
in Pakistan, both Abdelrahman (2007) and Clark and Michuki (2009) found that donors prefer to give to 
NGOs with more women employees. The authors’ conjecture that it is donors’ intention to counteract the 
low rates of economic activity among women in the Middle East.  
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5 Conclusion 
NOGs rose to prominence in response to increased international development finance being 
channelled through non-governmental institutions in the 1980s, spurred by disillusionment with governments 
as lead implementers of large development projects. NGOs are advisors to governments and international 
bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank. Still, the financial capacity of most NGOs remains 
limited when compared to governments, and they rely on governmental and private donors.  
NGOs can be split into membership organisations, also called grassroots or community 
organisations, where members organise to defend their own interests; and intermediary NGOs, which raise 
funds from donors to distribute to, often disadvantaged, beneficiaries. Though both types of organisations 
can and do engage in any kind of activity, membership organisations are more likely to be advocacy and lobby 
groups while intermediary NGOs are more likely to be involved in service provision. Both types of 
organisation can potentially challenge government power, hence national attempts at controlling NGO 
activities through legislation. NGO regulation may limit organisations’ involvement in politics or their ability 
to receive foreign funds as well as restrict their activity to certain geographic areas. 
Donor preferences for NGOs over governments are often justified by arguing that NGOs are more 
cost-effective, though evidence indicates that this is only true for large ones. Secondly, that NGOs are better 
than the state at identifying and targeting the poor, but evidence here has been contradictory, with a number 
of studies finding that NGOs have just as much difficulty as governments do in identifying the neediest 
beneficiaries. Thirdly, NGOs are commonly thought to supply higher quality services, and though trust in 
academic or religiously run institutions is higher, evidence from the US indicates that users believe the private 
sector to outperform non-profit institutions. According to economic models of NGOs, what allows them to 
outperform government agencies or private companies is the motivation of their staff, which allows NGOs 
to pay lower salaries than in government or the private sector. Economic models of NGOs are versions of 
principal-agent models, representing donors as principals, sub-contracting agents for the implementation of a 
development project. Repeated interaction between donors and NGOs is based on the previous performance 
and intrinsic motivation of the NGO.  
Proponents of principal-agent models conceptualise NGO operations as autonomous, constituted 
from the intrinsic motivation of NGO staff, which is also the key factor setting NGOs apart from for profit 
organisations. Alternative conceptualisations of NGO agency see NGO operations as embedded in social 
context and funding structures. This is to say, rather than matching NGOs with autonomous motivations to 
donors with similar aims, donors themselves as well as context shape NGO objectives. Similarly NGO 
worker’s motivations are seen as being constituted within an organisation, rather than merely formed 
independently within the individual. This debate between NGO operations as embedded or autonomous is 
somewhat akin to the sociological one between structure and agency and can similarly be resolved by arguing 
that factors, such as and NGOs context and funding, structure but do not determine NGO operations. NGO 
staff are likely to self-consciously engage and negotiate with donor demands and prevailing social contexts as 
well as their own preferences when designing projects. The relative power of an NGO vis-à-vis a donor is 
likely to determine who will have to make greater concessions, with the balance likely to be tipped in NGOs’ 
disfavour.  
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In particular, changes in donor finance, from core funding to project funding, have affected NGO 
operations. NGOs are subcontracted for a short time-period to implement a project that fits donor guidelines 
and addresses prevalent development discourse reproduced by donors through calls for proposals. NGOs are 
structured by the reporting requirements that specify objectives and timeframe. Problems resulting from the 
shift to project-based funding and reporting requirements include mission drift, isomorphism, and loss of 
expertise in project implementation within NGOs at the expense of reporting requirements, leading to 
reporting overload especially for small NGOs. Complex reporting requirements may not actually fit the 
context of the reporting NGO’s project, in which case the reports sometimes become pro forma -writing 
exercises with little relation to the NGOs actual work. Reporting requirements also prefer positivist, 
measurable data rather than ambiguous narratives about the development process. The threat of not having a 
project renewed, and the need to acquire new projects, creates a strong disincentive for NGOs to report 
mistakes, and may mean that little learning or innovation happens, since NGOs prefer to stick to tried and 
tested processes. Attempting to control an NGO’s work, donors’ desire for efficiency and evaluation, leads to 
a multiplication of reports rather than true evaluation, and learning does often not take place. In addition 
problems of unequal resource distribution in a society sit ill in evaluation matrices and are excluded even if 
they affect development outcomes. This discourages NGOs from engaging in advocacy. Conversely, 
politically motivated donors may use NGOs as intermediaries to support or seek clients.  
NGO staff have a variety of motives in addition to caring for the NGO’s goals themselves, career, 
salary and job security are also important concerns. NGOs often do pay less than corporate counterparts, but 
this in a context of underemployment where and decent job is fiercely contested. NGOs are also more 
prompt in salary payments and may offer fringe benefits such as access to means of transport. However, 
project funding means that NGO workers are increasingly casualised, working on fixed term contracts 
without benefits such as insurance and pension contributions or compensation for over-time. Clark and 
Michuki (2009) point out that few studies exist that examine quantitative data on the percentage of women 
working in NGOs and at what rank of seniority they work. They add that information on educational levels 
of NGOs staff is similarly scarce. One purpose of the present study intends to partly fill this gap. 
The preceding discussion shows that individual motivation and commitment of NGO staff is not 
the key determinant shaping NGO behaviour. NGO staff’s scope in shaping operations is embedded in 
context and constrained by donor conditions. These are two complementary explanations that will be further 
discussed in this thesis. The first, context, refers to historical, social, political and legal factors. NGOs have to 
abide by laws governing them, act in specific political and social structures and operate in a historical context 
that defines which NGO activities are relatively more recent compared to others. How context shapes NGOs 
is one question this thesis seeks to address. The second factor, donor conditions, is found to be a major 
concern for NGOs bidding for funding from donors adopting technocratic or rational management 
accountability regimes. Questions of NGO effectiveness are superseded by insuring NGO accountability. 
This is not to argue that donors should not hold NGOs accountable, but to point out that current monitoring 
and evaluation practices may not achieve their stated aim. This limits the capacity of NGOs to offer 
alternative forms of development. How donors, through their monitoring requirements, shape NGO 
operations is another key topic this thesis seeks to address.  
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6 Introducing the case study: Lebanon 
NGOs are ubiquitous in Lebanon, a small open economy with liberal NGO regulation, making it an 
apt case study for this thesis. Two frequently used attributes used to describe Lebanon are that it is a 
merchant republic (Gates, 1998) and marked by sectarianism (Makdisi, 2000). These attributes are the 
outcome of political and historical processes, which will be outlined below. Lebanon is a tiny (10,400 sq km 
(World Bank 2007)) densely populated country. Three times as many Lebanese citizens live abroad than 
reside in Lebanese. 
6.1 Economic history 
Lebanon’s reputation as a merchant republic stems from its role as trading hub and financial 
intermediary, which from the mid-19th century onwards developed increasingly at the expense of domestic 
productive industries. By the late 19th century the silk economy of Mount Lebanon depended completely on 
France for exports, while it relied on the Syrian hinterland for cereals and livestock supplies. The opening of 
Ottoman markets to European commodities by the British victory over Egypt in 1840 and the subsequent 
reduction of customs barriers led to the collapse of the local textile industry (Gilsenan 1996:73 cites Tamimi 
1916; Traboulsi 2007:22), while the low price of silk meant that no investments were made to move up the 
value chain (Gates 1998:13). Returns in sericulture declined while activities related to the financing and 
exchange of silk commodities such as shipping, insurance, and brokerage prospered (Gates 1998:15). During 
the early 20th century, investments in real estate and finance, increasingly made by émigrés, were preferred 
over silk because of low risks and high returns (Gates 1998:21-22). The silk trade saw the emergence of a 
bourgeois class of merchants and financiers whose wealth grew with foreign trade and services. The 
importance of this merchant/financier class increased after the importance of the silk trade declined and 
Lebanon’s role as an intermediary between the West and the Middle East increased (Traboulsi 2007:46-47, 
56-58; Gates 1998:13-16) With a brief interlude during the Second World War and in the Civil War, the 
Lebanon has acted as an entrepôt trade post and financial intermediary, relying on the export of financial and 
trade-related services and real estate speculation. However, trade, or at least imports, were highly regulated. 
The French Mandate authorities introduced a system of economic concessions and licences to control nearly 
all sectors of economic activity, (Traboulsi 2007:95-97). Corruption dominated the issuance of import 
licences and quotas. Market restrictions from this colonial period remained and were legally enshrined in 
1967, when commercial representation of foreign companies was restricted to an exclusive agent (Traboulsi 
2007:157). Lebanon never fully industrialised and labour released from increasingly capitalist modes of 
production in agriculture could not be absorbed since the fastest growing sectors did not generate many jobs 
(Gates 1998: 143). As tertiary activity replaced commodities production, unemployment rose and emigration 
has been a prominent feature of the Lebanese labour market since the mid 19th century (Gates 1998:109). 
Banking secrecy was introduced in 1956 and by the 1960s banking was a major industry in Lebanon 
(Dib 2004:99). Funds were deposited with Lebanese banks following nationalisations by socialist regimes in 
Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Beirut gained financially from the demise of Palestine, as Palestinians transferred funds 
into Lebanese banks and international aid started to be channelled through the Lebanese financial system 
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(Gates 1998:95). In addition, tourism and education emerged as among the most dynamic elements of the 
service sector (Gates 1998:118). The vast majority of the profits were absorbed in the commercial and 
financial centre of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Banks did not lend to the productive sector but preferred to 
trade in gold, speculate in foreign currency and advanced commercial short-term loans to, among others, the 
World Bank and the Indian government. (Traboulsi 2007:156; Dib 2004:97).  
The unequal distribution of the benefits of the mid-twentieth century boom created disaffection, 
especially among Muslim sections of the population who represented a much smaller share of the middle 
classes and elites. They were less well-educated, and Christian dominance in government bureaucracy as well 
as the private sector, and the clientelist system where patrons prefer to appoint co-religionists translated into 
poor employment prospects for Muslims (Johnson 1986:33). These social inequalities no doubt played a role 
in the Civil War (1975-1991). Johnson (1986:225) argues that already before the Civil War Lebanon’s role as 
intermediary had begun to decline as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States built direct relations with Europe and 
the United States. Lebanon is unlikely to ever regain its pre-Civil War position, despite the persistence of the 
image of Lebanon as a free and open broker.  
The post-Civil War period was dominated by new elites either from the business sector, some of 
whom had made their fortunes abroad, or from Civil War militias. While the most dynamic economic sectors 
were dominated by Christian families before the war, the Sunni community came to dominate notably the 
financial services sector. This shift also translates into the political realm, with Muslims and in particular 
Sunni Muslims gaining more political representation through the Ta’ef accords of 1989. Rieger (2003) states 
that while old elites had used access to politics to secure rents and advantages in business, the new elite 
increasingly uses political power to generate new rents and gain business from the public, most prominently 
via reconstruction ventures but also through infrastructure and utility contracts. In addition, the emancipation 
of the Gulf States means that Lebanon lost its privileged position as a financial intermediary. Instead, it 
became dependent on financial inflows in the form of remittances (25% of GDP (Eid-Sabbagh 2007:67)) and 
foreign aid.  
Four reconstruction programmes6, spanning more than a decade from 1993-2007 were launched for 
the total sum of 30 billion US Dollars7. The programmes were several times adjusted to accommodate 
sectarian or patronage interests and rarely discussed in public institutions like parliament or the cabinet. The 
programs’ focus on physical and real estate reconstruction had no real impact on the economy (Hamdan 
2000:71). In addition, the reconstruction effort was skewed in favour of Beirut and its surroundings at the 
expense of other regions (Makdisi 2004:149-150). Corm (1998) and Hamdan (2000) criticise the 
reconstruction plans as undertaken with overly optimistic estimates of GDP growth. Corm (1998) asserts that 
policy makers misjudged the level of affordable indebtedness and while the 1995 budget scenario predicted a 
sharp decline in debt by 2003 and a surplus for 2005, instead the debt exploded in the late 1990s, and leaving 
Lebanon one of the most indebted countries worldwide. In 2006 the gross public debt reached 182% of 
GDP, though it has since declined to 137% (Ministry of Finance 2012). The post-Civil War monetary policy 
was one that encouraged international confidence (Gates 1998:9) Key monetary policies were and still are 
stabilising the Lira at the cost of high interest rates and with it high debt service. This also led to expensive 
credit at the domestic level, making investments costly (Hamdan 2000:72). Numerous authors (Leenders 
                                                          
6 The national emergency and recovery program 1993-1995, the program of reconstruction and development 1993-1997 ,Horizon 
2000 and Horizon II (Hamdan 2000:71) 
7 These are 2000 prices.  
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2004b; Fattouh and Kolb 2006; Gaspard 2004; Makdisi 2004) conclude that Lebanese financial stability was 
purchased at major economic cost in terms of failing growth rates, high debt and high unemployment.  
The wage share in factor income declined from a pre-war 50-55% to 15-25% after the war (Dibeh 
2005:10). Between 1990-1999, indirect taxes doubled as a percentage of GDP while direct taxes have nearly 
halved and average real salaries in 1997 were still lower than in 1966 (Makdisi 2004:149-150). No active social 
policies, with the exception of two increases of the minimum wage, were enacted (Nahhas, 2012). The 
government is an important employer in Lebanon, with 20% of the labour force (Leenders 2004a:8). Wealth 
distribution is regionally unequal, with the central areas of Beirut and Mount Lebanon more prosperous than 
peripheral regions of the North, Bekaa and South. Household survey data from 2004 and 2007 shows that as 
the North, Bekaa and the South suffer from higher rates of poverty than Beirut and Mount Lebanon (El 
Laithy, Abu-Ismail, & Hamdan, 2008). 
6.2 Government institutions  
Marked differences in wealth exist between Lebanon’s main sects or confessions. However, these 
differences are sometimes overstated. Ussama Makdisi (2000:6) sees sectarianism as a practice that arose in a 
climate of transition and modernising reform in the 19th century. The political transformation of the Tanzimat 
reforms privileged religious community as a category for social organisation and access to power. Traboulsi 
argues that religious sects function as “enlarged clientelist networks” (Traboulsi 2007:viii) through which the 
competition for power and socio-economic benefits is articulated. These informal institutions dominate 
formal, constitutional centres of decision-making, namely parliament and the council of ministers. Traboulsi 
argues that it is the ambition of each prominent figure of a sect to become its unique political representative 
(2007:233). The position at the top of each sect, which can be understood as a pyramid with various classes of 
labour as its base and the professional classes as its middle, virtually guarantees access to government office. 
The founding document of the Lebanese Republic, the National Pact of 1943, institutionalised the 
split of governmental office according to sect, with the presidency being allotted to a Maronite Christian, the 
post of prime minister to a Muslim Sunni and the least important office of speaker of parliament to a Muslim 
Shi’a. The National Pact was updated following the Civil War by the Ta’ef Accords, which increased the 
power of the Sunni prime minister and the Shi’a parliamentary speaker relative to the president and made the 
distribution of parliamentary power between Muslim and Christians more equitable. Makdisi and Sadaka 
(2003) point out that the sectarian formula is also informally applied to cabinet posts, which are distributed 
among the six largest religious communities. Meanwhile, the remainder of Lebanon’s 18 officially recognised 
sects are understood to receive their share of posts at every other level of government. Government 
resources are distributed in a similar fashion, since members of parliament or other officials gain support 
through their ability to distribute patronage in the form of government jobs or favourable planning decisions 
to their constituents. Mistrust between confessions, rather than being resolved, is expressed through an 
insistence on veto powers, consensus or large majorities, all of which lead to what Leenders (2006:193) calls a 
“quasi-permanent institutional gridlock”. When disagreements arise between the president and the prime 
minister, serious cabinet crises with sectarian overtones ensue (Makdisi and Sadaka 2003).  This makes any 
kind of long-term policy-making, regarding, say, regulation of economic development programs, politically 
impossible and favours short-term improvisation, and encourages the adoption of informal institutions 
(Leenders 2006; Makdisi 2004). In terms of economic policies, the persistent political stalemate and the 
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inability to agree on or implement policies results in a political economy system usually mistaken for laissez 
faire. In fact the Lebanese economic order is neither an intentional policy nor characterised by free market 
exchange. Rather it is marked by informal processes such as haphazard licence procedures, personal contacts 
or wasta8 and highly restricts access to economic opportunity (Leenders 2006:191-192). 
Foreign interests in Lebanon 
An important feature of the Lebanese political set up is the prominence of foreign actors. In terms 
of volume, Saudi Arabia and France are usually the biggest donors (Hamieh and Mac Ginty 2008; Jomaa 
2007). The government as well as the opposition enlist outside support. This leads to a relationship of mutual 
use and abuse in which foreign powers manipulate local actors and local actors call on foreign support to 
underpin their claim to power. Khalili (2006:65) adds that another foreign conflict, the increased competition 
between US Arab allies in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan) and Iran may play itself out in the 
Lebanese political arena. The United States’ aim is to integrate Lebanon in the pro-American fold of Arab 
States, and support the March 14 coalition. Saudi Arabia is unofficially bankrolling the Lebanese state, 
depositing hard currency with the central bank whenever the Lira is under pressure. Saudi Arabian 
competition with Iran is played out via the latter’s support for and bankrolling of Hizbullah, who, in alliance 
with Amal, attempt to be the sole representatives of the Shi’a community.  Though Hizbullah readily admits 
Iranian support, the degree of closeness between the partners is much disputed, from assumptions that 
Hizbullah is an Iranian stooge to declarations that the party of God is independent and merely consults with 
Tehran. El Husseini et al. (2004:206) state that Hizbullah’s annual revenues from Iran stand at US$1 billion, 
excluding military and resistance spending.  
6.3 Clientelism 
Elites from each sect legitimise themselves through the allocation of government benefits and 
funds to their constituents, mostly but not exclusively, co-religionists. This in turn dominates the logic of 
political decision-making, which is extremely concerned with the perception of fair partitioning of material 
benefits among the sects. Political elites, deriving their power from their ability to serve their constituents, 
have no interest in secularisation or the universal application of any type of policy be it the availability of 
health care, schooling or a universal civil law code, covering issues such as family law or environmental 
regulations.  
More recently, Makhoul and Harrison (2002:614) state that in order to campaign for infrastructure 
projects, such as rainwater collection tanks, the “more powerful of the local men compete for access to 
available funds, often using wasta”, via the intermediary of a powerful family. Favours are granted in exchange 
for support. The authors argue that using connections is the most efficient way of getting things done. The 
authors echo Gilsenan’s (1996) argument of vested elite interest in the patron client system and state that 
powerful families have no interest in having the government fulfil their clients’ demands through the 
provision of universal access to services, since it increases the family’s legitimacy and is a way for them to gain 
social control over their clients. Similarly, Makhoul and Harrison (2002)state that interviewees’ attitudes 
                                                          
8 Wasta can be translated as intercession, or using contacts to intervene on ones behalf to produce a favourable outcome, outside 
formal administrative structures. 
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towards wasta is ambivalent. In particular those without access to wasta and hence less power to attract 
privilege, blame the government for idleness and neglect of their concerns.  
Johnson (1986:5-6) points out that in the Lebanese clientelist system the dominant social class to 
which patrons usually belong manipulates and divides the masses on whose exploitation they depend. The 
author argues that since patrons and clients themselves often interpret their relationship in terms of 
redistribution and exchange, where a patron genuinely believes he is supporting a client who is genuinely 
grateful, the diverging class interests of the two actors are not immediately apparent. 
In order to maintain a large clientele it is essential to be regularly elected into government office. 
The status of a position is directly linked to amount of material benefits, such as contracts for public works 
and services, it gives access to. This influences the ‘ranking’ of ministries, with service-disbursing ministries 
particularly sought out. In order to survive electoral defeats, patrons need to be wealthy in their own right so 
as to be able to continue serving their clients even when out of office. Since access to the state is crucial for a 
patron to maintain his or her status position, political competition for government office is strong. Khan’s 
(2000) description of factional competition in Bangladesh strongly resembles that in Lebanon, where the 
bargaining power of a faction depends on the number of people who can be mobilized to vote but also to 
participate in large scale demonstrations  and strikes as well as coercions and the occasional violent face-off.9  
In their anthropological micro-studies, Gilsenan (1996) and Johnson (1986) both refer to instances 
where clients maintained affiliation to a patron despite the fact that alternative affiliations might have better 
served their interests. Both authors point to social practices, such as visits, presence at weddings and funerals, 
enquires and knowledge about family members, but also narratives of honour and obligation that go beyond 
mere material transfers and establish social, non-material ties between patron and client. In addition to 
loyalty, ideology may play no unimportant part in a client’s party affiliation. Political parties in Lebanon 
represent genuinely different interpretations of Lebanese history, present and by implication future policies. 
Loyalty and ideological preferences may be interpreted as markers of social identity and belonging which 
might override individual self-interest. The Appendix (p. 148) includes an inventory of important Lebanese 
families and their intermingling with government and business. 
6.4 Social service provision 
Lebanon does not have a coherent and comprehensive system for social protection (El Masri 2007). 
The Lebanese government does provide some social services to its citizens. However, Jawad (2009:170) states 
that Lebanese have low expectations of government services and believe that one needs wasta to benefit from 
them. More than half of resident Lebanese are without health insurance or retirement schemes and NGOs 
play a major role in providing social assistance to those cut off from formal protection systems (El Masri 
2007). Slightly more than a third (37%) of insured Lebanese are covered through the National Social Security 
Fund (NSSF), the Army, Internal Security Forces or civil servants cooperative. 10% are privately insured, 
either at their own cost or through their employer or a syndicate. The NSSF excludes some of the most 
vulnerable, namely the unemployed, agricultural workers, and own-account workers (El Masri 2007). 
Lebanese are entitled to care at hospital emergency rooms and their hospitalisation in private as well as public 
                                                          
9 It is worth pointing out that sectarian strife as a source of conflict within Lebanon can be overstated, Rodenbeck (2007) points 
out that some of the most “vicious political sniping” takes place within sects, some of Hizbullah’s sharpest critics are Shi’a within 
the Amal movement while the Christian camp is also split. Makdisi (2004:167) argues that sectarianism is a relatively modern 
phenomenon and while it existed in Ottoman times it was not defining political camps. 
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hospitals is theoretically covered. However, in practice the tertiary care of the uninsured is assessed by 
hospitals on a case-by-case basis and the patient may only receive basic or palliative care. Government 
coverage does not include primary care or medical exams (El Masri 2007). Private hospitals are key providers 
of health care and 75% of public health expenditure goes to re-imbursement for private health care services 
(Jawad 2009 cites Ghaleb 2000:11). For a developing country, Lebanon’s health expenditure is high, at 7%  of 
GDP in 2010. However, private expenditure on health care outweighs public expenditure (World Bank 2012). 
As for education, only 39% of students in Lebanon attend state schools ((Makhoul and Harrison 
2002:616). Schaery-Eisenlohr (2005:224) attributes this to the pervasiveness of private schools. Both state 
and private schools usually require the payment of fees, though in theory state elementary education should 
be free. However state schools are, with fees of $133 a year, much more affordable than private schools 
where primary school fees for a school run by the Shi’a NGO al-Mabarrat cost $1,000 a year while standard 
private school tuition is $6,000-12,000 a year (Deeb 2006:89). On the other hand, at the level of tertiary 
education, the public Lebanese University enrolls 60% of all university students (Makdisi 2004:152). The 
quality of education in state schools is lower than in private establishments due to overcrowding, poorer 
facilities and less-qualified teachers. Jawad (2009:169, 171) argues that parents wanting their children to 
receive good education but who cannot afford a private school may put them in care (an orphanage) so that 
they will be subsidised by MoSA and receive a better education.   
6.5 Conclusion 
Reports assessing Lebanese economic performance praise the outward-looking character of its 
economy. Lebanon is heralded as surviving on financial services and tourism. Rampant unemployment, a 
spiralling debt, and widespread corruption are typically blamed on bad institutions. The country’s economic 
order and the direction and pace of its development are critically shaped by the material interests of powerful 
elites, whose configuration and power in society is historically specific.  
The role of the Lebanese state is, willingly or not, small in terms of social service provision. The 
resources it distributes seem not to be disbursed according to the criteria of need but according to 
considerations of political influence and affiliation. The benevolent, social welfare maximising concept of a 
state does not apply to Lebanon. The government is if anything a scene for elite competition and 
reproduction, not one of re-distribution or citizen participation. The unsteady provision of public services 
cedes aspects of sovereignty to the sects via affiliated private providers Though the scant provision of public 
services in Lebanon is also very much linked to budgetary constraints imposed by high debt, it is also the 
outcome of the Lebanese political system which relies on informal processes that institutionalise 
sectarianism and favour distribution along these lines. 
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III. Methodology 
This dissertation is animated by a key question: ‘What shapes NGO operations?’ Though any 
response to this question is unlikely to be exhaustive, the literature review has raised a number of potential 
answers: First, NGO staff motivation can be considered a key driver of NGO operations. Second, donors 
attempt to prescribe project scope and scale; and third, NGO are shaped by and reflect the prevailing social, 
political and economic conditions they operate in. These three are not a comprehensive list of factors 
influencing NGO operations, beneficiary preferences are an important omission.  
The first of these, staff motivations are not directly observable; observed instead are implemented 
projects or programs. These have of course been influenced by the NGO’s context and donor demands, 
which NGO staff, if asked directly may not admit to. This dissertation hence analyses the influence of context 
and donor demands on NGOs, using Lebanon as a case study. NGO staff and their motivations will be 
analysed in more detail as a corollary to these two key points.  
This chapter will first outline in more detail the research questions tackled by this dissertation, 
before discussing in more detail the ontological assumptions underlying the methodology used to tackle the 
research questions. The third section will discuss in detail the secondary as well as primary data used in this 
dissertation. The last section concludes with shortcomings and potential biases of method and data used.  
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1 Definitions and research questions 
1.1 An attempt at defining and classifying NGOs 
As alluded to in the introduction, NGOs are difficult to define and categories difficult to delineate. 
DeMars (2005:6) observes that distinguishing NGOs in categories of classification might hide more than 
reveal and diverts attention from how NGOs operate to achieve results while obscuring the influence of 
context. Igoe and Kelsall (2005:8) argue for a re-conceptualisation of NGOs that does not merely focus on 
organisational features or objectives. They argue that rather than assuming NGOs have “universally intrinsic 
qualities”, NGOs reflect the socio-historical conditions of the locale in which they operate. Similarly Hilhorst, 
rather than attempting to devise a definition for all NGOs, considers any organisation that calls itself NGO 
as such. In doing so she draws attention to the fact that that the NGO label bears a claim, but not necessarily 
a reality that fits into a definition (Hilhorst 2003:4-8). Hilhorst’s approach to NGOs focuses particularly on 
internal dynamics. This is possible due to the logic of her own research which traces the evolution of a single 
Filipino NGO rather than attempting to create a framework that allows for the comparison of many. 
Similarly studies by Ebrahim (2003), and Igoe and Kelsall (2005) focus on specific cases or countries and 
come to more conflicting conclusions, where what might be true for an NGO in a certain context does not 
apply to one facing different working conditions. Similarly Wallace et al. (2007:77) make no attempt to divide 
NGOs into a neat typology, but found that key criteria emerged during their research. Tvedt (2006) laments a 
lack of theoretical vigour and an excess of anecdotal evidence in NGO research. However, one might argue 
that the particularistic and hybrid nature of NGOs, the fact that much evidence pertaining to them is not 
universally applicable but depends on the political and economic context, is at the origin of the theoretical 
vagueness Tvedt deplores. 
As have Wallace et al. (2007) and Hilhorst (2003), this study will use a similarly context driven, non-
universal approach to defining and categorising NGOs. Any NGO that defined itself as such and could be 
found in any of the registers discussed in this chapter was considered as such. International NGOs are those 
that are Lebanese chapters of internationally operating organisations, while local NGOs only have offices in 
Lebanon. International approaches to defining NGOs have been briefly discussed in the Introduction (on p. 
2) and a contextualised discussion of NGOs in Lebanon follows in chapter 4 (from p. 56 onwards). 
Donors are a second category that requires definition for the purposes of this study, particularly 
chapters 5 and 6. Any individual, organisation or government disbursing funds to an NGO is considered a 
donor. Chapter 5 considers a wider range of funding sources to NGOs compared to chapter 6. Specifically, 
membership and service fees are briefly discussed (see p. 91 onwards), while chapter 6 focuses largely on 
institutional donors. A typology and discussion can be found in chapter 6 (from p.115 onwards). 
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1.2 Research questions 
In detail the question of what shapes NGO operations in Lebanon translates into two research 
questions with sub-propositions. Propositions, unlike hypotheses, in this context should not be understood as 
mutually exclusive but adding to a mutable body of knowledge about NGOs.  
RQ1: What shapes NGO operations? 
Proposition 1:  Context  
This dissertation proposes, as have many studies before, that multiple contextual factors, such as 
legislation or prevalent development discourse, shape NGO operations. By tracing Lebanese NGOs 
evolution over time and across sectors, this dissertation analyses various statements made in the 
literature, such as whether NGO foundations are influenced by foreign aid, how the Lebanese 
government regulates NGOs and whether they operate as government subcontractors or are better 
at targeting poor populations. It also analyses idiosyncrasies of the Lebanese NGO sector, such as 
the prevalence of family NGOs.  
 
Proposition 2:  Donors 
This dissertation further proposes that donors play a key role in shaping NGO operations. 
Accordingly, NGO characteristics (e.g., size, age, and sector of activity) are likely to vary from donor 
to donor (e.g., international donors, national or local government, private individuals and 
organisations). This dissertation will tease out to what extent observed NGO characteristics differ 
across donors and, by implication, what kind of NGOs are preferred by what kind of donors.  
RQ2:  How do donors shape NGO operations? 
Proposition 1:  Donors shape NGO operations through project funding and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices 
This dissertation proposes that project funding and accountability regimes based around monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) used by donors, structures NGO operations. NGOs are funded on a project 
rather than mission basis and staff reports on pre-determined project outcomes. It is argued that the 
structuring dynamics of these various accountability obligations impact NGO operations and may 
affect their humanitarian objective. It is this humanitarian objective that that has been discussed as 
NGO agency and commitment in the literature review.  
 
Corollary:  An outcome of the project funding regime is staff casualisation and potential loss of intrinsic motivation  
This dissertation argues that short term funding cycles imply that NGO employment is increasingly 
insecure, impeding job satisfaction and potentially damaging to staff motivation. 
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2 Research design 
Pragmatically, the choice of research methodology employed in this dissertation is motivated by the 
research questions. However, ontological assumptions, in addition to research questions, shape 
methodologies and what is considered valid evidence or good data. This section discusses two extreme poles 
of ontological assumptions, considering human action as either autonomous or embedded; these have briefly 
been alluded to in the previous chapter. It is outlined how the two poles may be reconciled, referring to the 
critical realist approach (Lawson 1997). The methodological approach employed in this dissertation is 
specified. 
2.1 From ontological assumptions to research methodology 
In terms of academic discipline this thesis has been compiled within an economics department. 
Economics has often been situated at one end of the social science spectrum, with anthropology on the 
other. Though Bardhan and Ray (2008) are careful to underline that none of the disciplines are monolithic, 
they consider the underlying dichotomy of ontological approaches to human action as a useful metaphor to 
contrast methodologies. The opposing poles of these two disciplines offer a good illustration of the variety of 
methodological approaches that exist within the social sciences. Various disciplines seek to describe and 
analyse different phenomena, but also differ in their assessment of what characterises a good explanation. 
Most social sciences centre on explaining human action and interaction; in this context, ontological 
assumptions concerning the degree of human agency and autonomy are critical.  
Debating ontologies 
Bardhan and Ray (2008:6) contrast two assumptions, one of which they attribute to economists and 
the other to anthropologists: the economics-associated assumption of autonomy, that individuals act 
independently within social constrains – and the anthropology-associated assumption of embeddedness – that 
human actions are influenced by the same social structures that bound their agency.10 One’s school of 
thought on the nature of human agency influences one’s choice of unit of analysis. That is to say, the unit of 
analysis encompasses either the individual or larger social structures, such as households, communities or 
entire polities. Economists in particular, the authors argue, take autonomous individuals as a unit of analysis 
and explain societal changes as the aggregate result of individual choices, made on the basis of exogenously 
given and stable preferences. Referring to Taylor (1988) Bardhan and Ray (2008:6) describe this 
methodological individualism as a ‘thin’ theory of human behaviour: precise, parsimonious and claiming 
predictive power.  
Methodological individualism is coupled with realist ontologies that assume phenomena exist 
independent of the researcher. Within these, Blaikie (2000) distinguishes between inductive and deductive 
methodologies. Inductive methodologies accumulate a large number of observations, generalise on their 
                                                          
10 Though there is an economic school of thought called structuralists, from the 1980s. Structure there refers to national 
economic structures requiring change, within which agency is constituted. 
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basis, and epistemologically assume that it is possible to ascertain the truth of an assumption. Deductive 
methodologies test theories to eliminate and corroborate hunches, and epistemologically assume that reality 
can never be fully ascertained. 
Anthropologists critique precisely the assumption that choice-making units, be they households or 
individuals, are autonomous and hold exogenously formed preferences. Indeed, referring to work by 
Bourdieu and Foucault it is argued that preferences unavoidably reflect culture and power. Therefore enquiry 
solely at the level of the individual is deemed insufficient. Since individuals are embedded in social and 
political relationships, those relationships require analysis and description if social phenomena are to be 
satisfactorily described (Bardhan and Ray 2008). Methodologies which attempt to discover underlying 
mechanisms by explaining observed regularities are termed retroductive or abductive (Blaikie 2000). Bardhan 
and Roy (2008:6) as well as Blaikie (2000)  reject the assumption of a neutral observer or researcher, but point 
out that the researcher’s presence will shape responses and that subtext implicit in social interaction can be as 
important information as those that are explicitly articulated. Since all observations are presumed to contain a 
certain bias, data is gathered that does not necessarily require the respondents’ cooperation, such as fieldnotes 
from case studies, which contain more reflexive meta-data. 
From ontology to epistemology 
Thus, diverging ontological assumptions of how social choices are constituted and what role 
researchers play in gathering data, lead to different epistemologies of what makes a good explanation or how 
and on what level social phenomena are best described. This has implications on what is considered valid or 
good data and what is not. While economists prefer quantitative analysis of statistical datasets, aggregating a 
large number of individual observations, anthropological studies focus on collecting qualitative data through 
case studies containing few observations (Bardhan and Ray 2008:11-12). The kind of data collected also 
differs: information for statistical datasets is positivist and gathered through structured surveys or from 
government registers. Bardhan and Ray (2008) argue that case studies may yield better insights in human 
behaviour, but the ‘thick’ data collected in this way can be generalised only to a limited extent. Quantitative 
data, on the other hand, covers many more observations and in conjunction with the ceteris paribus assumption 
makes generalisation easier. The authors point out that the ‘thinness’, parsimony and also elegance of 
quantitative analytical models stems from the adoption of ‘Occam’s razor’ from the natural sciences. Occam’s 
razor postulates that the simplest possible, among equally valid theories should be used to correctly describe 
the observed outcome. In terms of research strategy the focus on certain data and omission of other, 
considering the universe of human action as a closed system, constraints serendipity. This limits the 
opportunity for stumbling upon elements not initially considered or theorised. The exclusion of some 
explanatory variables as ‘insignificant’ is deemed reductionist. For example, more qualitative methods 
describe how power operates and manifests itself in multiple ways, while quantitative data would measure it 
through positive observables such as poverty, which conceptualises power as a standing condition. Bardhan 
and Ray (2008:10) cite Lipton (1992) who argues that economics is primarily concerned with outcomes while 
anthropology focuses mainly on processes.11  In addition, while realist methodologies that seek to generalise 
or test theories can rank hypothetical policy options in ceteris paribus conditions, few can answer ‘why’ 
                                                          
11 Bardhan and Ray (2008) themselves are quick to recognise that economists themselves have criticised this preoccupation with 
equilibrium analysis at the expense of theorising how transitions take place.  
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questions, such as why certain social conditions exist in the first place. This makes quantitative data analyses 
more able to offer policy recommendation and is correspondingly more popular with policymakers. 
Reconciling opposing approaches 
Bearing in mind that the dichotomy between economists and anthropologists is presented above as 
an illustrative metaphor rather than a sufficiently nuanced presentation of reality, it nevertheless demonstrates 
how methodological approaches in the social sciences can be located between two poles. One based on the 
assumption of individual autonomy which describes reality as the aggregation of individual choices, and 
which in terms of research methodology prefers the individual as the level of analysis. The opposing pole 
assumes that individuals’ choices are embedded and shaped by the social structures they operate in, and that 
their description is necessary to understand reality. These two approaches are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  
Lawson (1997, 2003) reconciles the opposing ontologies by proposing a critical realist approach, 
where underlying mechanisms and structures, even if not directly observed, are assumed to shape individuals’ 
motivations and preferences. Critical realism accepts that empirical observations can be made independent of 
the presence of a researcher, but proposes that underlying forces exist, which structure these observations. 
For instance, a number of empirical, quantitative studies demonstrate the relationship between poverty and 
single parenthood (reviewed in Hardisty 2008). While critical realists accept this correlation as an observed 
empirical regularity, deducing from it that poor parents should be convinced to marry so as to alleviate 
poverty, may be short-sighted. As a case in point, Boo (2003) demonstrates the failure of a policy aimed at 
promoting matrimony among poor Americans. The author’s unveils that underlying factors, such as very low 
paid casualised work, lack of public infrastructure or social services and plain discrimination, offer a more 
convincing explanation of why poverty persists than singledom. Hence a critical realist approach involves 
both the positivist analysis of empirical data, as well as attempting to unveil underlying mechanisms that 
produce these structures, using retroductive methodologies. Epistemologically, while reality can be observed 
and modelled, knowledge about underlying structures cannot be complete but is changing and subject to 
additions and revisions.  
A brief note on sample selection  
Bardhan and Ray (2008) point out that a general problem of the social sciences, inherent in all 
methodologies but more readily admitted in realist, quantitative ones, is sample selection and the question of 
whether the sample or case study is random or self-selected. Inference problems linked to omitted variables 
or reverse causation arise in both quantitative and qualitative studies. Since by definition social sciences data 
stems from social observations rather than controlled experiments, alternative hypotheses are difficult to 
eliminate or even to stipulate. Duflo (2006) and Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2007) argue that research 
design in experimental economics is increasingly sophisticated and that pilot stages of social policy initiatives 
occasionally include treatment as well as comparison groups. Duflo (2006) cautions that differences between 
groups can be due to pre-existing unobserved differences rather than the policy at issue; however she argues 
that in large samples random selection of groups should make this negligible. Duflo (2006) admits that in 
practice randomisation is frequently impossible. Since structuralist approaches are less concerned with making 
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generalised claims and some do not seek to establish causal links, sample selection is often purposive and 
selection problems are epistemologically of lesser significance.  
My research 
This dissertation adopts a critical realist approach. Positivist analysis of a quantitative NGO survey 
will be used to address questions related to RQ1 and its two subordinated propositions, such as which sectors 
NGOs are particularly active in; during which periods various types of NGOs were founded, or where 
NGOs locate. The proposition that donors structure NGOs and that NGOs receiving funds from different 
institutions have observably different structures is discussed. These questions are addressed using positivist, 
deductive methodologies. In this context it is reasonable to assume that the researcher is a neutral presence 
not affecting the outcome and to aggregate individual observations through the quantitative analysis of a 
large-scale survey. While the quantitative data provides answers to what influences NGO operations, it does 
not address how this influence is achieved. Hence, to address questions related to RQ2, namely what 
mechanisms are put in place by donors that structure NGOs, a retroductive approach is used based on semi-
structured interviews with staff of Lebanese NGOs.  
My presence in the field, as the researcher, was a potential influence during this last section of my 
research. In particular, budgetary questions are sensitive and the presence of the researcher is felt in the 
answers. This is not particular to Lebanon since surveys in Palestine (World Bank and Bisan Center for 
Research and Development 2006) and Uganda (Barr et al. 2003) have run into similar difficulties. For 
example, while interviewing NGO staff in Northern Ghana, Mohan (2002) felt that information released to 
him by his informants was done so on a strategic basis with informants presuming that Mohan would feed 
back data he obtained to other stakeholders. The author states that this made the information he obtained 
partial and politically selective, underlining that he did not present a neutral observer. Rieger (2003) expands 
that there are hardly any questions, be they related to project design, NGO affiliation, staffing or internal 
structure of the organisation, that are perceived as entirely neutral. She adds that an unstructured interview 
style, leaving the interviewee space to follow his or her own train of thought, yields significantly more 
information than closely structured questionnaires (Rieger 2003:8). Cammett (2006) concurs that in divided 
societies such as Lebanon maintaining the perception of neutrality is effectively impossible and informants or 
interviewees will second-guess and judge the researcher’s intentions and affiliation, which shapes their 
answers. In this context she points out that introductions are crucial since interviewees are sensitive to how 
they will be perceived and represented and might be unwilling to meet or talk openly to a researcher that has 
not been recommended by a trusted third party. On the upside, Schwedler (2006) points out that the status of 
a foreign researcher might bring access, unavailable to local scholars.  
3 Data  
This section discusses in more detail the data used to tackle the first research question, namely what 
influences NGO operations. First, it surveys methodologies used by previous research on the Lebanese NGO 
sector. Secondly, it presents in detail the large-scale NGO survey used. The description of how and with 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 41 
whom semi-structured interviews were carried out to tackle the second research question is left to Chapter 6, 
after the quantitative and archival data analysis. 
3.1 Previously used methodologies 
A variety of authors (Elbayar 2005; El-Husseini et al. 2004; El-Moubayed Bissat 2002; Fawaz 2005; 
Karam 2005; Makhoul and Harrison 2002; Traboulsi 2000; Deeb 2006; Arsanios et al. 1996; Baalbaki and 
Muhieddine 1998; Crumrine 2002; Haddad 1995; Karam 1991; Kingston 1995, 1997, 2000; LCPS 1996, 1999; 
Rieger 2003) have empirically tackled the subject of NGOs in Lebanon from a number of perspectives. Many 
are unpublished reports commissioned or produced by think tanks, NGOs, international organisations or the 
government. The content of these studies will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. This 
section outlines methodologies used and supplies an annotated bibliography of existing documents. 
The study by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (1996) is the only historical study, tracing the 
evolution of the sector back to Lebanon’s independence. Studies by Elbayar (2005), Karam (2005), El-
Husseini et al. (2004), Traboulsi (2000) Arsionos, El Husseini and Ghossob (1996) and Haddad (1995) 
attempt to formulate generalised characteristics from analyses of cross-sections of Lebanese NGOs. They 
mainly used structured questionnaires and focus on listing NGO activities, funding origin, or affiliations, and 
describe Lebanese NGO regulation or the roles of Lebanese NGOs in public life. These studies obtain their 
data from Lebanese government sources, UN-affiliated organisations, local media, or NGO cooperatives as 
well as from interviews with Lebanese experts. Traboulsi (2000) carried out perhaps the most comprehensive 
NGO survey in Lebanon. Conversely, generalisations made in other studies are based on a very small number 
of observations (Haddad 1995). None of the studies cited above carry out survey-based research similar to 
the scale of Gauri and Galef (2005) and Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2005). 
A number of studies analyse NGOs working in a specific sector, either in social service provision 
(Baalbaki 1998, Rieger 2003, Cammett & Issar 2010); targeting a specific beneficiary group, in this case the 
disabled (Kingston 1997); or in advocacy (Kingston 1995, 2000). With the exception of Cammett and Issar 
(2010), these studies are based on semi-structured key informant interviews and are typically more specific 
and contain fewer generalised observations. Rieger (2003) and Kingston (1995, 1997, 2000) strongly 
contextualise their her work. Kingston (1995, 1997, 2000) relates his observations to the workings of the 
Lebanese politics, while Rieger integrates her analysis of NGOs into a wider description of social service 
provision in Lebanon, also consulting archives and government documents. Cammett and Issar (2010) use 
GIS data and voter records to link service provision by politicians to political preferences of Lebanese. Papers 
by Fawaz (2005), El-Moubayat Bissat (2002), Deeb (2006) and Makhoul and Harrison (2002) however, focus 
on case studies of one or several NGOs, examining projects implemented and carrying out field visits to 
locations where these organisations had completed or were still implementing projects. These studies either 
research rural NGOs (Makhoul and Harrison 2002; Crumrine 2002) or urban ones (Deeb 2006; Fawaz 2005). 
The authors conduct semi-structured interviews with NGO employees (El-Moubayed Bissat 2002; Fawaz 
2005) and recipient stakeholders (Makhoul and Harrison 2002; Crumrine 2002) as well as participant 
observation within the NGO (Deeb 2006). Methodologies employed by Fawaz (2005), El-Moubayat Bissat 
(2002), Rieger (2003), Crumrine (2002), Kingston (1995, 1997, 2000) and Makhoul and Harrison (2002), 
focussing on interviews of NGO staff or NGO recipients, can be linked to studies by Edwards (1999) and 
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Farrington and Bebbington (1993) in Asia, while Deeb’s (2006) ethnological approach is similar to that of 
Igoe and Kelsall (2005) in Africa and Hilhorst (2003) in Indonesia.  
Lebanese sectarianism and clientelism is a widely researched subject (Gilsenan 1996; Johnson 1986; 
Leenders 2004b) and some of the NGO studies cited above make reference to sectarian and clientelist 
structures (Crumrine 2002; Kingston 1997, 2000; LCPS 1999; Rieger 2003). However, with the exception of 
Cammett and Issar (2010) they do not combine large-scale quantitative data of NGOs with qualitative 
observations as found in this thesis.  
Libraries and Online Resources 
A number of resources collect information on Lebanese NGOs.  Below key collections and online 
sources are listed. 
The Centre for Training and Research in Development Action (CTRDA) 
CTRDA maintains a library with many reports written on NGOs in Lebanon. It also runs an NGO-
themed newspaper archive, photocopying and archiving newspaper articles related to NGOs in Lebanon. All 
of their resources are hardcopies and unavailable online.  
The Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) 
The Ministry of Social Affairs is the main source for NGO data in Lebanon. MoSA keeps a 
publicly-accessible record of all registered NGOs. MoSA contracted out and managed the NGO survey that 
much of this thesis is based on. It also keeps some unpublished analyses and reports based on that survey. A 
notable resource on the internal governance of NGOs is a report published by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
in 2004.  
Lebanon Support 
The UNDP-financed website Lebanon-support.org is a coordination platform where NGOs can 
advertise their profile, job vacancies, and publicise tenders and project reports. The site’s managers 
complement data offered by NGOs with ‘needs assessments’ based on their own surveys, carried out, for 
instance, following the July 2006 war or the 2008 siege on Nahr el Bared, and by publicising government or 
UN reports on poverty and economic deprivation online.  
3.2 The survey project 
The NGO survey, which provide data used to tackle the first research question, namely what 
influences NGO operations, was commissioned by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs and carried out by 
a private social research company. Meta-data on the survey was collected by speaking to officials from the 
ministry who commissioned the survey, as well as staff from the company involved in the data collection. 
Some ministerial staff had left government employment and were an especially useful source of information 
in particular on difficulties encountered by the company during data collection.  
Context: A Period of Interest in NGO Research 
The NGO survey was funded by the World Bank under the remit of the Community Development 
Project (CDP), which operated from 2001 until 2008. The CDP financed, through a $20 million loan, 326 
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NGO-led projects (Srour 2008) which were a departure from the large-scale infrastructure projects more 
commonly financed by the World Bank in Lebanon. The NGO survey was carried out within the CDP 
framework. 
Two large NGO surveys were carried out in Uganda (Barr et al. 2003) and Bangladesh (Gauri and 
Galef 2005), also financed by the World Bank12 and carried out during a similar period. It seems that during 
the early 2000s the World Bank was interested in and willing to finance large-scale research on NGOs. The 
CDP financed survey can be seen as part of this broad international research agenda. The Ugandan survey 
took place in 2002 and the Bangladeshi survey in 2003, each surveying approximately 300 NGOs. The 
Lebanese survey under discussion is much larger, covering more than 3,000 NGOs. It took place in 2006; 
while work on establishing a sample frame started much earlier in 2002. Both the Ugandan and the 
Bangladeshi survey contained a beneficiary component involving focus groups of individuals in the 
community where the NGO was operating. This was not the case in Lebanon.  
Within Lebanon, the Community Development Project was managed by the Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (CDR). All World Bank-financed projects have to follow certain 
contracting procedures. The CDR and World Bank jointly published a call for proposals for a company to 
carry out and design the survey. The names of the CDR and the Community Development Project logo 
featured on the first page of each questionnaire. They would not have been perceived as neutral by NGO 
staff answering the questionnaires. The Council for Development and Reconstruction is considered to have a 
clear political agenda. The CDP would have been less well known, though its projects were occasionally 
discussed in the press. In addition, some surveyed NGOs would most certainly also have applied for one of 
the 326 small grants distributed within the Project. The questionnaire and by implication the enumerators 
administering them might have been perceived as, firstly, coming from a grant-giving agency, and secondly, 
from one with certain pro-Western political affiliations. This will most certainly have influenced some 
responses. NGOs may for example have overstated their capacity or experience or presented themselves in a 
way that they thought may increase the likelihood of receiving funds. 
The Sample Frame 
Data on the Lebanese NGO population was compiled from 2002 until 2006. The Official Gazette, 
where details of newly registered NGOs are published, was the key source for establishing an NGO 
population. In addition, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) in cooperation with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) drew on information obtained from Ministries 
of Health, Education and Youth and Sport to obtain information on NGOs providing health care and 
education services as well as youth clubs and Scouts programs, which register with these ministries. From 
these sources by 2002 a list of 6,017 NGOs was compiled containing the name and registration number of 
the NGO, its area of activity, and contact details. Since NGOs are only added to official registers but are not 
deleted, it is impossible to obtain data on the presently existing NGO population from these records. This is 
why the list was forwarded to consultants, whose task was to verify it. 
Nearly two-thirds of all NGOs on the list only included the district (caza) as address. Pre-Civil War 
addresses and telephone numbers had not been updated. In addition, addresses in Lebanon are often 
informal descriptions and many streets have several names and lack numbering. Some NGOs are known 
under Latin acronyms or spellings, while official registers only accept Arabic letters. Some NGOs were listed 
                                                          
12 In the case of Uganda, World Bank funding was complemented by financing from the Japanese government. 
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twice and many NGOs have similar names, such as “Cultural and Sports Club” or “Women’s Association”. 
The consultants cleaned and updated the list using various directories and listings of professional syndicates, 
international organisations and local authorities. NGOs do not have to de-register, they merely have to file 
annual reports with the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI). The MoI would thus be a good source to identify 
operating NGOs, since non-operating ones would have ceased to submit reports. However, an official letter 
to the Ministry by the CDR asking for information remained without reply.. 
Staff at the NGO Unit at MoSA took the decision to exclude certain NGOs, namely political 
parties, trade unions and health dispensaries from the sampling frame. International organisations that were 
authorized to operate by special decree were also excluded. International organizations that registered as local 
organisations, such as Amnesty International, do figure in the survey. It is unclear what motivated this 
decision. In total, 7 per cent of NGOs (423 organisations) were excluded. The final updated list of 2006 
included a total of 6,032 NGOs (Etudes & Consultations Economiques and PADECO Co. Ltd. 2007). The 
sample includes a substantially lower proportion of NGOs that registered in the years 2005 and 2006 when 
compared to NGOs registered in earlier years. This is probably due to the fact that the formal sample frame 
was established by 2004 and, since the survey was intended as a census, NGOs that registered after 2004 were 
included as enumerators came across them, rather than in a rigorous or systematic way. It is noteworthy that 
the Ministries of Interior and Social Affairs, both of which play a key role in  registering and keeping data on 
NGOs in Lebanon, are also a key source for data on NGOs in the Bangladeshi case (Gauri and Galef 2005) 
where the Department for Social Affairs keeps a comprehensive list13 including a diverse set of organisations 
such as trade unions, clubs and mosques. In the Ugandan case (Barr et al. 2005) records from the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs were used. 
Previous surveys (Gauri and Galef 2005; Barr et al. 2005) analysed smaller sub-sections of the 
sector. A more restrictive choice of sample frame, such as used by Gauri and Galef (2005) which only 
considered NGOs that had or intended to apply for foreign funding, and thus featured the required internal 
structures and administrative procedures, can create homogenous results. Broader sample frames such as the 
one used by Barr et al. (2005) lead to more heterogeneous results in terms of NGO budget, staffing, and 
funding structure. The sample frame of the present survey is broader than that of Barr et al. (2005) and Gauri 
and Galef (2005). It also includes membership associations, youth clubs or family associations. In contrast to 
NGOs engaged in more straightforward humanitarian work, the presence of membership, youth, and family 
associations in developing countries is rarely acknowledged. These organisations fall under the heading of 
Civil Society as understood by Gramsci (1971) or, from a different approach and more recently, Putnam 
(1993, 2000) and related Social Capital literature. In Lebanese society where social relations are organised 
along kinship and personal contacts, these organisations are likely to play an important role.  
Survey design: instrument and enumerators  
Two questionnaires were administered consecutively to NGO staff in two different sittings. Both 
instruments were developed by MoSA staff in cooperation with the consultants. The first, shorter 
questionnaire aimed firstly at updating existing records pertaining to the NGO’s address, location and contact 
person, and secondly to gather general information on NGO members and staff as well as the organisation’s 
                                                          
13 Importantly, the authors felt this list  was too comprehensive and decided to build a list by merging data from government’ s 
NGO Affairs bureau, the Association of development Agencies in Bangladesh and branch registers of large NGOs (Gauri and Galef 
2005:2046).  
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aims, services and target group. The second instrument asked more specific questions about staffing and 
members; it addressed issues including gender balance, the organisation’s governance structure, planning and 
record keeping processes, financial accounts and funding sources, sectarian affiliation, and the NGO’s 
relationship with the state. English translations of both questionnaires can be found in the Appendix on p. 
150 and p. 154 respectively.  
Several questions featured in the questionnaire were unspecific and open to different interpretations. 
For instance, one question inquires what the NGO’s general character14 is, giving four answer choices: 
general, religious, local, family or other15. None of these choices is mutually exclusive and are open to various 
interpretations, and answers may be inconsistent across NGOs. This is aggravated by the fact that, though 
the instrument was meant to be administered face to face, the consultants state that enumerators had to leave 
questionnaires with NGO staff to fill out in their own time on several occasions. As a consequence many 
questions were left unanswered and, if in doubt or unclear about certain questions, NGO staff were unable to 
consult the enumerators, who had been trained on the questionnaire. MoSA staff expressed frustration at this 
failure to administer the questionnaire in person. It is not clear from the data which questionnaires have been 
administered by enumerators and which were filled out by NGO staff on their own. 
The consultants argue that the second questionnaire in particular was met with reluctance by NGO 
officials unwilling to disclose sensitive information. They state that it is generally higher ranking officials who 
were more willing to share information but that it was considerably more difficult to obtain appointments 
with senior management staff. The consultants add, that larger NGOs were generally less willing to disclose 
information, while smaller NGOs tended to inflate the scope of their work. The consultants conjecture that 
this was done in an expectation to obtain funding. As mentioned above this is not an unreasonable belief, 
considering that the survey was coordinated by the CDR, which is the biggest public donor in Lebanon. 
Fewer than 200 NGOs refused cooperation outright (Etudes & Consultations Economiques and PADECO 
Co. Ltd. 2007:24). The consultants add that many NGOs only keep informal records and that some answers 
related to financial records and planning by NGOs are estimates. 
Response rate 
Of the 6,032 NGOs in the sample frame, 3,758 NGOs (62.3%) responded to the first questionnaire. 
Though intended as a census, in the context of surveying non-profit organisations, this is a good response 
rate. Mark A. Hager, from the School of Community Resources and Development and Director of Research 
at the Lodestar Center for Philanthropy & Non-profit Innovation at Arizona State University, states that in 
social research response rates, below two-thirds should be cause for scepticism. However, he adds that his 
own experience with surveying non-profit managers has forced him to lower this standard to 50%.16  
Similarly, response rates in Lebanon to other NGO surveys have been low. Traboulsi (2000) distributed 
questionnaires to about 400 NGOs, of which 128 responded. Arsanios et al. (1996) dealt with a smaller 
sample of 62 NGOs, 46 of which responded and 39 of which filled in the questionnaire. Of the 3,758 NGOs 
that completed a questionnaire, 398 respondents (11%) were no longer operating17 (see Table III.1).  
                                                          
14 In Arabic: ةيعمجلل ماعلا عباطلا  
15 In Arabic:  هريغ ,ةيلئاع ,ةيلحم ,ةينيد ,ةماع 
16 This statement was made on 7th August, 2008, in an email discussion on the ARNOVA mailing list (ARNOVA-
L@listserv.iupui.edu). 
17 For non-operating NGOs, a former member of the NGO was found to confirm that it had ceased to function. 
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Table III.1: Number of NGO respondents by geographical district 
  Indentified NGOs  Responses   
 
Initial List 
(2004)2 
Sample 
Frame 
(2006)3 
Excluded  
Total 
Responses 
Response rate 
(Per cent of 
sample frame) 
Operating 
Non-
operating 
Lebanon 4,073 6,032 423  3,758 62 3,360 398 
caza1         
Akkar 104 172 12  99 58 87 12 
Aley 150 234 19  159 68 149 10 
Baabda 411 630 28  412 65 365 47 
Baalbek 123 217 15  168 77 143 25 
Batroun 58 138 15  75 54 73 2 
Beirut 1,288 1,520 89  809 53 727 82 
Bint Jbeil 32 55 2  42 76 30 12 
Bsharre 23 42 4  27 64 26 1 
Chouf 177 297 28  214 72 185 29 
Hasbaya 20 56 3  49 88 36 13 
Hermel 11 23 7  14 61 13 1 
Jbeil 105 201 31  126 63 116 10 
Jezzine 36 66 7  46 70 42 4 
Kesrouan 169 243 18  131 54 123 8 
Koura 51 86 9  59 69 56 3 
Marjeyoun 17 52 1  47 90 36 11 
Matn 312 493 44  258 52 251 7 
Minnieh-
Dunnieh 
16 69 4  56 81 50 6 
Nabatieh 106 156 10  128 82 109 19 
Rashaya 14 31 2  25 81 23 2 
Saida 160 240 7  177 74 155 22 
Sour 105 157 3  107 68 98 9 
Tripoli 299 390 12  225 58 208 17 
West Bekaa 37 81 9  69 85 59 10 
Zahle 147 263 28  206 78 170 36 
Zghorta 47 72 13  30 42 30 0 
not specified 55 48 3      
1. Second largest geographical administrative subdivision. 
2. List submitted by MoSA to the consultants. 
3. Final sample frame compiled by the consultant. 
Source: (Etudes & Consultations Economiques and PADECO Co. Ltd. 2007) 
 
The geographical districts comprising the capital and its suburbs, namely the cazas of Beirut, Baabda 
and Matn, feature a greater number of NGOs than any other region. 1,520 NGOs, equivalent to a quarter of 
the sample frame, are registered in Beirut, which is more than twice as many as are registered in the second 
most NGO-populated caza of Baabda. This concentration in and around the capital has also been observed in 
Uganda (Barr et al. 2005) and Bangladesh (Gauri and Galef 2005). The consultants state that it was 
comparatively easy to retrieve NGOs in rural areas with the help of mayors, municipalities or social service 
centres. Tracing NGOs in urban areas, especially Beirut and its suburbs, was more challenging. Table III.1 
confirms that response rates vary considerably between regions. However, with the exception of Beirut, most 
cazas include urban as well as rural areas, making it difficult to verify whether in Lebanon NGOs operating 
from rural areas are indeed easier to trace than urban ones. Though Beirut and Matn, two largely urban cazas 
with very high NGO populations have among the lowest response rates, two largely rural cazas, Hermel and 
Akkar, also have response rates below the Lebanese average.  
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Geographic and temporal representativeness  
If observed response rates vary non-randomly between regions, this would influence the national 
representativeness of the survey. To avoid this problem, both the Ugandan and Bangladeshi NGO survey 
selected administrative districts as primary sampling units and randomly selected NGOs from within these. 
Since the Lebanese survey was planned as a census, enumerators attempted to trace all NGOs.  
I performed a Chi Square Goodness of Fit test to assess whether the number of NGOs reached by 
enumerators in each caza was close to those expected on the basis of the national average (see the Appendix 
on p. 162, Table VIII.1 for expected and observed counts). The response rate was not similar across cazas, 
(p<0.01). However, Simonoff (2003:77-78) and Agresti (2002:329) point out that if the sample is very large, 
goodness of fit tests will reject practically any null hypothesis, and find significant differences between 
samples even if the deviations are small and of little practical importance. The above authors instead suggest 
quantifying the practical importance of differences through, for instance, the Dissimilarity Index, which 
measures by how much the expected counts differ from what is observed. The Dissimilarity Index for the 
present case is D = 0.046, which implies that less than 5% of NGOs (about 275) would have to be moved 
between cells for the probability of them being surveyed or not to mirror the national one (see the Appendix 
for details). There seems to be no over-arching consensus on where exactly a threshold for ‘practical’ 
difference lies. The Dissimilarity Index is mainly applied in geography to measure racial or income-related 
segregation. In these cases, dissimilarity indices below 0.3 are considered low (Goering 2007:109; Iceland 
2009:40). In the context of testing goodness or lack of fit of a distribution, dissimilarity indices should be 
lower. Simonoff (2003:78) argues that dissimilarity indices above 0.1 - 0.15 are noteworthy. This implies that, 
despite a statistically significant difference in response rates across cazas, this difference is of little practical 
importance and the survey sample can be considered as broadly, geographically representative.  
Variations in NGO registration dates are very similar in the survey and sample frame. Correlation 
coefficients indicate very strong correlation (Pearson’s r=0.83, N=102 (1900-2004), p<0.01), indicating that 
registration dates in the survey vary similarly over time as those of the sample frame (see Figure VIII.1 in the 
Appendix p. 163) 
Missing value analysis and inconsistencies 
Excluding non-operating NGOs, the present survey contains 3,360 NGOs. After data cleaning the 
total was reduced by seven observations to 3,353. This constitutes 56% of the sample frame. The two 
instruments were aggregated into a single dataset. Examining missing values for questions relating to the 
second survey, however, it appears that the second questionnaire had a lower response rate than the first. 
3,034 NGOs, 50% of the sample frame, answered at least one of its questions. Attached to the second survey 
was a set of questions directed at the responding NGO official. Response rates for this attachment were even 
lower, with 2,412 respondents (40% of the sample frame). Response rates also vary significantly among 
questions. Questions relating to the financial set up or accounts of the NGO had some of the lowest 
response rates, with 44% missing values. Both previous quantitative NGOs surveys in Uganda and 
Bangladesh (Barr et al. 2005; Gauri and Galef 2005) as well as qualitative studies in Lebanon (Arsanios et al. 
1996; Rieger 2003; Traboulsi 2000) also observe this reluctance to disclose financial information to third 
parties. 
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As a final note, it appears no distinction has been made between missing observations, unspecified 
observations and not-applicable observations. In the present context, inapplicability has frequently been 
coded as ‘not specified’ or ‘missing’ and ‘not specified’ answers have been left blank as if they were missing. 
Therefore all three of responses have been treated in the same way and were deducted them from the base 
before indicating valid percentages. In addition, whenever numerical answers were required, as for staffing 
levels or budgets, the entry ‘0’ seemed occasionally to refer to what should in fact be a ‘not specified’ 
response. This has been confirmed by Abi Samra et al. (2009) who re-interviewed NGOs featured in the 
survey for a capacity-building project. This may lead to an underestimation of averages. 
Conclusion 
Three shortcomings and potential sources of bias exist in the survey data.  
 
1. The absence of a reliable sampling frame introduces potential sampling bias 
2. Unclear questionnaire design, such as ambiguously phrased questions in addition to the 
absence of face-to-face enumeration 
3. Inconsistency between missing, non-specified, not-applicable, and ‘zero’ responses. 
 
As for the first issue, though exact information on the Lebanese NGO population is lacking, thanks 
to MoSA registers it can be ascertained that the entire Lebanese NGO population in 2006 counted around 
6000 organisations, very likely a few hundred more. With 3,353 organisations, the present survey has at least 
some information on over half of them. In addition, the difference in geographical distribution across 
Lebanese cazas between sample frame and surveyed NGOs is significant but not practically important, 
ensuring a degree of geographical representation. Still, despite temporal and geographical representativeness, 
the sample is not random. As discussed in the theoretical section on sampling bias, response bias may arise 
since NGO that did respond to the survey are likely to be structurally different from NGOs that did not 
respond.  
The two remaining problems are related to the quality of survey design and execution. If questions 
are misunderstood, the instrument may not be measuring what it was intend to and confusing between 
various kinds of missing values may lead to overestimation of means and underestimation of response rates. 
Caution will be used when interpreting results. Despite these shortcomings, the present survey is a unique 
dataset, the first large-scale NGO survey in the Arab world, and a survey with an unusually high response rate 
within NGO research. 
3.3 Qualitative methodology 
NGO structure and operations vary widely across activities. The entire Lebanese NGO sector is too 
large for such a detailed qualitative study. Similar to Karam (2005), who concentrated on advocacy, and 
Kingston (2013), who focussed on environmental, women’s rights and disability NGOs, chapter 6 of this 
thesis focuses on a particular section of Lebanese NGOs, namely those working in rural and agricultural 
development. This minimises confounding factors. Data from agricultural development projects will provide 
a micro-case study. The choice of the sector is motivated by two factors. Firstly, its small size makes it 
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treatable in as a PhD thesis research project and secondly, this research took place in 2007 and 2008 
following the 2006 war of Israel on Lebanon. Following the conflict, a number of international donors 
became active in Lebanon to support the reconstruction effort, transforming the rural development sector 
into a particularly dynamic, albeit small, one. The rural development sector is also interesting since an 
assessment (Srour 2008) of the World Bank-funded Community Development Project Fund indicates that 
projects in agriculture where the most successful projects financed by the Fund. In particular, processes of 
control used by international donors to structure agricultural development projects in Lebanon will be 
examined. This involves dissecting NGO programmes involved in micro-credit, marketing and other services, 
as well as observing modes of operation and management adopted by NGOs. 
The qualitative data chapter draws on two data sources. Firstly, an inventory of agricultural 
development projects between 2008 and 2009 was compiled. Since there is no centralised register for 
development projects, this list was compiled from NGO websites and reports as well as databases18 
aggregating information on NGOs in Lebanon. 197 projects implemented by 60 individual NGOs were 
listed. This allowed to assess which donors and NGOs dominate the sector and in which sub-fields they are 
active. Of these, 37% were international and 44% local. The remaining fifth of the projects were implemented 
by the government. Though comprehensive, this list is not exhaustive. Small organisations that do not 
publicise their projects through reports or on the Internet are less likely to be included in the list. To counter 
the bias towards public listings, a particular effort was made to track down information about projects and 
organisations mentioned during interviews. In addition to a short description of what each project entails, 
data was gathered on project locations, duration, beneficiaries, budget and donors.  
Secondly, semi-structured interviews were carried out. Respondents fit into two broad categories: 
firstly NGO staff, mainly from the middle management level and secondly experts, that is to say academics 
and journalists, public sector officials or professionals from the agro-food sector.  Using information on 
agricultural development projects from the Lebanon-Support website, as well as information on NGOs active 
in agriculture from the NGO survey, a list of NGOs working in agriculture was compiled and called to 
arrange an interview, some were unavailable or had wrong contact details listed. This was especially the case 
for NGO details obtained from the survey.  
Table III.2: Number of interviews carried out with various NGOs and donors 
NGO staff working in NGOs implementing rural development projects 25 
 
International NGOs 10 
 
 
Local NGOs receiving international funding 12 
 
 
Ruling class NGOs 3 
 
QUANGO, multilateral donor 5 
 
QUANGOs running  rural development projects 3 
 
 
Multilateral donor funding rural development projects 2 
 
Note: See appendix p.164 for list of organisations. 
 
NGO staff engaged in the implementation of development projects in the agriculture sector were 
interviewed. These include staff from Lebanese chapters of international NGOs, as well as staff from 
Lebanese NGOs. In addition to NGO staff engaged in the implementation of development projects 
government employees who worked on similar projects financed by foreign donors were interviewed. Two 
                                                          
18 Namely: Lebanon-Support, a Lebanese coordination platform, the UNDP and the NGO database compiled by MoSA. 
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multi-lateral donors, the European Commission and the World Bank have set up large projects inside 
government offices (see p.115 for a discussion). Staff working on these projects are officially government 
employees, but are financed by a foreign donor while implementing through public institutions. On the one 
hand they act like donors, disbursing funds to cooperatives and municipalities, on the other hand they are 
closely involved in project implementation since their beneficiary organisations often have low capacity. To 
account for the mixed constitution of these projects, part government, part donor and part NGO, they are 
referred to as QUANGO in this thesis.  
An effort was made to speak to donors. However, few have offices in Lebanon. This is true in 
particular for bilateral donors who may have representatives at embassies but will not have staff making 
funding decisions stationed in-country. In contrast, multilateral donors, such as the European Commission or 
UN agencies, do have offices in Lebanon and were interviewed. In total 30 staff were interviewed, Table III.2 
shows a taxonomy of interview partners and the number of interviews carried out in each category. 
There is a notable scarcity of NGOs working in rural development that have an independent 
national donor base. The only local NGOs that do have sufficient funds from national sources are those with 
powerful political patrons and are referred to as ‘ruling class’ NGOs in Table III.2, following Zurayk 
(2011:178). He argues that in terms of financial capacities the Lebanese NGO sector is dominated by 
organisations such as the Fares, Hariri, Moawad, and Safadi Foundations who have solvent patrons with 
political ambitions. Among the local NGOs listed in Table III.2, international funding makes up most of their 
revenue. Two NGOs receive only little foreign funding compared to their local sources. One of them is 
Amel, a well-known Lebanese NGO with an unusually diversified donor base and eclectic project portfolio; 
and the second St. Vincent de Paul, a small NGO struggling with declining local donations but unable to win 
international funding.  
As for the second category of respondents, experts, they could be consultants hired by NGOs or 
former NGO employees. The same interview format and only slightly altered questions were used. The 
interest in carrying out these interviews was to complement information obtained from interviews with NGO 
and QUANG staff. In addition, when interviewing relative outsiders it was hoped that they would 
corroborate or challenge observations collected in previous interviews. Unsurprisingly, many consultants or 
former staff were quite critical of some projects. These interviewees were accessed through snowball 
sampling, i.e. they were recommended, or encountered serendipitously. For instance, two of the most 
interesting interviewees were encountered while waiting to be called into the offices of another interview 
partner. Cammett (2006) observes that access to interviewees is often a function of personal contacts and 
points out that this ‘snowball’ sampling limits generalisation. However, she continues that in research that 
takes place in divided polities on sensitive issues, personal referrals are often the only way to access a 
respondent. Two of the most interesting interviewees were encountered while waiting to be called into the 
offices of other interview partners. 
Table III.3: Number of expert interviews carried out 
NGOs and donors not working in rural development  
 
6 
Former staff and relevant practitioners in the sector 
 
11 
Public servants from various ministries 
 
10 
Private sector professionals 
 
5 
Academics, journalists and researchers 
 
13 
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Field notes: Trade Fairs, workshops, cooperative meetings, farm visits 
Note: See appendix p. 165, Table VIII.3 for a more detailed break-down. 
 
Expert interview partners were also sought for specific information, in the case of academics and 
journalists, previous research and experience. Government officials were asked for regulatory procedures and 
their experience in cooperating with NGOs. Professionals in the agro-food sector were interviewed so as to 
build up background information on the sector. In total 45 experts were interviewed (see Table III.3). 
 
Interview guide 
The second research question, namely what shapes NGO operations, was the underlying rationale 
for the guide used during interviews. Since qualitative data was gathered so as to uncover underlying 
mechanisms shaping NGOs, it was not asked outright what NGO staff thought shapes NGO operations. 
Instead the subject was approached indirectly, by asking about NGO projects and staff’s understanding of 
development challenges. This is potentially patronising towards NGO staff since it effectively assumes that 
throughout the course of a few cross-sectional interviews, more can be learned about the inner workings of 
NGOs, than by asking NGO staff directly. However, when asked outright why an NGOs engages in certain 
topics, NGO staff themselves conceptualise their agency as autonomous of context and donors. Hence direct 
answers may not always be a good guide of what shapes an organisation’s operations. Though some 
respondents were very lucid about the pressures they operate under.  
The interview guide did contain questions, in particular numbers 5 and 7 in Table III.4, that asked 
about what influenced NGOs at least in their choice of work and how they see NGOs’ scope in dealing with 
development challenges. Answers to these questions indicate that NGO staff see their own as well as their 
colleagues’ agency as primordial in shaping NGO operations. However, responses to other questions, such as 
2 and 3 in Table III.4, clearly indicate frustration with limitations imposed on NGO agency by external 
factors.  This somewhat validates a more indirect approach.  
Hence, to find out what shapes NGO operations and particularly how donors do so, staff was asked 
to list and describe projects. Information on project location, scope or timeframe as well as more subjective 
information related to difficulties encountered and successes achieved was collected (questions 1, 2 and 3 in 
Table III.4). These questions proved particularly revelatory of processes that affect NGO work. Further 
inquiries were made about NGOs’ portfolio (questions 4 and 5 in Table III.4) so as to assess how important 
rural development is compared to other NGO activities. It was also asked how and where NGO staff place 
themselves within the broader rural development discourse (questions 6 and 7 in Table III.4). This question 
proved useful to ascertain to what extent responses were inspired by specific local experience or made with 
reference to international development discourse, in particular in light of the publication of the 2008 World 
Development Report (2007) on agriculture. The interview concluded with a discussion of the roles of donors 
and government, in particular the relationship between the NGO and its donors as well as the role of the 
government in rural development overall (questions 8 and 9 in Table III.4).  
Each interview was framed by the same ten broad questions, in an order that seemed most logical in 
each context (see Table III.4). If a respondent had addressed the question already it would be omitted. If the 
respondent was keen on elaborating a relevant point, further questions were asked. This style of semi-
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structured interview meant that interview transcripts of varying lengths and focus were compiled. In contrast 
to quantitative research, where it is important that each respondent addresses each variable to the same 
extent, the interest here was to focus on respondents’ interpretations of their role in implementing rural 
development projects, what meaning it had for them, and what challenges they saw.  
Table III.4: Semi-structured interview guide 
1. What projects does your organisation carry out? Talk me through them. 
2. What are your most successful projects? 
3. Which projects do not work so well and why? 
4. How important are rural development projects in your organisation’s portfolio?  
5. Why did you decide to work in rural development? How do you decide on which topics to work? 
6. Where do you see the greatest challenges in agriculture for Lebanon? 
7. What is the role of NGOs in alleviating them? 
8. What is the role of the government? 
9. Who are your donors? How would you describe your relationship with your donors? 
10. NGO size, age, respondent education. 
 
Experts on NGOs were asked to comment on NGO-donor relationships since questions about 
donor relations were received with a certain degree of caution by NGOs themselves and addressed relatively 
briefly by most respondents. Experts were more forthcoming and critical of NGO-donor relations. In 
deciding how to record material Cammett (2006) states that while audio recordings are more detailed and 
allow for more verbatim quotes, they might also be intimidating and discourage frank discussion. It the 
present context it was felt that more insightful answers and frank discussions ensued when taking notes only. 
One respondent, towards the beginning of my research, refused that I record outright, prompting me to 
abandon recordings. Whenever a phrase was particularly noteworthy it was written down verbatim.  
Since transcripts do not allow for verbatim quotes but only to paraphrase what I understood the 
respondent told me, it is important to separate my voice from the transcripts I took during interviews. Rather 
than using quotes, I decided to show citations from my transcripts in tables (see Table VI.3 for example). 
These tables have captions that make explicit that what is presented below comes from NGO or QUANGO 
respondents. Each table groups statements by theme and topic. 
Data analysis methodology 
Thematic Analysis was used to describe interview results. As recommended by Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane (2006), deduction was used to identify themes from a list of topics discussed in the literature review 
and grounded in the research questions. Induction was used to identify data-driven themes that recurred 
during interviews. Two themes, each with three sub-topics were isolated. The first theme was deduced from 
the research question while the second theme was induced from recurrent mentions by respondents. The 
corollary, namely NGOs as employment generators, forms part of the larger corollary related to the second 
research question. From these themes it will be hypothesised what the mechanisms are that shape NGO 
operations, this constitutes the retroductive element to my analysis. Material published by donors on their 
funding guidelines and rationale for operating in Lebanon is also included in the analysis. Table III.5 shows 
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the label and definition of each theme as well as the data source, if interview or secondary material. Areas of 
consensus and conflict around these themes are identified and analysed.  
Chapter 6 will discuss the results of thematic analysis. Each theme and sub-topic will be discussed in 
turn. Excerpts from interview transcripts that have been coded as belonging to a particular theme or topic 
will be grouped together and shown in one table (see Table VI.3, for example). Statements made by NGOs 
will then be discussed and paraphrased in the text, referring back to the relevant table.  Each table will take up 
one particular element listed in the ‘themes’ column of Table III.5. 
Table III.5: Themes identified 
Propositions made in the 
literature 
Themes identified in 
interview transcripts 
Questions addressed by 
theme 
Data source 
Theme 1: Donor funding frameworks and conceptualisation of development puzzles shape NGO projects 
 
Donors define project design, 
inspired by international 
practice not local experience  
(Ebrahim 2009, Wallace et al. 
2007, Lewis & Opoku-Mensah 
2006) 
Topic 1: What projects 
does the NGO run 
How is funding obtained? Why 
does an NGO chose to work in 
rural development? What kind of 
projects are implemented by 
NGOs? 
Interviews, 
pamphlets published 
by donors, online 
project information 
Donors define development 
purpose, implementation 
procedures and outputs  
(Wallace et al. 2007, Easterly 
2002, Fowler 1993) 
Topic 2: Limits to 
project implementation 
i. Limited ability to impose 
higher prices  
ii. Misguided export 
focus 
iii. Small producers face 
disadvantageous 
market structures 
 
What are the NGOs’ most 
successful projects? What are 
the most unsuccessful ones? 
Why? 
Interviews 
Donors determine the role to be 
played by NGOs in the 
development process. There is 
limited participation 
(Wallace et al. 2007, Lewis & 
Opoku-Mensah 2006, Jad 2004, 
Hilhorst 2003) 
 
Topic 3: Small scale 
i. Forming 
cooperatives does 
not solve the scale 
problem 
ii. Limits of NGO 
capacity 
iii. Jaded beneficiaries: 
project participation 
is work for the NGO 
 
What are the NGOs’ most 
successful projects? What are 
the most unsuccessful ones? 
Why?  
Interviews 
Theme 2: Structuring dynamics of donor requirements 
 
Donor interests influence 
funding direction  
(Tvedt 1998) 
 
Topic 1: Geopolitical 
interests of donors 
influence project 
location 
Are there geographical donor 
preferences? 
Interviews, 
pamphlets published 
by donors, online 
project information 
 
Donors define project design 
and framework  
(Wallace et al. 2007, Ebrahim 
2009) 
 
Topic 2: Timeframe for 
project implementation 
is short 
What is the average project 
duration? Who sets project 
timeframe? 
Interviews, 
pamphlets published 
by donors, online 
project information 
Donors set cumbersome 
reporting and accountability 
systems. Core costs are not 
covered  
(Carrol 1992, Edwards & 
Hulme 1996, Wallace et al. 
2007) 
 
Topic 3: Reporting and 
budgeting requirements 
How do NGOs describe 
results?  
Interviews and 
online project 
information 
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Corollary: NGOs as employment opportunities 
NGO staff work on 
temporary contracts, with 
little social protection  
(Abdelrahman 2007, Clark 
& Michuki 2009, Siqqique & 
Ahmad 2012) 
NGOs as employment 
opportunities 
(No direct question was asked 
investigating this.) 
Interviews 
3.4 Data use throughout this study 
The following three chapters will address the two research questions discussed. The next chapter 
addresses proposition one of the first research question. Using descriptive analysis of the survey data it 
discusses to what extent context shapes NGO operations. The fifth chapter tackles the second proposition of 
the first research question. Using multi-variate analysis of the NGO survey it teases out what kind of NGOs 
are preferred by what kind of donors. After having completed the quantitative analysis of the NGO dataset, 
the sixth chapter will use qualitative data reviewed in the previous section, to address the second research 
question. While chapters four and five addressed which factors structure NGO operations and characteristics, 
the sixth focuses on how NGO operations are shaped 
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IV. Lebanese NGOs: 
Analysis of  a sector
A key proposition of this thesis is that context shapes NGO operations. Part of this context is a 
country’s legal and regulatory framework of NGOs as well as social and political conditions such as the 
degree of welfare provision by the government or the level of interest by international donors in the country. 
This chapter will describe the Lebanese NGO sector with respect to age, size and staffing, using uni- and bi-
variate analysis of NGO survey data described in the previous chapter. It will outline the legal and regulatory 
framework in which NGOs operate and trace a short history of NGOs in Lebanon. Questions raised in the 
literature with regards to NGOs, including whether they are better able to target poor beneficiaries when 
compared to government agencies, will be explored. In light of the scant provision of welfare by the 
Lebanese state since the Civil War, NGOs have played an important role in the provision of public services. 
This chapter will address how NGOs relate to the Lebanese government: do NGOs increase or decrease 
service provision when government spending increases? The Lebanese government and NGOs are in a 
symbiotic, even mutually dependent, relationship with respect to social services. Lebanese NGOs also have to 
increasingly negotiate international donor demands and pressures. This chapter analyses to what degree 
Lebanese NGOs respond to increases in international development aid. 
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1 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
There are significant disparities between official regulations pertaining to NGOs and actual 
implementation and enforcement of these laws. Below the existing body of law is reviewed and contrasted to 
actual implantation. 
1.1 De jure regulation 
To this day, NGOs in Lebanon are governed by the 1909 Ottoman Law on Associations. Because 
the law pre-dates the Lebanese state, it makes reference to institutions and authorities that no longer exist.19 
The 1909 law defines an association as a group composed of several Lebanese citizens or legally resident 
persons “permanently unifying” their knowledge and efforts for non-profit objectives (NGO Resource & 
Support Unit 2004:7; Elbayar 2005:18 ). Establishing an association does not require a permit, but founders 
must submit a statement to the Ministry of Interior Affairs detailing the organisation’s main office address, 
objectives, and the names of individuals representing the NGO. In return, an association obtains a 
notification, akin to a receipt20, from the Ministry. Details of the organisation are published in the Official 
Gazette. NGOs do not have to wait for receipt of the notification to start operating, but can do so as soon as 
all documents have been submitted. Nevertheless, El-Moubayed Bissat (2002) reports that in fact many 
associations wait for the notification before operating.  
The law requires associations to maintain records of membership rolls, financial accounts, and 
formal decisions, any of which the Ministry of Interior Affairs may request. Organisations must annually 
submit an income statement, a membership list, and a draft budget to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and 
must inform the Ministry of board elections. NGOs are exempt from commercial or industrial taxes, but 
liable to pay employee income tax. The organization must subscribe to the National Social Security Fund 
within 15 days of hiring their first employee. The NGO must pay non-resident tax if it lacks a Lebanese tax 
number, as well as taxes on capital gains and tariffs on imported goods (NGO Resource & Support Unit 
2004). 
Several later decrees have supplemented or modified the 1909 law. For instance, regulation specific 
to foreign associations was introduced during the Mandate period in 1939. If the founder or director is 
foreign, if the NGO is based outside Lebanon, or if more than a quarter of members are foreigners, the 
association is considered foreign and must obtain special permission from the Council of Ministers to operate 
Without a permit, a foreign NGO cannot legally open a bank account, hire staff or rent an office in Lebanon. 
Obtaining such a permit begins with an application to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and a vetting by the 
Ministry of External Affairs, all of which is reviewed by General Security and then sent back to the Ministry 
of Interior to be than signed by the Council of Ministers.  
Regulations specific to cooperatives were introduced in 1964. In 1996, oversight of associations with 
mentorship authority (i.e. scouts as well as youth and sports clubs) was transferred to the Ministry of Youth 
                                                          
19 For instance, the law stipulates that associations are not allowed to work towards politically separating ‘the different Ottoman 
entities’ (NGO Resource & Support Unit 2004:7).  
20 This is referred to as ‘Ilm wa khabr’  (ربخو ملع) in Arabic. 
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and Sports. Such an organization also requires prior approval and a permit. Health care and educational 
institutions are subject to additional legislation from the health and education ministries, and trade unions are 
licensed by the Labour Ministry (NGO Resource & Support Unit 2004). 
1.2 De facto application 
The current set-up provides a comparatively benign regulatory framework, though there are marked 
differences in enforcement among different types of NGOs. While launching a mountaineering club proved 
comparatively quick and hassle free21, the registration of a branch of a foreign NGO took the greater part of 
a year22. In another case, a foreign NGO succeeded in obtaining permission to operate through a decision of 
the Lebanese Council of Ministers as required by law. When the NGO’s registration was announced in the 
Official Gazette, however, two powerful Lebanese syndicates objected publicly and threatened to challenge 
the Council of Ministers’ approval in front of the Shura Council. Shortly thereafter a member of the Council 
of Ministers made an off-the-record request that the NGO withdraw its registration to avoid confrontation. 
The NGO complied.23 The regulation of foreign NGOs poses a problem for Palestinian NGOs. If run by 
Palestinian residents of Lebanon, such NGOs bring in Lebanese board members to qualify as local; in these 
cases management often hires its board, rather than vice versa (Abi Samra et al. 2009).  
For Lebanese NGOs, the receipt of notification can take months or even years. In the meantime the 
organisation in question has no proof of its status as a legal entity and might find it difficult to open a bank 
account, sign a tenancy agreement or apply for funding (NGO Resource & Support Unit 2004). The varying 
degrees of inspection that different NGOs are subject to suggest that the Lebanese government seeks to 
monitor certain elements of the NGO sector more than others. For instance, employee protection regulation, 
which stipulates that NGO employees must be registered with the National Social Security Fund is not 
enforced: nearly 80 percent of staff are without social security (see Figure IV.5 on p.75). Further, most small 
NGOs submit annual financial reports, required by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which bear no 
relationship to any actual financial planning by the NGO; the reports are instead drawn up solely to fulfil 
annual reporting requirements (Abi Samra et al. 2009). 
To conclude, current Lebanese NGO legislation was produced during several historical periods and 
several government authorities, occasionally with overlapping jurisdiction, are involved in supervising and 
regulating NGOs. Foreign NGOs are subject to more scrutiny than their national counterparts. Karam (1991) 
argues that the official multiplicity of authority reflects an absence of any one effective authority governing 
NGOs. This messy state of affairs is characteristic of Lebanese public regulation (Leenders 2004b).  
                                                          
21 Interview with head of the club, who also works for an international NGO, on 13th March 2008 in Beirut 
22 Interview with Planning and Programs Director of the NGO, on 7th November 2007 in Beirut 
23 Interview with former Country Director of the NGO, on 13th June 2012 in Beirut 
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2 NGO Activity Sectors 
A wide variety of organisations operate in Lebanon, from sports clubs to hospitals to family 
associations (see Figure IV.1). The present survey includes a wider array of organisations than was surveyed 
by Barr et al. (2005) or Gauri and Galef (2005), who focussed primarily on development-oriented NGOs and 
excluded welfare organisations and sports clubs. The type of NGO activity shapes many key internal, 
organisational aspects of an organisation. This impacts NGO characteristics such as staffing or budget size. 
NGO activity types were coded following the International Classification of Non-profit Organizations 
(ICNPO) standard (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2003). Some codes were 
expanded and some compressed so as to safeguard international comparability while also respecting Lebanese 
peculiarities (see the Appendix p. 166 for details).  
The largest segment of NGOs in Lebanon consists of organizations engaged in some form of social 
service delivery: 18% of organisations provide such social or charitable services. That is to say, they may 
support poor families, run orphanages or operate programs for the disabled. Closely related but excluded 
from the previous category are NGOs providing more specialised social services, such as health care, 
education, or research, which constitute 9% of NGOs. This group includes schools, hospitals or 
organisations that offer scholarships. Hence, more than a quarter of active NGOs (27%) in Lebanon in 
Lebanon are engaged in some form of social service delivery. This illustrates the important role that non-
governmental organisations play in welfare provision in Lebanon, also commented on in the literature (Rieger 
2003; Cammett 2007; Cammett and Issar 2010).   
Figure IV.1: NGO activities 
 
Base: 3353 NGOs 
Note: The total number of NGOs includes 3 NGO networks and 29 NGOs with unclassified activity. These two do not appear in the figure. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
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Seven percent of NGOs are classified as Social Development and Awareness Raising Organisations, 
7% as Community and Village Development Organisations and 2% as Economic Development 
Organisations. Thus, 16% percent of Lebanese NGOs are engaged in local, economic or social development. 
Note that the ‘Economic Development’ category also includes rural and agricultural development NGOs, 
which is the NGO sector chapter 6 examines in particular. 
A small share, 2% of NGOs, are classified as religious: mosques, churches or other organisations 
with a religious purpose. The LCPS (1996:50) observes that since all Lebanese are registered based on their 
religious affiliation, the reach and influence of these institutions is large. Religious institutions own large 
properties, run religious courts, schools, orphanages, hospitals, nursing homes, and youth groups. They 
manage internal relations of the community and negotiate interaction with other communities as well as the 
government (LCPS 1996). Religious affiliation of an organisation is a distinct issue discussed in more detail 
on p. 60. 
As for Advocacy Organisations, 4% of Lebanese NGOs are classified as civic and advocacy NGOs. 
One could add the 3% of Environmental and Animal Rights Groups to this category. Tocquevillian concepts 
of civil society – defending individuals vis-à-vis the state – may be appropriate to describe these NGOs, 
which include initiatives that aim at electoral or citizenship reform. However, political demands can be 
appropriated by competing elites if it suits their interests. Kingston’s (2000) analysis of the environmental 
movement in Lebanon aptly describes this tension, or process of structuration (Giddens 1984), between an 
organisation’s agency in setting campaign goals and structural pressures, arising from participation in political 
decision-making or dealing with the demands of large donors, which tend to mute the bolder tendencies of 
campaigns.  
The above are all intermediary organisations, defending the interests of vulnerable groups rather 
than primarily those of their members. In contrast, a substantial set of Lebanese associations, discussed 
below, work chiefly for the interests of their members.  
These include Youth, Sports, Social and Recreational Clubs (14%) as well as Cultural and Arts 
Organisations (11%) and make up a quarter of Lebanese NGOs. Youth and Sports Clubs may be akin to the 
kind of organisations which Putnam (2000) links to social cohesion and social capital, and whose apparent 
decline in the United States he laments. However, current affairs commentators (Lee 2008; Worth 2008) 
argue that some organizations of this type may not be so unambiguously beneficent. These commentators 
argue that Scout movements in Lebanon, for example, have clear political affiliations and may even involve 
some degree of militarisation. In such cases, youth movements may be better analysed referring to Gramsci’s 
(1971) association of civil society with the interests of a country’s elite.  
Another substantial set of NGOs are Family Associations, which constitute 12% of all NGOs in 
Lebanon, the third largest sub-group. Family organisations formalise links of kinship across several family 
branches and offer financial support, mentorship and patronage to junior family members, while giving senior 
members access to a support base helpful for gaining political office or leverage with larger patrons.24 These 
are vertical organisations consolidating hierarchical family structures and can be contrasted to Membership 
Associations, constituting 10% of associations, which include professional, business, alumni and veteran 
organisations. Membership Associations are more horizontal than Family Associations, and bring together 
individuals of similar rank, education or material background. Although family associations are more 
prominent, membership organisations have been more dynamic since the early 2000s. Taken together, Family 
and Membership Organizations form 22% of Lebanese NGOs.  
                                                          
24 See Johnson’s (1986) study for examples with respect to Sunni families in Beirut. 
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Mission drift among Lebanese NGOs 
When asked to tick boxes from a list of activities, most NGOs respondents chose more than half of 
all possible answers. This reflects how vague some NGOs chose to describe their activities. Barr et al. (2003) 
make similar observations and note that when prompted to identify which of a list of activities, their NGO 
focussed on, many managers indicated that they were focussed on every activity on the list. Similarly, Abi 
Samra et al. (2009:5) note that Lebanese NGOs they surveyed had vague and broad mission statements and 
that many managers failed to elaborate on the link between mission statement, projects implemented and 
their intended impact. This raises questions about how an NGO, or the respondent member of staff, 
conceives of the organisation’s policy domain. Fafchamps and Owens (2009) argue that if NGOs operate as 
sub-contractors to donors, they have no need or interest in developing a programme or adhering to a 
mission. Indeed, Scott (2003) argues that this mission drift is an outcome of project-based funding, in which 
funding guidelines rather than NGOs themselves determine what kind projects receive funding.  
There is some evidence of mission drift among Lebanese NGOs. Some NGO respondents gave 
very vague answers to questions related to the goal of their NGO.25 For instance, Social Development and 
Awareness Raising organisations often define their organisational purpose using a number of vague terms 
that do not necessarily imply specific activities.26 All contain the now omnipresent terms ‘capacity building’ 
and ‘awareness raising’.27 Like social development organisations, the culture and arts category includes NGOs 
with broad activity spheres, such as organisations caring for cultural heritage28 and engaged in cultural 
exchange or international friendship29. While the above are precise activity spheres, many NGOs, also 
frequently simply replied “cultural” or “cultural activities”30.  
2.1 A note on self-declared religious affiliation of NGOs 
Denominational affiliation is not an innocent question in Lebanon since an individual’s or 
organisation’s denomination, or sect, has political implications. Any individual, by virtue of his or her sect is 
presumed to identify or be affiliated with a set of political elites. The survey contains a question on whether 
the NGO has a specific denominational affiliation31. The same sectarian-political presumptions as apply to 
individuals are also valid for organisations, where the denomination of management or patrons has immediate 
presumed political connotations. These presumptions, valid or not; will influence whoever responds to the 
survey question, because the answer does not simply describe the organisation’s religious beliefs, but is 
understood to describe some aspects of its public and political identity. In particular, it is presumed that 
NGOs of a certain denomination will primarily address the concerns of constituents from the political faction 
                                                          
25 The question in Arabic reads: Specify the goals of the organisation in accordance with the founding documents. ( فادهأ زربأ
سيسأتلا دنتسم قفو ةيعمجلا). 
26 Typical replies were: improving social conditions (يعامتجلإا عضولا نيسحت), cultural, economic, social and political awareness 
raising (ةيعوتلا ةيسايسلاو ةيعامتجلااو ةيداصتقلاا ةيفاقثلا), social, economic, medical and cultural aid ( ةيعامتجا تادعاسم
ةيفاقث ةيبط ةيداصتقا), developing a spirit of cooperation and generosity in society (عمتجملا يف ةبحملاو نواعتلا حور ةيمنت) 
27 In Arabic: تاردقلا ءانب and ةيعوتلا 
28 examples from the survey: preserve historic sites (ruins) (راثلآا ىلع ةظفاحم), preserve Lebanese heritage, customs and 
traditions (ةينانبللا ديلاقتلاو تاداعلاو ثارتلا ملاعم ىلع ةظفاحملا) 
29 examples: cultural exchange with the Arab region (يبرعلا طيحملا عم يفاقثلا لدابتلا), cultural, economic and academic 
exchange between Canada and Lebanon ( انبلو ادنك نيب يملع يداصتقا يفاقث لدابتن ), bolster the friendship between the 
Lebanese and Ukrainian peoples (يناركولااو ينانبللا نيبعشلا نيب ةقادصلا زيزعت) 
30 In Arabic: يفاقث / ةيفاقث  or   ةيفاقث تاطاشن  
31 The Arabic question reads: دااجو ا د ةاايعمجلل يبه ااملا ءااامتنلإا  Followed by ten answer options: non-sectarian/non-
confessional, the eight largest officially recognised sects as well as the option ‘other’. 
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representing its denomination. Thus a number of organisations surveyed, whose name clearly indicates a 
religious affiliation, chose “non-denominational” as their answer.  
However, since sectarianism structures such a large part of public life, sect very often influences 
what target populations an NGO serves or works with, whether or not by design. Cammett (2007) points out 
that beneficiaries self-select organisations of their own faith rather than providers having exclusionary 
policies. Cammett (2007) adds that, managerial staff of NGOs highlighted that volunteers and staff self-select 
NGOs that fit their own sectarian profile. Sectarian homogeneity often seem to be a by-product of social 
structure rather than an intentional strategy. One very large Lebanese NGO, whose managers insisted on the 
non-denominational character of their organisation, intended to create a map showing the location of all their 
agricultural development projects and then place the map on the organisation’s website, but reversed course 
after realising that the projects were concentrated in the constituency of the NGO’s patron.32 Thus structural 
factors seem likely to inhibit religious diversity at an NGO unless such diversity is actively sought and 
promoted. 
Still, faith clearly plays an important role for many Lebanese. Only a tiny minority would call 
themselves agnostic or atheist. In addition, many widely-respected Lebanese NGOs have known religious 
affiliations. Why, then, are Lebanese NGOs so eager to claim the non-denominational label, as indicated by 
survey results?  This may be for two reasons. Firstly, as discussed above, sectarian affiliation has immediate 
political implication and indicating the absence of denominational affiliation may be a way to resist being 
pigeonholed. Secondly, Makdisi (2000:166) points out that within a nationalist understanding of Lebanon, 
which many NGO staff subscribe to, sectarianism is seen as illegitimate, divisive, and regressive. Indeed 
much of the writing on Lebanese NGOs criticises sectarianism (Baalbaki and Muhieddine 1998; Karam 2006; 
Kiwan 2004; Traboulsi 2000). Being non-denominationally affiliated may imply, from the point of view of the 
responding NGO, being modern and progressive. Organisations which subscribe to what Deeb (2006) calls a 
pious modern ideal, premising development on faith and piety, are seen with suspicion by many NGO staff 
who would call themselves secular, even if they admire the service delivery capacity and organizing prowess 
of some religious organisations.33 
Survey results indicate, prima facie, that 588 NGOs in the sample, or 20% of valid responses, 
indicated that they have a denominational affiliation. Older NGOs in the sample are more likely to have 
indicated a denominational affiliation, than NGOs that registered from the 1960s onwards. Survey data 
indicates that the period from independence to the crisis of 1958 saw the most notable decline in NGOs with 
self-declared denominational affiliation. This is in accord with Baalbeki and Muhieddine (1998) who 
characterise the period from Independence to the early 1960s as one dominated by religious and urban 
associations while they characterise the immediate pre-war period by secular associations.  
                                                          
32 Interview with NGO manager 4th November, South Lebanon. 
33 Deeb (2006) concentrates on Shiite organisations, mainly those affiliated to Hizbullah such as the Social Advancement 
Association or the Martyrs’ Association. Rieger (2003) list the largest faith based organisations for the main confessions in 
Lebanon. In terms of public discourse, few enjoy a similarly stellar reputation in terms of capacity and efficiency, but also piety, as 
do Shiite and in particular Hizbullah affiliated organisations. 
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Figure IV.2: Founding dates of self-declared denominational affiliation of NGOs (1942-2004) (five-year moving 
average) 
  
Note: Prior to the 1940s less than a handful of NGOs registered on an annual basis, only in the mid 1940s about 10 NGOs register per year, it is only 
in the 1960s that between 20 and 50 NGOs start to register every year and only beyond the 1990s do annual registrations reach about 100 NGOs. 
Excluded from the percentage calculations are 198 NGOs that did not specify an answer, only NGOs that replied to the second questionnaire are 
considered. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
As for international comparisons in large-scale NGO surveys, reported religious affiliation differs 
significantly between Bangladeshi and Ugandan NGO surveys. The Bangladeshi survey reported only a very 
small minority (0.5%) of NGOs as religious (Gauri and Galef 2005), while the Ugandan survey reported that 
about 30% of NGOs were faith-based organisations (Barr et al. 2005). These differing values are probably 
strongly influenced by the surveys respective sample frames. The Bangladeshi survey explicitly excluded 
mosques and focussed on NGOs that had applied for international funds, which may be less likely to identify 
themselves as religious. The sample frame for the Ugandan survey, on the other hand, is much more inclusive 
and the question of whether an organisation is ‘faith-based’, rather than “religious”, may address the role of 
belief more subtly and may possibly result in different responses. In addition, the authors of the Ugandan 
survey point out that the 1970s and 1980s saw a boom in faith-based organisations, especially churches (Barr 
et al. 2005). 
Denominational affiliation in Lebanon is not limited to a question of faith but is a marker of identity 
with political and social implications. Survey results on self-declared denominational affiliation of NGOs may 
be reductive and fail to describe the meaning of denominational affiliation with nuance. This data is included 
here because denominational characteristics of NGOs are the subject of academic literature on faith-based 
NGOs in general (Clarke and Jennings 2008; Hefferan et al. 2009; Clarke 2006) as well as the Middle East in 
particular, where it is frequently linked to Political Islam (Ismail 2006; Hefner and Zaman 2007; El-Said and 
Harrigan 2009). Contributing significantly to this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis. This section 
merely seeks to make public the information on denominational affiliation of Lebanese NGOs that the 
survey offers. 
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3 A historical account of the Lebanese NGO landscape 
This section gives a historical account of the Lebanese NGO sector, tracing its growth throughout 
several periods over the past century.  
The median founding year of NGOs in Lebanon was 1992.34 This is similar to results found in 
Uganda where the median establishment year for NGOs was 1997 (Barr et al. 2005) and Bangladesh where 
the average founding year was 1993 (Gauri and Galef 2005). Reflecting to a certain extent the post 
1980sNGO boom commented on in the literature review.  
The number of organisations founded per year has varied considerably over time (see Figure 
IV.3)35. The oldest surveyed NGO registered in 1710, while the two youngest date from 2006. Throughout 
the 18th and 19th century, frequency of NGO registration was very low. NGO foundations become more 
frequent during the 20th century, in particular during its second half and especially its last decade. NGOs that 
indicated registration dates earlier than 1909, pre-date the Law on Associations and could be backdating their 
actual founding dates.  
Figure IV.3: NGO founding dates 
 
Base: 3274 NGOs 
Note: The exponential curve has been fitted to the 3 year average to avoid 0 registrations in earlier years. The exponential curve has a fit of 82% as 
measured by R2. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
 
                                                          
34 The earliest NGO surveyed registered in 1710, about 3 NGOs indicated they registered in the 18th century and only 14 in the 
19th century. Most NGOs in the sample registered in the second half of the 20th century.  
35 Further details about the correspondence of sampled NGO registrations discussed here and NGO registrations of the sampling 
frame can be found in the Appendix (see page 42). 
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It is noteworthy that, though establishments roughly coincide with the NGO in fact starting 
operation, there might be some delay in processing applications, depending on the prevailing political climate 
in general and the Ministry of Interior in particular. These factors may have affected variations in 
registrations. Therefore a trend line indicating the average over the preceding three years of NGO 
foundations for each year is useful in interpreting actual variations. Figure IV.3 shows that over the past 
century NGO registrations in Lebanon grew at an approximately exponential rate. Similar growth rates have 
been observed in Jordan (Clark and Michuki 2009) and the wider Middle East (Gubser 2002). A noticeable 
break in the growth pattern occurred during the Lebanese Civil War, when NGO registrations slowed. 
Several broad periods of NGO foundations can be identified. NGO registrations increased slightly 
after 1920 during the French Mandate but remained low overall until Independence in the early 1940s. 
During most of the 1940s and 1950s, during what Traboulsi (2007) calls a phase dominated by merchant 
capital and marked by pro-western authoritarianism, slightly more than 10 NGOs registered per year. The 
1960s and early 1970s saw Lebanon’s first ‘NGO boom’, with on average 35 NGOs registering per year. This 
was a period of expansionary public policy with more Lebanese gaining access to education. The mid 1970s 
were a period of social crisis and marked the run up to and the early years of the Lebanese Civil War; NGO 
registrations slowed across activities by on average two-thirds and NGO registrations remained low 
throughout the first years of the Civil War.  NGO registrations increased markedly across activities after 
1982. Despite the fact that this was probably the most violent period of the Civil War, NGO registrations 
picked up. This is likely due to increased foreign intervention in the Civil War being accompanied by 
increased disaster and relief spending by international donors in Lebanon. Indeed, overseas development 
assistance (ODA) to Lebanon increased both during the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the Israeli bombing of 
Lebanon in 2006 (see Figure IV.10). From the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s, annual NGO registrations 
increased fivefold, to more than 125 organisations registering each year. This second NGO boom during the 
later phase of the Lebanese Civil War and the post-war reconstruction in the 1990s coincide with the 
international NGO boom. Registrations remained high throughout the early 2000s.36  
3.1 NGO activities 
Over time, some NGO activities proved more popular than others. Several studies on NGOs in 
Lebanon (Baalbaki and Muhieddine 1998; Crumrine 2002; Karam 2000; Kiwan 2004; LCPS 1996) observe 
that the socio-economic and political context of a given historical period shapes what kind of NGOs were set 
up. Karam (2000) argues that since associations have accumulated and been superposed throughout Lebanese 
history, the NGO landscape itself reveals structures of social change in Lebanon. NGOs average founding 
dates vary significantly across activities (see Table IV.1) The key difference in NGO registrations across 
activity groups are (1) how early they started registering and (2) how pronounced the two NGO booms were 
for each activity. NGOs such as Youth & Sports and Religious NGOs experienced a more pronounced boom 
prior to the civil war, while for relatively more recent activity fields such as environmental protection, 
advocacy, or economic development the second boom was relatively more important. Variations in NGO 
                                                          
36 Figure IV.3shows a decline in registration around 2005. However, as pointed out on page 100, this is likely to be due to data 
collection issues.  
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registrations across activity fields was analysed using statistical tests of similarity of variance (see Table IV.1), 
so as to assess if certain activities were more prevalent in certain historical periods than others.  
Table IV.1: Average establishment year by activity group 
  95% Confidence 
Intervala 
Mode 
(year most NGOs 
were established in) 
Reasonably Similar Groups 
test statisticb   Mean 
Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational Clubs  1968 1944 1980 1970 Wilcoxon Rank sum    p=0.60 
 
Variance ratio test of transformed 
establishment year: p<0.001 Religious Associations 1977 1975 1979 
1962, 1971, 1989, 
1994, 2000, 2003 
Social & Charitable Services 1979 1977 1982 1993  
Education, Health Care & Research 1985 1982 1987 2000, 2001, 2005 Wilcoxon Rank sum p=0.32  
Variance ratio test of transformed 
founding date: p<0.001 Family Associations 1987 1986 1988 1994 
Community & Village Organisations 1988 1985 1989 1993, 1998, 1999 
Kruskal Wallis p=0.29 
 
ANOVA of log transformed 
founding date: p=0.21 
Social Development & Awareness Raising 1988 1985 1993 2000 
Economic Development 1988 1986 1990 2000 
Membership Associations 1988 1986 1992 2000 
Culture & Arts Organisations 1989 1987 1991 2003 
Civic & Advocacy Associations 1990 1989 1992 2004 
Environment & Animal Welfare 1995 1994 1997 2000  
Total 1985 1984 1986 2000 
Kruskal Wallis p<0.001 
 
ANOVA of log transformed 
founding date: p<0.001 
aBias adjusted confidence interval obtained through bootstrapping using 50 replications. Increasing the number of replications did 
not affect results.  
bThis column shows results testing the similarity of variance of founding date across activities. Since founding date is non-
parametric, non-parametric tests were used. The data was also lag transformed to achieve normality. Normality was not satisfied 
after transformation. However, the central limit theorem states that if the sample is large enough this may not be an issue since 
the distribution of sample means becomes sufficiently normal. The population size of the smallest activity group (religious 
associations) is 57 observations, which according to Diehr and Lumley (2002) is sufficient. The user written Stata simanova 
command was used to assess the seriousness of the violation of homogeneity of variance assumption (UCLA: Academic 
Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group n.d.). These simulation results suggest that there is little danger of falsely 
rejecting the true hypotheses for the log transformed variable. To assess similarity of variance when comparing two activities, the 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) test was used for non-parametric data and the variance ratio test for log transformed data. 
To assess similarity of variance for more than two groups, the Kruskal Wallis Test was used for untransformed and ANOVA for log 
transformed data. The null hypothesis, in all cases, states that there is no difference in variance across groups. If p>0.05 the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
Though historical context shapes NGOs, registration of NGOs, a number of activity fields have 
been remarkably constant throughout history. Namely registrations of Religious, Education, Health Care & 
Research as well as Community & Village Organisations begin early and continue throughout the two NGO 
booms. Karam (2006:39) distinguishes four periods of NGO development37 in Lebanon: firstly the mid-19th 
to mid-20th century, secondly the pre-war period from the late 1950s until the mid-1970s, thirdly the Civil 
War period (1975-1990), and fourthly the post-war period.  
19th to mid-20th century: The earliest NGO registrations 
The first NGOs in Lebanon were founded during the second half of the 18th up to the early 20th 
century.  NGOs providing education or health care were among the earliest organisations, with the two oldest 
NGOs in the sample registering in 1868 and 1878; both are faith-based education organisations. The first 
                                                          
37 Karam (2006) prefers the term ‘association’ to ‘NGO’. It is a direct translation from the Arabic (ةايعمج) and commonly used in 
Lebanon to denote NGOs. I believe they can be used interchangeably but respect the authors distinction and will use ‘association’ 
whenever referring to his arguments.  
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Social and Charitable Services organisations in the survey sample registered in 1766 (followed by 
organisations registering in 1856 and 1879). These types of organisations were easily the most prevalent until 
the mid-19th century, and have remained among the top most dynamic fields of activity.  NGO registrations 
have been the most constant for Religious Associations, the activity field with the smallest NGO populations, 
with the first NGO in the sample registering in 1736 (the second in 1867) and never more than three NGOs 
registering per year.38  
Since Ottoman schools offered levels of education deemed insufficient, Beiruti Sunnis founded the 
Makassed, now one of the most important organisations, providing mainly education but also health care 
(Karam 2006:45). Karam (2006:51) cites Labaki (1988) who argues that between 1918 and 1920 there were 
only 17 secular schools in Lebanon. Karam (2006:43) states that the majority of associations served a family 
or community network and that the lack of social policy during the French Mandate period spurred the 
development of and competition between associations.  
In addition to social service-providing organisations, several movements and ideologies articulated 
themselves through the formation of associations: ethno-sectarian, imperial, nationalist, pan-Arab, etc. 
(Karam 2006:43) Political parties are not included in the survey, but a series of political parties were founded 
in this period, such as the Communist Party in 1922, the Syrian National Socialist Party in 1936, the Kata’eb in 
1943 or the Progressive Socialist Party in 1949 (Karam 2006:48). The first Culture and Arts Organisation of 
the sample registered in 1911, the second in 1929. Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational Clubs are the activity 
category associated with the earliest foundation dates. The first of these clubs registered in 1903 (the second 
in 1905), while the first Civic and Advocacy NGOs registered in 1919 and 1921. Judging from registration 
data from the survey, many Youth and Recreational Clubs were also founded during this period.  
The pre-war years: A new type of mobilisation: modernist  
Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational Clubs saw their heyday during the first NGO boom and the 
pre-Civil War modernising period, discussed in more detail below.  The large confidence interval (see Table 
IV.1) indicates a sustained period in which these clubs were founded, though they have declined since the end 
of the Civil War. 
The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS 1999) states that the late 1960s and early 1970 were a 
period of political mobilisation, especially on the left and outside the habitual community or family structures 
that dominated associations previously. Karam (2006) adds that during the period following the 1958 
Lebanon Crisis social inequalities were increasingly forced onto the political agenda. The period was marked 
by a changing socio-economic context and engendered a new type of association, one set apart by a desire for 
modernisation and development. Gilsenan (1996:97) observes a shift in policy-making from privileging the 
personal and community ties to a focus on technocratic decision-making and universal access. In 1961 the 
Movement Social Libanais was founded by Gregoire Haddad, a popular Greek Catholic cleric who decried social 
inequality and was inspired by liberation theology. Similarly Musa Sadr’s ‘Movement of the Deprived’, a 
precursor of today’s Amal movement, recruited among urban poor of the Beiruti suburbs as well as rural 
poor Shi’a of the Bekaa and the South (Johnson 1986:171). Karam (2006) refers to the Movement Social 
Libanais as emblematic for the period. It was open to all sects.  
                                                          
38 Note that the earliest registered NGOs have been excluded as outliers in quantitative analysis. Since they reflect actual 
observations I discuss them in the text. 
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Widening access to education meant that a new generation of rural migrants received secondary and 
university education. This body of students constituted not only the cadre of the technocratic bureaucracy 
(Karam 2006:57) but also a new middle class which shaped the Lebanese association landscape. Karam 
(2006:58) argues that several left-leaning political groups invested in associations, in particular youth and 
cultural associations, as vehicles for their ideas. Kiwan (2004) argues that prior to 1975 the national student 
movement as well as national trade unions offered alternative modes of association to that of sectarianism. 
Political mobilisation by parties often went through universities, where parties would support student 
activities. Many Lebanese migrants from the southern periphery were absorbed into organisations of the left, 
such as unions and left-leaning political parties but also denominational organisations, especially Imam Musa 
Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived. Traboulsi (2007:173)  argues that the elite was unwilling to reform.  
Karam (2006:59) outlines the tension between organisations based on shared material experience and those 
based on kinship or personal and clientelist relationships. He cites studies by Ghassan Salem (1979), which 
describe how  workers and farmers in Hermel failed to organise in unions or agriculture cooperatives; and 
Tabar (1997), who analyses a village youth association with leftist tendencies that publicly denounced local 
underdevelopment and had their offices raided and torched, forcing the association to cease activity. A 
noticeable feature from the survey data for the 1960s is the rise and peak in registrations of Youth, Social and 
Recreational Clubs, more than tripling from three or four per year to about 15 per year, registration levels not 
seen since. Similarly, Culture and Arts Organisations boomed during the 1960s until early 1970s. Registrations 
of Social and Charitable Services declined from the mid 1960s, where registrations halved from about 10 
registrations a year in the early 1960s to four or five in the early 1970s. 
Thus the pre-Civil War years were a period of social organisation that challenged the status of family 
and community as prime constituents of allegiance. Associations were founded that were based on shared 
material experiences and ideological perceptions of progress. 
The Civil War: Institutionalisation and the emergence of international donors  
Karam (2006:43) argues that the insecurities and emergencies of the Civil War led to the 
involvement of international donors and pushed for an increase in administration and institutionalisation 
within associations to be able to maintain and increase service delivery. Many authors (Deeb 2006; Elbayar 
2005; El-Husseini et al. 2004; Makhoul and Harrison 2002; Makdisi and Sadaka 2003) argue that the vibrancy 
of the Lebanese NGO scene stems from their role as major welfare service providers and recipients of 
international aid during the Civil War.  In addition, the Movement Social Libanais, the Lebanese chapter of the 
YMCA and the Makassed all intensified their relationship with international donor agencies, in particular the 
United Nations, to gain access to financial resources (Karam 2006:60). Registrations of Social and Charitable 
Service NGOs more than quadrupled between 1975 and 1980. Registrations of NGOs declined across 
activities during the early years of the Civil War, but picked up during the early 1980s, due to public 
reconstruction efforts and an increase in international aid flows (Makdisi 2004:65). With the support of 
international donor agencies, NGO umbrella groups were set up to coordinate the relief effort. The Collectif 
des ONG au Liban was formed in the mid-1980s and includes Makassed, the Movement Social Libanis, Caritas, 
Amel, Terre des Hommes, the Imam Musa Sadr Foundation and the Secours Populaire au Liban. In 1988 the NGO 
Forum, which figures in the survey, was set up, comprising the YMCA, the Lebanese Federation for Child 
Care,  the Lebanese Association for the Disabled, the Superior Shiite Council, the Maronite League and the 
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Sunni Dar al Fatwa (Karam 2006:63, 68). Most of the NGOs listed in these two networks were recipients of 
foreign grants.  
Civil War militias set up social services to support their military action and lessen their unpopularity 
in areas of operation. After the collapse of the Lebanese currency in the 1980s they became increasingly 
involved in the provision of scholarships, medical assistance and food subsidies. Makdisi and Sadaka 
(2003:17) estimate that these social services amounted to about 20% of large militias’ budgets. During the 
Civil War local micro-powers such as parties or militias supervised NGO activities closely or became affiliated 
to them (Karam 2006:62). The Lebanese Association for the Disabled, for instance, is considered a close 
associate of the Amal Militia (Karam 2006:68). Baalbeki and Muhieddine (1998) argue that while the pre-war 
period saw organisations opposing sectarianism, the Civil War further entrenched sectarianism. 
The post-war reconstruction and donor discourse  
Reconstruction efforts of the post-war period led to a second, more pronounced boom in NGO 
registrations in the 1990s. Registrations in nearly all activity categories doubled or tripled. A number of 
relatively new categories, such as advocacy, the environment, and social and economic development saw 
strong increases in registrations. At the same time many categories that had been prominent in the pre-war 
period such as arts and culture activities, charities or education and health care providers also increased, 
making the Lebanese NGO sector more diverse than it had been in previous years (see Table IV.1). 
A noteworthy feature of the immediate post-war period is a short-lived boom in family association 
registrations, which briefly increased to more than 25 a year. Some may have been founded to re-connect 
family members dispersed by the war and mobilise support networks. Karam (2006:71) argues that the 
remobilisation of family associations was not opposed by the government since family networks are a 
convenient control mechanism in a clientelist set up. Survey data shows that after Mount Lebanon, most 
registrations for Family Associations came from the South. The LCPS (1999) conjectures that that the large 
number of family association registering from the Bekaa and the South were due to changes in family 
leadership induced by the war and out-migration in particular in the South.   
In terms of variance over time, Community & Village-, Social Development & Awareness Raising-, 
Economic Development-, Membership-, Culture & Arts as well as Civic & Advocacy Associations have 
followed similar foundation dynamics over time (see Table IV.1). These organisations marked the post-Civil 
War boom. They were founded concomitant to large ODA flows and emerging international attention to 
NGOs as development agents. Following the Civil War, NGOs began looking abroad for funding, in addition 
to the state or local benefactors (Karam 2006:66). 
Though registrations reached pre-war levels, Youth, Recreational and Sports Clubs no longer 
constituted the most dynamic sector within the Lebanese NGO landscape, as they had been in the 1960s. 
Registrations declined significantly after 2000. Karam (2005) argues that youth activism was absorbed within 
other categories in the post-war period; in particular into advocacy NGOs since this terminology is preferred 
by donors. After the American intervention in Iraq, Lebanon emerged on the US’ agenda for democratisation 
of the Middle East and is a recipient of funding for advocacy projects. Advocacy and Human Rights groups 
multiplied (Karam 2006:64, 71, 84). Rodenbeck (2007) argues that the ‘freedom agenda’ promoted by the G. 
W. Bush administration gained public traction in Lebanon more than in other Middle East countries. Toukan 
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(2010) adds that following the Independence Intifada in 2005 international funding for activism and arts 
increased significantly. 
Environmental and Animal Welfare NGOs are another example of a newly emerging NGO 
category. The first NGOs from the survey that were active in this category registered in 1957 and 1979 and 
registrations increased most rapidly during the 1990s, peaking in 2000. The environmental damage caused in 
several locations by the Civil War, but more importantly relentless real estate expansion and virtually absent 
environmental oversight in industry are likely domestic catalysts for environmental protection movements. In 
addition, as pointed out by Kingston (2000), development funds for environmental projects became available 
through the Global Environmental Facility created at the Rio conference in 1994. In addition to earmarked 
funds for biodiversity administered by the UNDP and technical assistance by World Conservation Union are 
likely to have supported the boom in environmental NGOs. Like many aspects of the Lebanese NGO 
landscape, the boom in the Environmental activity sector is the outcome of domestic as well as international 
conditions. 
3.2 A brief note on labour- and other social movements 
The LCPS (1999) notes that guild-like associations such as professional associations, chambers of 
commerce, and trade unions emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. The first Membership organisations from the 
survey registered in 1921 and 1923. Secular social movements and organisations had more popular appeal 
before than after the Civil War (LCPS 1996). Johnson (1977) states that what little collective action there has 
been on behalf of workers, has generally been shut down by various governments. In April 1935 the French 
authorities shot at taxi drivers who went on strike against the French tramway company and to protest low 
pay. The French High Commission interpreted this, not incorrectly, as inspired by radical pan-Syrian 
nationalists, leftists and communists, whom they saw as a threat to their authority (Johnson 1986:24). At 
farmer protests in Nabatieh in 1973, two were shot dead, causing 20,000 to demonstrate in the streets of 
Beirut the next day (Traboulsi 2007:164-165). Demonstrations on January 27, 2008 in the Beirut district of 
Chiyah were roused by electricity cuts but were due more broadly to the concurrence of high unemployment; 
stagnating wages; rising prices of necessities such as fuel and food, health care and school fees; and cancelled 
second instalments of government payments to those whose houses had been destroyed by Israel in 2006. 
Army personnel shot three protesters. The government correctly took the demonstrations as, if not instigated 
than managed by Hizbullah. Concerns of the crowd however, were left unaddressed.  
In the 1970s, Johnson (1977) adds, that zu’ama, local leaders, would not deal with organised labour 
and a salary increase was considered a gift from the za’im not subject to negotiation. Nahhas (2012) has 
argued that at present Lebanese unions are co-opted by employers, which is why they often oppose proposals 
such as real estate financed health care programs, or suggest wage increases below those of government 
proposals. He further argues that the multitude of unions registered and the fact that workers are allowed to 
register in several unions at once leave unions weak and reinforces social organisation along sectarian lines. 
Thus the labour movement only plays a tiny role in Lebanese Civil Society.  
This does not just apply to the labour movement. Karam (2005) and Kingston (2000) examine how 
issue-based social movements (civil marriage, municipal elections and environmental protection) with 
universal rather than sectarian interests become jaded by their interaction with, and need to accommodate, 
sectarian political institutions in order to see their demands implemented. Kingston (2008) points out that the 
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nature of civil society in Lebanon tends to reflect rather than transcend the socio-economic structures. Quilty 
(2006:82) adds that the vibrancy of the NGO landscape in Lebanon is not the “institutional expression of 
participatory democracy” but a network of organisations limited by Lebanese clientelism. Aside from 
organisations sponsored by and attached to political interests, such as the Future Movement, the Amal 
Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, or Hizbullah; there are also more radical 
organisations such as the Mouvement Social or ad hoc cooperatives organising the efforts of several NGOs in 
times of crises like the Mowatinoun or now defunct Samidoun (list from Quilty 2006). Still, the latter are more 
poorly-funded than the former type of organisation, mainly because in being staunchly secular, rigorously 
against corruption and sceptical towards neo-liberal policies, they alienate the conservative religious as well as 
the pro-western free marketeers and lack (and in any event refuse) powerful political patrons. 
4 NGO location and geographical concentrations of poverty 
Authors reviewed in chapter 2 (Brass 2012, Edwards and Hulme 1996, Paul and Israel 1991, Tvedt 
1998) discuss if NGOs have an advantage over the government in targeting the poor. This section examines 
this argument more closely.  
4.1 NGO location  
Lebanese NGO offices are mainly located in Beirut and its suburbs in Mount Lebanon. NGO 
concentration in and around economic and political centres has been observed by Barr et al. (2005) as well as 
Gauri and Galef (2005) in Uganda and Bangladesh. Bebbington (2004) also found that NGOs eschew remote 
areas. 
Table IV.2:  Geographical location of NGOs 
Muhafaza Number of NGOs  
 Per cent Per 1,000inh 
Beirut  22 1.5 
Mount Lebanon  35 0.8 
North 16 0.7 
Bekaa 12 0.8 
South 9 0.7 
Nabatieh 6 0.9 
Total 100 0.9 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
Since geographical coverage of the survey approximates that of the sampling frame it is assumed to 
be representative for the entire NGO sector (see the Appendix p. 162). NGO concentration per inhabitant is 
higher in metropolitan Beirut than in any other region in Lebanon (see Table IV.2). This is little surprising 
considering that are a number of networking effects may be gained from locating close to key government 
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offices, business centres, and other NGOs. However, considering NGO per inhabitant concentrations it is 
noteworthy that the muhafaza of Nabatieh, a largely rural and peripheral area39, has also high NGO 
concentrations.  
Emergence of NGOs across muhafaza 
Crumrine (2002) notes that the oldest NGOs in Lebanon were founded in urban or suburban 
centres such as Beirut, followed by Mount Lebanon and the coastal towns of Tripoli (in the North muhafaza) 
and Saida (in the South muhafaza), followed by rural locations. However, excluding the North and Nabatieh, 
variations in NGO registration dates are not significantly different (p=0.48)40 from each other.  
NGOs registered in the muhafaza of Nabatieh have the most recent average founding dates (1989, 
CI: 1986-1991), implying that the NGO population in this muhafaza is generally younger than the national 
average. Nabatieh occupies a large stretch of the Lebanese-Israeli border and so has been the most severely 
affected region in the 2006 hostilities with Israel and shares hosting the UNIFIL troops with the South 
muhafaza. Consequently Nabatieh has been the focal point of repeated reconstruction efforts. The blue-
helmet UNIFIL presence is also accompanied by a number of community development projects to win the 
sympathy and cooperation of local residents (Fisk 2007; CDA Listening Project 2009). These factors may 
explain the comparatively recent emergence of NGOs in this region as well as the high density of NGOs 
compared to other peripheral regions such as the Bekaa, the South and the North.  
The North registered the oldest NGO population, with an average founding date of 1982 (CI:1981-
1984). The NGO landscape in the North is set apart from the national average in that it has benefited little 
from the post-war NGO boom. Until recently the region was far from national headlines. Chaaban and Salti 
(2007) show how, compared to the North’s high poverty and level of unsatisfied needs, it receives little public 
spending.  Mouchref (2008) argues that Akkar, Lebanon’s poorest caza and part of the North, is a ‘forgotten’ 
region. Indeed, the two most northern and deprived caza, Hermel and Akkar, have the lowest NGO density, 
at half the national average. A study of the geographical distribution of new NGO registrations shows that 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s registrations declined in the poor North while they increased in the 
comparatively less poor South (Traboulsi 2000:29). However, this is likely to have changed in recent years, 
not included in the survey. The razing of Nahr el Bared refugee camp in 2007, Islamist activities as well as the 
presence of Syrian refugees since 2011 is likely to have increased NGO presence in the North.   
Rural-urban dynamics 
Certain activities are more prevalent in cenral areas, in particular Beirut, while other types of NGOs 
are more frequently found in the periphery (see Table IV.3). Civic and Advocacy Associations are a case in 
point, more than 80% per cent of organisations are located in urban areas and 40% in Beirut alone, while 
another 30% are in Mount Lebanon. Similarly, 84% of Membership Associations are located in urban areas, 
37% and 36% of which in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, respectively. For both advocacy and membership 
associations, an urban location benefits them, because cities and especially capital cities offer opportunities 
for networking and mobilisation as well as access to government. Associations providing education and 
                                                          
39 Lebanon is densely populated. Most rural areas are within a two hour driving distance from urban agglomerations.  
40 Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test used to compare groups. 
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health care also locate predominantly in urban areas (80%). Two-thirds of organisations are found in Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon. Unsurprisingly nearly 70% of Community and Village Associations can be found in 
rural areas. Similarly, a couple of activity fields can be found in predominantly rural areas. Occasionally, 
NGOs from one activity field are strongly represented in a certain muhafaza. Economic Development NGOs, 
for instance, are strongly represented in Nabatieh. Again, this is likely linked to reconstruction efforts and the 
UNIFIL presence in the region. There are comparatively few Youth, Sports and Recreational Clubs in Beirut.  
Table IV.3: Per cent of NGOs activities by muhafaza 
 
% 
urban 
 
Beirut 
Mount 
Lebanon 
North Bekaa South Nabatieh 
Membership Associations 84  37 36 11 6 6 3 
Civic & Advocacy Associations 81  40 29 16 4 6 4 
Education, Health Care & Research 80  31 36 16 8 6 3 
Religious Associations 75  23 32 21 12 9 4 
Social & Charitable Services 66  21 35 16 15 8 6 
Environment & Animal Welfare 65  20 41 11 14 8 6 
Social Development & Awareness Raising 64  27 29 20 12 6 6 
Economic Development 63  17 37 10 17 7 12 
Total 63  21 36 16 12 9 6 
Culture & Arts Organisations 60  21 33 15 16 10 6 
Family Associations 60  14 44 10 12 12 7 
Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational Clubs 48  12 39 17 16 10 6 
Community & Village Organisations 31  7 28 27 9 16 14 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
NGO density in poor areas 
Literature on NGOs debate whether NGOs address the needs of the poorest better than the state 
(Paul and Israel 1991) or do they target their services to the middle class or the better off among the poor 
(Abdelrahman 2004; Clark 2004).  
NGOs in Lebanon do not locate in the poorest areas. There is no significant correlation between 
NGO density and the number of poor households in a particular region (p=0.98)41. This holds even when 
considering only charities, education and health care NGOs (p=0.91). Thus there seems to be no 
relationship between poverty and NGO location.42 With small samples such as these the correlation 
coefficient is susceptible to outliers. Figure IV.4 confirms that there does not seem to be a relationship 
between poverty and NGO density, but that most areas seem to be clustered along a vertical line, implying 
similar NGO densities across the country, independent of local poverty levels. Similar evidence emerges 
when only considering welfare related NGOs, such as Social & Charitable Service and Education, Health 
Care & Research NGOs. 
It is noteworthy, that nearly all areas with an above-average percentage of poor households also 
have lower than average NGO density, implying that, if anything, poorer areas have a less dense NGO 
population. It is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from this evidence: It may testify to NGOs ability 
to alleviate poverty or indicate that NGOs do not locate in poor areas to start with. Regions like Nabatieh, 
Bint Jbeil, Marjeyoun and Hasbaya but also Jezzine, Sour and Saida, have seen improvements in terms of 
                                                          
41 Significances refer to the Pearson correlation coefficient. 
42 A number of NGOs with head offices in Beirut may run projects in remote areas. I will thus only consider NGOs active on a 
municipality or Caza level. Survey data indicates that regionally active NGOs also have their headquarters in the region they serve 
on.  
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poverty reduction between 1997 and 2004, while areas in the North, such as Akkar, Minnieh-Dunnieh and 
Tripoli have seen declines in household consumption (UNDP 2008). Thus the fact that comparatively few 
NGOs are located in Akkar or Minnieh-Dunnieh may indicate that they eschew remote and potentially 
difficult areas. 
Figure IV.4: Poverty and NGO density 
 
Sources: Poverty data are from (UNDP 2008:110, Table A.2.3). The upper poverty line was used. Population data are from (Etudes 
& Consultations Economiques and PADECO Co. Ltd. 2007:40). NGO data are from the NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by 
author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
Note: Nationally active NGOs are excluded. The poverty data for 2004 is available only within 15 sub-regions, some of which 
aggregate data for adjacent cazas. Population and NGO data was summed to match these aggregate regions. 
 
Figure IV.4 below shows that the caza of Metn, which comprises the urban sprawl in the Lebanese 
littoral between Beirut and the Nahr el-Kalb river as well as some of capital’s eastern suburbs, has a 
comparatively small share of poor households. It has also the lowest density in regionally active NGOs. It is 
noteworthy that if one includes NGOs active on a national level not represented in Figure IV.4, the region’s 
NGO density increases to close to the national average. Its outlying position in the graph is consequently 
linked to the fact that Metn hosts few regionally active NGOs but more nationally active ones.  
Chaaban and Salti (2007:15) point out that government provision is similarly skewed. The Ministry 
of Social Affairs supports social and health care centres through transfers to NGOs. The authors note that 
the distribution of these centres is skewed in favour of the Beirut. Indeed, social services financed by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and carried out by NGOs reached 10% of the poor in Beirut but less than 2% in 
the North.  
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The inter-linkage between government and NGO social service providers implies that NGO and 
government target overlapping areas, indicating that NGOs may not be better than the government at 
identifying poor areas in Lebanon. However, poverty data is only available slightly above caza level, covering 
on average about 250,000 inhabitants. Poverty levels within areas vary (UNDP 2008) and NGOs might well 
target poverty pockets within comparatively well-off areas. Still, the evidence available shows that NGOs in 
Lebanon do not primarily locate in the poorest or most remote areas.  
5 NGO Staffing 
NGOs play an increasingly important role as employers. Though benefitting from a demographic 
dividend, Middle East countries face high unemployment rates (Jones 2012), especially among youth 
(Goldstone 2011; Hoffman and Jamal 2012), who have particular difficulty in finding decent work (Dhillon et 
al. 2010). Based on the present survey it is estimated estimate that NGOs in Lebanon employ approximately 
seventy thousand individuals, or 5% of the economically active population in Lebanon.43 Personal 
information of the proxy respondent NGO employee was collected and gives some indication of education 
levels prevalent among senior or middle-ranking NGO staff. More than 92% of respondents had been to 
secondary school and two-thirds (67%) had a university degree. There is small variation in education levels 
across NGO activity categories. A lower than average proportion of staff interviewed at family, youth and 
community associations as well as Economic Development organisations had been to university, while a 
slightly higher than average proportion of staff  at religious environmental cultural and civic NGOs44 had 
graduated from university.  
5.1 Paid staff and volunteers 
One quarter of NGOs (28%) employ permanent staff or contractors. A qualitative follow up study 
to the survey (Abi Samra et al. 2009) revealed that many NGOs who are coded in the survey as having no 
paid staff do in fact have employees. The authors state that NGO employees were reluctant to disclose exact 
numbers of staff. When NGOs do employ staff and disclose their numbers, they hire on average 42 
employees or contractors (CI: 28-54). NGOs may under-report staffing levels to shirk on National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) contributions, which they are theoretically obliged to pay for each member of staff. 
However, less than a third of organisations pay NSSF contributions for their employees. This is not unique to 
the Lebanese NGO sector. NGOs in Egypt (Abdelrahman 2007), Jordan (Clark and Michuki 2009) and 
                                                          
43 This was calculated as follows: 27% of NGOs state that they employed at least one staff or contractor. Responding NGOs 
(N=655) employ 27,385 (CI: 21,348-42,182). Extrapolating this to the entire sampling frame from 2006, which comprised 6,032 
NGOs implies that 1,673 NGOs hire 69,947 staff. ILO LABORSTA (ILO 2012) indicates that in 2007 32.7% of the Lebanese population 
was economically active. Lebanese survey data (CAS and Ministry of Labor 2009) as well as data on resident refugees (Chaaban et 
al. 2012; Chaaban et al. 2010) indicates a total resident population of 4.2 million, implying 1,373,400 economically active, of which 
NGO employees constitute 5.1%. This is a conservative estimate. 
44 There were only 50 valid responses to the question of education level in the Economic Development category, 43 valid 
responses for Religious Associations, 70 for Environment and Animal Welfare Associations as well as 74 for Culture and Arts 
Associations. 
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Pakistan (Siddique and Ahmad 2012) also tend not to offer insurance coverage to their staff. Lebanese NGOs 
may be taking advantage of the unfavourable labour market or, as Abdelrahman (2007) conjectures in Egypt, 
staff may wish to receive their salaries without deductions since their period of employment is likely to be 
short. Employees may therefore collude with their employers in evading NSSF contributions.  
Figure IV.5: NGO employees covered by the National Social Security Fund 
 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
Unsurprisingly there is wide variation in staff numbers across NGOs. Service delivery, charitable, 
and religious associations have on average twelve times as much staff as membership or advocacy 
organisations (see the Appendix Table VIII.6 on p. 168). Social clubs and arts organisations lie in between 
these two in terms of staffing levels. This is likely because the running of schools and hospitals does not 
benefit from scale effects to the same extent as membership or advocacy organisations do, where the cost of 
up-scaling a campaign requires fewer additional staff than the treatment of additional patients. There is 
significant skew in the data, with a few organisations employing many more staff than the large majority.  In 
addition, more social service-providing NGOs stated that they have paid employees (e.g., 53% of education 
and health care providers) than others (e.g., 6% of membership NGOs) (see the Appendix Table VIII.6 on p. 
168 for a complete list). 
 
Volunteering 
During times of crisis, such as the July 2006 bombings, NGOs often rely on local volunteers to 
scale up their efforts (Quilty 2006). Deeb (2006), Karam (2005) and Fawaz (2005) argue that for Lebanese 
NGOs in general volunteers play an important role in service delivery.  
Three quarters (76%) of NGOs have volunteers, echoing the observation made by Salamon and 
Anheier (1992) referred to in the introduction, that volunteering is a key characteristic of the non-profit 
sector. The importance of volunteering does not differ much across organisations. Membership associations 
have the lowest share of organisations with volunteers (65%), likely because members are not considered 
volunteers, while environmental and animal welfare organisations are most likely to have volunteers (86%). If 
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NGOs do have volunteers, staff and volunteer numbers are correlated, reflecting the size of organisations. 
Indeed, significant correlation between staff and volunteer numbers are observed for health care and 
educational organisations (=0.38, p=0.001)45 as well as charitable organisations (=0.25, p=0.01). 
Figure IV.6: Average NGO paid staff and volunteers 
 
Note: Bias adjusted confidence interval obtained through bootstrapping using 50 replications. Increasing the number of 
replications did not affect results.  
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
Family associations, environmental, advocacy, village and membership organisations as well as social 
clubs all have many more volunteers than paid staff, at least five times as many. These organisations are more 
likely to be supporting the interest of their members and volunteers rather than those of disadvantaged third 
parties. Staffing is likely based on amateur engagement. These organisations are the structural opposite of 
social service-providing organisations, such as non-profit schools and hospitals, which rely on many paid staff 
with technical skills. 
5.2 Women in Lebanese NGOs 
Moghadam (2010) argues that Middle East labour markets remain prejudiced against women, 
especially married women. As a consequence, Clark and Michuki (2009) conjecture that NGOs are becoming 
increasingly important as employers of educated, professional middle class women. Gauri and Galef (2005) 
on the other hand observe that the staff of Bangladeshi NGOs are predominantly male. In Lebanon, 42% of 
NGOs have no women on their board, and about one quarter have neither women members nor women 
volunteers (27% and 24%, respectively). Nearly half (49%) have at least one women on the board and about 
                                                          
45 Both variables are non-parametric, Spearman’s  for rank correlation was used to assess and test correlation. 
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two-thirds have women members and volunteers (64% and 66% respectively).  About one in ten NGOs are 
exclusively staffed by women at either the board level (9%), or without male members (9%) or volunteers 
(10%). If NGOs are composed of both men and women, women work as a minority among men. They 
constitute about a third of NGO personnel (see Figure IV.7), with on average 33% of board members being 
women (CI: 31-34), the average share of women members being 34% (CI: 33-35) and the average share of 
women volunteers 38% (CI:37-38). This implies that, if women outnumber men, it is likely that the entire 
organisation is constituted of women only.  
Figure IV.7: The share and position of women in NGOs 
 
Note: Density curves reflecting the share of women in mixed NGOs. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
Clark and Michuki (2009) state that in the Jordanian public sector, women work in lower echelons. 
The same applies to Lebanese NGOs. The share of women members and volunteers is significantly higher 
than the share of women on NGO boards (p=0.045 and p<0.001 respectively)46. Thus there are more 
women in lower ranks of NGOs than higher ranks, though absolute differences, even if significant, are not 
very large (see Figure IV.7). Once women are strongly represented in an NGO, they are so at all levels of the 
organisation. The shares of women on NGO boards, as members or as volunteers are significantly (p<0.001) 
and strongly positively correlated with each other, with correlation coefficients between 0.5 and 0.747.  
In Jordan women NGO workers are concentrated in certain sectors, such as health and education 
(Clark and Michuki 2009), while Abdelrahman (2007) found that advocacy NGOs in Egypt are a ready 
employer of women. There is some evidence of the feminisation of certain NGO activities. The share of 
women on the board will be used as a proxy for women participation in NGOs in general. Correlation figures 
presented above justify this approach. Nearly half of all civic and advocacy NGOs have no male board 
members, echoing evidence from Egypt. Advocacy NGOs are the only sector where there are more 
                                                          
46 Since all three variables are close to being parametric I used t-tests to compare means.  
47 Using parametric measures (Pearson’s r) as well as non-parametric ones (Spearman's rank correlation ). Correlations were 
very similar across measures and all significant at p<0.001 for both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
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exclusively female than exclusively male organisations (see Figure IV.8). Nearly half or more of membership 
and community organisations and youth clubs have no women on their board. For family and religious 
associations, this approaches two thirds.  
One in six social services supplying NGOs, such as schools, hospitals and charities, have no men on 
the board, this chimes with Clark and Michuki’s (2009) argument. Interestingly however, a similar proportion 
of organisations involved in social (12%) and economic (20%) development are also composed exclusively of 
women. In fact, it is advocacy organisations that are most likely to have boards composed entirely of women. 
Figure IV.8: Share of exclusively male/female NGO boards (share of women on mixed NGO boards) 
 
Note: The bars reflect the share of NGOs that only employ women or only men. The right hand column of numbers is the average 
share of women board members in the NGO if it is mixed. For instance, 46% of advocacy NGOs have only women board members, 
while 6% of advocacy NGOs have only male board members. If an advocacy NGO is mixed, on average 45% of its staff or 
volunteers would be female.  
a Bias adjusted confidence interval obtained through bootstrapping using 50 replications. Increasing the number of replications did 
not affect results. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
If they have men and women on their boards, advocacy organisations are also the ones closest to 
parity between the sexes, with on average 45% of the board being composed of women. It is noteworthy that 
on average, nearly half of the board of religious organisations is composed of women (44%). Social service 
and development NGOs have boards on which 35-42% are women. Family associations have the lowest 
share of women board members with about one fifth (21%). Community, youth and membership NGOs also 
have relatively few women their boards.  
Thus, the Clark and Michuki’s (2009) hypothesis that feminisation takes place in particular in social 
service providing NGOs does not apply to the Lebanese case. If anything, women are under-represented in 
Lebanese NGOs irrespective of activity. It is only advocacy NGOs that approach parity between men and 
women. This section confirmed Salamon and Anheier’s (1992) conjecture that, in the Lebanese case, 
volunteers are an important resource for NGOs, in particular youth and family organisations. Still, a majority 
of NGOs employs paid staff. There are some indications that the staffing levels cited above are an 
underestimate since NGOs are reluctant to disclose staff numbers. Despite a legal obligation, very few NGOs 
pay social security contributions for their staff.  
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6 NGO revenue - between government and ODA 
More than staffing levels, NGOs were reluctant to disclose income data. 50% of respondents chose 
not to declare their budget. Barr et al. (2005:664) faced similar problems in Uganda, where a third of their 
respondents were unwilling to provide financial accounts. They also note that of those who did, many were 
inconsistent. The authors conjecture that many Ugandan NGOs only keep approximate accounts. Similar 
cautions apply to the budget data presented below. This section also analyses in more detail two key sources 
of NGO funding in Lebanon, namely the government and overseas development aid (ODA) 
Figure IV.9: Average NGO budget in US Dollars 
 
Notes: Response rates were very low; the base of 1671 translates into an overall response rate of 50 per cent. Across NGO 
activities response rates varied between 39% (Religious Associations) and 61% (Youth, Sport & Social Clubs). Means exclude 
outliers and negative responses. Confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping with 50 iterations. Bias-adjusted confidence 
intervals displayed. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion) . 
6.1 NGO budgets 
As was the case with staffing levels, there is a large amount of positive skew in the data for NGO 
budgets, since the size of NGOs surveyed varies considerably and average budgets are dominated by large 
NGOs. The 10% of NGOs (165 organisations) with the highest budgets account for 90% of the total sector 
budget, while the bottom 50% account for two percent.48 This is comparable to the Ugandan case, where 30 
NGOs, or 15% of valid responses, accounted for 90% of total sector budget (Barr et al. 2005:665). In 
                                                          
48 This excludes two top outliers, one with a budget of $258 million and one with a budget of $68 million. All figures are from 
2006 and have not been adjusted. 
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Lebanon, half of responding NGOs indicated annual budgets below $10,000. The median revenue for 
Ugandan NGOs in 2000/2001 was $ 22,000 (Barr et al. 2005:665). The average budget for Lebanese NGO 
respondents was $140,57849. The comparison with Uganda is instructive, if flawed, since many organisations 
with small budgets (such as Family Associations or Youth Clubs) were excluded from the Ugandan sample.  
Older NGOs tend to have larger budgets. Founding year and budget are significantly, though 
weakly, negatively correlated ( = - 0.16, p<0.001). There are marked differences in budget across activity 
fields. Membership and local grassroots-based organisations such as Family and Membership Associations, 
Community Organisations, Youth and Sports Clubs, and Arts and Culture Organisations have smaller average 
budgets of $32,000. Conversely, intermediary NGOs, such as those involved in education and health care, 
have budgets 20 times that value with $621,000, which is twice as much as charitable NGOs or advocacy and 
development NGOs. These have on average annual budgets of between $100,000 and $300,000 (see Figure 
IV.9). This pattern broadly reflects the staffing numbers discussed above. 
Estimating the size of the NGO sector in terms of money disbursed is difficult. This difficulty stems 
from two main challenges. Firstly, while NGOs do submit income statements to the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs, these are often considered as an annual formality rather than an attempt to account for past activities 
(Abi Samra et al. 2009). The LCPS estimates the total budget of NGOs in the 1990s as between US$ 250 and 
300 million (LCPS 1996:25). Extrapolating from survey data and assuming that half of all registered NGOs 
do not have a budget, which is to say are based solely on the in-kind and labour contributions of their 
members, a total sector budget of $420 million (CI: 280-565) is estimated, which is in line with estimates 
made by the LCPS, considering they were made in 1999 and the present ones date from early 2006.  
About a third of the total sector budget (38%) is spent by education and health care organisations, 
which constitute 9% of the NGO population. A fifth (26%) is spent by social and charitable organisations, 
which constitute 18% of organisations, managing budgets of $218,000 per organisation, per year. Social 
development organisations, which constitute 7% of the NGO population, manage 15% of the sector’s 
cumulative budget, and have average budgets exceeding those of charitable organisations at $297,000, though 
confident intervals are large, indicating a lot of variation within this group. Civic and advocacy NGOs spend 
6% of cumulative non-profit budget and constitute 4% of the NGO population. They have on average same 
budget as charitable organisations. This is in contrast to Youth and Sports clubs which constitute 14% of 
organisations but only account for 3% of cumulative sector budget, or family associations constituting 12% 
of total organisations but managing 1% of total non-profit budgets. Thus numerous small grassroots or 
membership-based organisations with small budgets exist alongside fewer but in terms of budget much larger 
intermediary NGOs, providing services and working in development or advocacy. 
6.2 NGO funding sources: the government and overseas development aid 
As briefly alluded to in the section on NGO location (p. 71), the Lebanese government, in particular 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, subcontracts the provision of services to external providers, frequently NGOs. 
20% of NGOs indicated that they received funds from the government and a third (32%) had some form of 
cooperation with the government. Cammett (2007) argues that since the government is a major indirect 
provider, as source of financing behind nominally private organisations, the distinction between state and 
                                                          
49 This refers to strictly positive amounts only. 
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non-state actors in Lebanon is blurred. Within the 2006 budget proposal, the year applicable to the survey 
data, the Lebanese Ministry of Finance  stated that the Ministry of Social Affairs spent $62 million, which is 
97% of its budget, supporting 720 NGOs and welfare centres as well as on “contributions to social 
committees and UN projects” (see Table IV.4).  
Table IV.4: Government contributions to NGOs 
Responsible Government 
Agency 
US$ 
million 
% of 
government 
budget 
recipient NGOs 
Ministry of Social Affairs  62.33 97 
233 contracts with NGOs,176 social welfare institutions, 65 special 
welfare institutions,146 social development centres &branches, 
typical centre for individuals with disabilities, contributions to 
social committees and UN projects 
Ministry of Education& 
Higher Education  
23.15 4.1 
364 subsidized schools (affiliated to NGOs), 19 vocational training 
projects, Primary and Secondary Teachers Unions, Private Teachers 
Union, National Education Scout, National Education Counsellors 
Ministry of Public Health  7.16 3.1 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA),Red Cross, Caritas 
Ministry of Youth & Sports 1.58 44.6 2 sports clubs,17 unions, 4 committees, 2 associations 
Ministry of Information 0.66 4.9  
Ministry of Environment 0.53 27.3 7 protected areas, environmental associations 
Ministry of Justice  0.46 1.4 1 Association for delinquent minors 
Ministry of Tourism  0.45 5.8 7 Tourism Associations, 5 committees 
Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers  
0.43 0.2 Former Public Employees, Caritas, Pilgrimage Mission 
Ministry of Labour  0.33 0.5 Labour Union 
Ministry of Displaced  0.33 8.7  
Ministry of Industry  0.27 7.6 The Institute for Industrial Research 
Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport  
0.20 0.6 Technical School for Preparatory Training 
Ministry of Culture  0.18 1.6 65 Cultural Associations, clubs, gatherings 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0.03 0.04 Lebanese Ambassadors Forum 
Total 98.1 1.3  
Source: Ministry of Finance (2006) 
 
The Ministry of Education & Higher Education spent $23 million on subsidising 364 schools and 19 
training projects. The Ministry of Public Health spent $7 million on support for the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA), Red Cross and Caritas. This excludes additional subsidies to registered hospitals and 
dispensaries. In total $98 million was allocated to NGOs by Lebanese ministries, amounting to 1.3% of the 
government budget. 
This is likely to be an underestimate, because research by Rieger (2003) lists NGOs not mentioned 
in Table IV.4. The government’s contribution to private health care providers is more significant. Cammett 
and Issar (2010) state that the government is the major indirect provider of health care, as the key source of 
financing behind the mostly private health care organisations. Though coverage is minimal and of last resort, 
the Lebanese social security administration is the major funder of the healthcare system in Lebanon. Cammett 
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and Issar (2010) add that the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, the army and cooperatives of 
employees are also important financiers of the system.  
Conversely, a number of authors reviewed in chapter 2 argue that NGOs may replace government 
in terms of service provision (Deeb 2006,  Farrington and Bebbington 1993,  Gideon 1998,  Hungerman 
2005, Igoe and Kelsall 2005). Gruber and Hungerman (2007) argue that NGOs may take up social service 
provision in response to government budget cuts. Fruttero and Gauri (2005), however, find that projects of 
well known Bangladeshi NGOs were in the same locations as government projects. In Lebanon, 
subcontracting of social services to NGOs may lead to a similar overlap between government and NGO 
presence. 
Table IV.5: Partial correlation between NGO location and public service provision (controlling for population) 
Selected NGO Sectors 
Overall public 
Spending 
US$ Millions 
(1996-2005) 
Number of Public 
School students by 
caza (2001-2002) 
Number of Public 
Schools by caza 
(2001-2002) 
Number of hospital 
beds created 
(1996-2005) 
Edu. Health Care & Research 
0.418* -.270 -0.379 .291 
.04 .19 .06 .16 
Soc. & Charitable Services 
.347 -.277 -0.376 .251 
.09 .18 .06 .23 
Soc. Dev. & Awareness Raising 
0.363 -.122 -.121 0.376 
.07 .56 .56 .06 
All sectors 
0.347 -.288 -.316 0.393* 
.09 .16 .12 .05 
Note: The first line represents correlation coefficients, in italics below the two tailed significance levels.  
Sources: Government expenditure, health care and education data from Chaoul (2007), population data from Etudes & 
Consultations Economiques and PADECO Co. Ltd. (2007) and NGO data from MoSA (2007). 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
There is a significant correlation between government spending per caza, and the number of NGOs 
located in it. However, this correlation becomes weaker or disappears when controlling for population. Table 
IV.5 analyses if NGO density per capita and government spending are correlated, that is to say take place in 
the same locations. While public spending per sub-region is positively correlated to NGO density the 
relationship is not always significant. If correlations between NGO location and government spending are 
significant, they are also positive. Thus government provision supports, rather than replaces NGO presence, 
an observation also made by Cammett and Issar (2010) with particular reference to health services in 
Lebanon.  
The fact that many social services in Lebanon are provided by NGOs who act as subcontractors to 
the government implies that the relationship between government expenditure on the whole and NGO 
foundation is positive rather than negative. That is to say, NGO foundations increase as government 
expenditure increases. Indeed, Table IV.6 shows that the relationship between NGO registrations and the 
volume of government expenditure is positive and significant when controlling for ODA (r=0.41, p=0.04)50. 
Partial correlation was used to assess this relationship since the post-Civil War Lebanese government has 
relied extensively on foreign aid. In fact, ODA flows and Lebanese government spending are moderately 
correlated but the correlation is not statistically significant.  
                                                          
50 Pearson’s correlation was used despite the data being non-parametric. This is to assess shared variance. As above, Spearman’s 
 for rank correlation yielded similar results and significance levels. 
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This positive relationship holds especially for NGOs engaged in social service delivery rather than 
advocacy. Indeed, correlations between NGO registrations and government expenditure, controlled for 
ODA, are positive and largely significant for social service and development organisations as well as 
environmental, advocacy and culture and arts organisations (see Table IV.6). The founding dates of charitable 
organisations are positively correlated to government expenditure (r=0.36) but just miss the 5% significance 
level. This is evidence against the argument that NGOs respond to shortcomings in government expenditure. 
These data support conjectures that increased government expenditure may lead to a proliferation of NGOs. 
Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational Clubs and Religious Associations in addition to Family Associations and 
Community and Village Associations were not significantly correlated to government expenditure. Thus, 
intermediary NGOs defending the interests of third parties are more likely to respond to increases in 
government expenditure than local or membership based ones.  
Table IV.6: Correlation coefficients for ODA and government expenditure with NGO registrations 
  ODA Government Expenditure 
  N=44 (1960-2004, excl. 1981) df=25 (1972, 1974-76, 1980, 1982-2002) 
Correlation Statistic Pearson Correlation Spearman's Rho Partial Correlation controlled for ODA 
NGO registrations 
.389** .413** .406* 
.01 .01 .04 
Edu. Health Care & Research 
.476*** .589*** .504** 
.00 .00 .01 
Soc. & Charitable Services 
.395** .450** .366 
.01 .00 .06 
Soc. Dev. & Awareness Raising 
.327* .387** .440* 
.03 .01 .02 
Econ. Dev. (finance, small 
business) 
.285 .373** .404* 
.06 .01 .04 
Environ. & Animal Welfare 
.408** .600*** .490** 
.01 .00 .01 
Civic & Advocacy Assoc 
.432*** .542*** .508** 
.00 .00 .01 
Culture & Arts Org. 
.313* .361* .525** 
.04 .02 .00 
Membership Assoc. 
.375* .476*** .401* 
.01 .00 .04 
Community & Village Org. 
.305* .333* .231 
.04 .03 .25 
Family Assoc. 
.312* .404** -.058 
.04 .01 .77 
Youth, Sports, Social & 
Recreational Clubs 
-.115 -.133 .165 
.46 .39 .41 
Religious Assoc. 
.070 .106 .123 
.65 .49 .54 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05, p values are given in italics below the correlation statistic. The year 1981 is an 
outlier, see Figure IV.10. 
Sources: NGO registrations: MoSA (2007), Overseas Development Assistance: OECD-DAC (2009c). ODA in current prices was 
deflated using OECD-DAC (2009b) deflators for the USA. Ideally, ODA flows from each donor should be deflated individually and 
added up. However, since the United States are Lebanon’s largest donor and I am merely interested in variations of ODA deflating 
the totality of ODA by a deflator for US American ODA is sufficient. Lebanese government expenditure: data for 1972, 1974-1976 
and 1991 from Helbling (1999), for 1980, 1982-1990 from Makdisi (2004) and for 1992-2008 from the Lebanese Ministry of 
Finance (2009). Government expenditure in current prices was deflated using consumer price indices from Gaspard (2004). Refer 
to p. 167 in the Appendix for a more in depth discussion of how the time series for government expenditure was constructed. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
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6.3 NGOs and ODA 
In addition to the government, overseas development aid is an important source of NGO finance. 
NGO literature (Tvedt 1998) debates whether NGOs are in fact a response to increased availability of 
overseas development aid rather than a response to need. There are several sources for ODA flows, though 
none are entirely reliable. The most frequently used sources are OECD statistics on overseas development aid 
as well as more recently the AidData database. These data have two shortcomings. Firstly, especially when 
going back beyond the 1990s, the data does not provide a very good indication of how much money is 
disbursed to NGOs. Secondly, and more importantly, OECD data is flawed with respect to bilateral and 
multilateral donors from the developing world, in this case Arab countries and affiliated agencies as well as 
Iran. Arab countries frequently make donations to each other outside official donor conferences.  
AidData (2011) as well as OECD (2009c) data show that France, the United States and Italy are the 
largest bi-lateral donors for Lebanon, while the European Community and Arab multi-lateral agencies are the 
most important multi-lateral agencies. This data may underestimate contributions made by bi-lateral Arab 
countries. In 1977, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) replaced the Lebanese Ministry 
of Planning and became the main administrating institution of loans and grants to the Lebanese government. 
CDR data is useful to validate OECD and AidData resources.  
As for multi-lateral donors their contribution to Lebanon listed by the CDR broadly match those of 
AidData. However, there is some divergence when it comes to bi-lateral donors. According to the CDR 
(2010; 2007; 2011; 2008; 2004), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait contribute between 8-11%  of ODA annually. Data 
from the CDR fills a gap with regards to the importance of Arab donors, which may avoid international 
donor structures and not figure in AidData nor OECD databases. A notable absence from CDR data is the 
United States, which contribute only 2% of CDR-administered funds.  
Some donors prefer to disburse funds directly to municipalities or NGOs, circumventing the state 
(Karam 2006:85). Eid-Sabbagh (2007) argues that donors are increasingly disillusioned with the working of 
the Lebanese political machine and seek to implement programmes directly or channel funds through 
alternative institutions, circumventing those of the state.  Western donors prefer to work through pre-existing 
development programmes they run in Lebanon, while most Arab donors use local Lebanese partners 
(Hamieh and Mac Ginty 2008). For example, in 2006 a $243 million grant from the EU was disbursed over 
four years through the European Commission Cooperation Framework’s Beirut office. Similarly the majority 
of US funds is directly managed by USAID and affiliated NGOs (Traboulsi 2000:28).  
Examining various donors’ contributions after the July 2006 bombings is indicative of their 
political interests within Lebanon and their trust in the government. While Kuwait and Qatar signed 
protocols with the government, Iran did not lodge funds with the government and worked directly with 
municipalities. Iran declared support without a ceiling and newspapers estimate the funding volume in 
excess of US$1billion (Hamieh and Mac Ginty 2008). Saudi Arabia routed most of its funds through the 
central government, directly through the Prime Minister’s office (then Sanyioura, a Hariri ally).  
Though AidData has more project-based details and would be a preferred data source, its time series 
are shorter than those of the OECD, and hence OECD data was used. Survey evidence from Lebanon 
supports the hypothesis that development aid flows and NGO foundation are related. The post-Civil War 
period, when the country was awash with foreign aid money, was also the most dynamic in terms of NGO 
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foundations. Table IV.6 shows that ODA51 flows are moderately correlated to NGO registrations (=0.41, 
p=0.01)52. The degree of correlation between ODA and NGO registrations varies from activity to activity. 
The only two activity fields not significantly correlated to ODA are Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational 
Clubs, and Religious Associations. Religious associations are more likely to receive funds from private 
individuals rather than governments. In addition, OECD data used may underestimate contributions made by 
governments of Muslim countries. The responsiveness to ODA is particularly strong for Advocacy and 
Environmental NGOs as well as education and health care organisations, the founding dates of which 
moderately to strongly correlate with ODA. As discussed on p. 68 of this chapter, this may be in part 
explained by reconstruction funding as well as the US’ agenda for democratisation of the Middle East, which 
increased funding for advocacy projects (Karam 2006, Rodenbeck 2007, Toukan 2010). In addition, through 
the Global Environmental Facility of 1994, funds for environmental projects became available (Kingston 
2000).  
Beyond correlation coefficients 
Correlation coefficients are limited in scope and some of the above results are puzzling. In particular 
the fact that the founding of Family Associations is correlated to ODA flows but not government 
expenditure. Especially since their key target group is very exclusive, mainly restricted to family members, and 
their purpose is to support a specific family network. In addition, the next chapter will show that hardly any 
institutional donor makes contributions to these organisations. Only one Family Association indicated that it 
received funds from an international or Arab donor. It may be that the correlation between NGO registration 
and ODA is spurious and veils additional underlying factors, such as the general revival in associational life 
following the end of the Civil War; concomitant but not necessarily related to increased ODA flows. 
A scatter plot of NGO registrations and ODA flows to Lebanon (see Figure IV.10) shows that 
observations are clustered into two groups: The first, in the bottom left of the figure, comprises years when 
up to 75 organisations registered and ODA reached up to around $200 million. This cluster chiefly contains 
observations from the pre-Civil War period (1960-1974)53 as well as some observations from the mid- to late-
1980s and one from 1991. The second cluster can be roughly delineated by the gridlines that indicate between 
100 and 150 annual NGO registrations and annual ODA flows of between $200 million and $400 million. 
This cluster depicts observations for the post-Civil War years (after 1990). Connecting these two clusters does 
indeed indicate a positive correlation between ODA and NGO registrations. However, no correlation exists 
within these two clusters. Splitting the sample into pre-war (1960-1974) and post-war (1991-2004) period, the 
correlation between ODA and NGO registration is small, not significant and even negative.  
Additionally, observations in the lower right of the figure do not seem to follow the correlation of 
high ODA and high NGO registrations. These observations signify combinations of high ODA, i.e. above 
US$200 million annually, and average or low NGO registrations, i.e. below 100 registrations. All, bar one of 
these observations are for Civil War years. Due to conflict, associational life is likely to have slowed and 
NGO registrations are unlikely to have been processed promptly by the government, Development aid to 
                                                          
51 As will be discussed below in more detail, ODA figures from the OECD tend to significantly underestimate funding from Arab 
states. 
52 Spearman’s  for rank correlation was used since data are non-parametric. Pearson’s gives similar results and significance 
levels. 
53 Observations for ODA are only available from 1960. 
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Lebanon has been high during or immediately after acute conflict that attracted international attention. The 
year 1981 is an outlier that falls in this group. While 33 NGOs registered in 1981, which is a similar number 
to adjacent years, Lebanon received US$922 million in ODA. This is more than five standard deviations 
above the mean and more than two standard deviations away from the observation’s nearest neighbours, the 
years 1978 and 1980.  
Figure IV.10: Scatter plot of NGO registrations and ODA 
 
Sources: NGO data from survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). Overseas Development 
Assistance: OECD-DAC (2009c). ODA in current prices was deflated using OECD-DAC (2009b) deflators for the USA. 
 
General ODA disbursements54 are often unreliable and delayed, and disbursement schedules 
depend on the budgetary requirements of donors more than recipients’ needs (Bulířa and Hamanna 2008). 
High ODA levels in 1978 are due to, official reconstruction efforts that had begun with support from the 
Arab summit in Cairo and in 1977. The CDR drew up a reconstruction plan in 1978, from which date 
onwards the CDR attempted to secure external loans and grants (Collelo 1989). The 1981 and 1980 and to a 
lesser extent 1982 increases in ODA to Lebanon are the actual disbursements of pledges made in 1979 in the 
framework of the Arab Summit in Tunis (Majdalani 1988:40). Less than a quarter of the amount pledged was 
received in practice (Makdisi 2004:66). Foreign aid declined after the withdrawal of the multi-national force in 
1983; in particular US American aid was suspended following the Marines barracks bombing (Collelo 1989). 
Similar ODA spikes as in the 1980s were again seen in 2002. In 2002 the Paris II conference was held with 
                                                          
54 The OECD (OECD Development Assistance Committee 2009a), which collects the statistics I refer to define ODA as: “Grants or 
Loans to (…) developing countries which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development 
and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element of at least 25 per cent]. In 
addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. 
(...) Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance pay-outs) are in general not counted.” 
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the main purpose to restructure Lebanese government debt. It also had development and financial aid 
components.55  
It seems that the positive correlation between ODA and NGO registration may stem from 
connecting two different historical periods, or more visually, clusters: the low ODA, low NGO pre-war 
period with the very high NGO registration and comparatively higher ODA post-war period. Though ODA 
flows play a role in shaping the Lebanese NGO landscape, it is vital to consider the influence of domestic 
historical contexts in NGO registrations. High rates of NGO registrations in the post-war period may be a 
response to increased funding or a sign of reviving civic life after a period of conflict.  
While ODA disbursed through the government may be used as budgetary support or potentially 
government support for affiliated NGOs, ODA allocated by donors directly, chiefly western funds, are an 
important source of revenue for Lebanese NGOs and may be a tool for Western donors to wield political 
influence.   
7 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to place Lebanese NGOs in their national as well as international context, by 
giving a historical overview over the role of the third sector in Lebanon and its importance in the country’s 
labour market, as well as examining to what extent hypotheses made concerning NGOs in the literature apply 
to the Lebanese context. 
The regulatory environment for NGOs in Lebanon is liberal, especially when compared to 
neighbouring Arab countries. Submissions of registration documents and annual reports are straightforward 
administrative requirements and often a mere formality. However, the Lebanese government discriminates 
among NGOs, with Palestinian and foreign NGOs subject to stricter oversight. This lax regulation, the 
outcome of a government unable to plan and execute comprehensive policy strategies, is probably an 
important factor contributing to the vibrancy, at least in terms of numbers, of the Lebanese NGO sector. 
NGOs are split almost equally, at least in terms of numbers, into on the one hand membership and 
grassroots organisations, namely social clubs (14%), family (12%), culture (11%) membership (10%), and 
community (7%) organisations; and on the other hand intermediary NGOs, namely social service providers, 
which make up one quarter of all NGOs, NGOs working in economic or social development (16%), and 
advocacy NGOs (7%). These categories are quite fluid; a number of surveyed NGOs indicated their 
organisations goals in vague terms and this may be evidence that mission drift is an issue among Lebanese 
NGOs.  
The composition of the Lebanese NGO sector varied over time in response to changing 
circumstance. The number of NGOs operating in Lebanon has increased exponentially since at least the late 
19th century, though there was a significant dip in registrations during the period of the Civil War. Charitable, 
family, religious as well as social and youth clubs are among the oldest NGOs, while development and 
advocacy organisations are significantly younger. Membership organisations, such as professional or alumni 
organisations are also quite recent, indicating at least a partial shift in social organisation from one based on 
                                                          
55 A very similar follow up conference was held in 2007 (Paris III) a time period not covered by the survey data. 
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kinship (in family organisation) to one based on shared material experiences, such as education or profession. 
Four distinctive periods can be isolated. The first, during the early 20th century was a period marked by 
charitable and welfare organisations, often operating within religious communities. The second period, the 
pre-Civil War, was marked by a policy shift to modernisation policies of economic and regional development, 
this was concurrent to the heightened formation of political parties (not included in this survey) and social 
organisation expressed in the foundation of arts and culture associations as well as youth and social clubs. 
Policy focus on the underdeveloped periphery potentially played a role in the increased formation of village 
and community organisations. The formation of social service delivery NGOs declined, a trend that was 
reversed during the third period, the Civil War, which saw a shift of focus from development to emergency 
service provision. Service delivery NGOs were further institutionalised during the Civil War period, due to 
war pressures requiring service delivery without a state. Registrations of grassroots and membership 
associations declined. The post-war and fourth period, in the 1990s and early 2000s, saw the emergence of 
NGOs as international development actors on a global scale. Since the Civil War, in addition to domestic 
funding, international funding has become increasingly important. Lebanese NGOs increasingly respond to 
international trends in development discourse. The registration of development, but even more so advocacy 
organisations increased, as Lebanon became part of the drive for democracy in the Middle East and involved 
in environmental activism following the Rio conference. Lebanese NGOs are shaped by periods of war and 
peace and are involved in a political economy context of varying national and international funding priorities 
as well as political agendas. 
Few Lebanese NGOs locate in remote areas; instead, they are concentrated in and around Beirut. 
NGOs also eschew poorer regions. As sub-contractors of public services, NGO location often mirrors the 
location of government spending, refuting the hypothesis that NGOs may be replacing the government as 
service providers. If anything, NGO provision tends to be reinforced by government spending, especially 
with regards to social services. There is little evidence in Lebanon that NGOs may have a grassroots 
information advantage that allows them to better identify the poorest of the poor. The NGO landscape in the 
South of Lebanon has seen a recent renaissance following the aid inflow after the July 2006 war, and as a 
consequence NGOs there have the youngest average age by registration year. NGOs are oldest in the North, 
a poor region which until recently was far from political interests, though with events in the Nahr el Bared 
refugee camp and continued clashes in the  Bab el Tebbene neighbourhood in Tripoli as well as the recent 
Syrian refugee crisis, this may change.  
As has been observed in other surveys, (Barr et al. 2005) many small NGOs, with few staff and 
small budgets, co-exist with a small number of large organisations. Only a quarter of NGO respondents had 
any paid staff and half of all respondents indicated annual budgets below $10,000, though budget and paid 
staff levels are likely to be understated. The average budget for NGOs is $140,000, size varies across 
activities, with social service providers having on average more staff and much larger budgets, while 
grassroots organisations have smaller budgets and fewer staff. Some organisations, such as those involved in 
advocacy or environmental protection have quite large budgets when compared to their comparatively few 
staff. Membership associations and social clubs have many staff but low budgets. Levels of volunteering are 
relatively higher among these organisations than intermediary NGOs. In total it is estimated that the non-
profit sector in Lebanon has an annual budget of $421 million and employs about 5% of the economically 
active population. Two-thirds of proxy-respondent staff members are university or college graduates, and 
over 90% have attended secondary school.  However, only a minority of Lebanese NGOs pay national social 
security contributions for their staff. The majority of NGO employees are male, senior positions in particular 
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tend to be taken by men rather than women. It is noteworthy that nearly half of all advocacy NGOs are 
staffed solely by women. Conversely three-quarters of religious and family associations with staff, have only 
male employees.   
Lebanese NGOs have international as well as national donors. NGO foundations respond to both 
government expenditure as well as international development aid. The government is an important 
contributor in particular to social service delivery NGOs. As for international aid, the foundation of religious 
associations and youth clubs is largely independent of international development finance while advocacy, 
environmental, education, and health care organisations respond more strongly to increases in international 
aid. Saudi Arabia, France and the United States are the largest bi-lateral donors to Lebanon, each with their 
own political interest. This is served by either supporting the government, as many Arab donors do; or 
channelling funds to sympathetic Lebanese organisations, as is the case of Iran; or donors can channel funds 
through local branches of their own organisations, which seems to be the preferred channel for western 
donors.  
The next chapter will discuss these varying funding sources, and what kind of NGOs are the 
preferred recipients of what kind of funding sources. 
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V. Donor-NGO matching
Funding is a primordial consideration for many NGOs. This chapter will analyse what type of 
NGOs receive funding from what kind of donors. While the previous chapter addressed Proposition 1 of the 
first research question, by analysing how context shapes NGO operations, this chapter focuses on 
Proposition 2 of that question, namely how donors influence NGO characteristics. The previous chapter 
showed that historical events, for example, influence what types of NGOs are founded, such as social service 
providing NGOs during the Civil War. Similarly, legal context can stimulate or stifle the sector. The previous 
chapter already hinted at the importance of donors by highlighting that NGOs respond to the availability of 
funding, as demonstrated by the rise in advocacy NGOs linked to donors’ democracy building agenda in the 
wider Middle East. NGOs in Lebanon have access to a variety of funding sources, from institutional donors 
such as international funding agencies or the government, to service or membership fees. International 
development aid to Lebanon as well as transfers by the Lebanese government to NGOs, were discussed at 
the national level in the previous chapter. This chapter analyses funding flows at the organisational level. 
Rather than answering questions related to how the NGO sector as a whole responds to increases or 
decreases in government funds or ODA, this chapter takes NGOs themselves as the unit of analysis.
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This chapter hypothesises that each funding source shapes the structure of the organisation reliant 
on it. That is to say, NGOs relying mainly on funding from local government may have different institutional 
structures than NGOs receiving funding from international organisations. NGO structure here refers to 
NGO characteristics such as the organisation’s activities, its age, location, institutional sophistication, share of 
women employees, or degree of worker protection. 
First, the seven most important types of funding available to NGOs, will be described, namely  
1. funding from local56 or  
2. national government,  
3. service or  
4. membership fees,  
5. donations from private organisations, that is to say businesses, or individuals, and   
6. international funding agencies or  
7. the Lebanese non-profit sector.  
Second the NGO characteristics that are assumed to be associated with certain funding sources are described, 
before analysing the results of multi-variate analysis, linking funding sources to NGO characteristics. 
1 NGO funding sources  
Funding shapes the governance and managerial structure of NGOs (Abi Samra et al. 2009). Though 
most NGOs receive funding from a variety of sources simultaneously, government funding, third sector 
grants, as well as private donations are more important for intermediary NGOs than for membership and 
grassroots organisations, with the latter more likely to fund itself through membership fees and volunteer 
labour contributions. Abi Samra et al. (2009) group funding sources available to NGOs into three categories: 
(1) “Easy money”, which Abi Samra et al. describe as coming without accountability, and is chiefly comprised 
of donations made by private individuals, service and membership fees. (2) “Partisan money”, which is 
granted to gain or cement the political allegiance of the NGO and compromise, where applicable, the NGOs’ 
neutrality and independence. Political figures, parties and the Lebanese third sector or ‘ruling class NGOs’ are 
the main contributors. As discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation, government funds may 
occasionally also be partisan. And lastly, (3) “difficult money”, requiring a project proposal and strict 
mechanisms of monitoring and reporting. It is focussed on mainstream NGOs that can abide by professional 
standards of program management and have a history of working with these donors. The main donors 
making these funds available are international development agencies.  
The importance of funding sources and what percentage of the budget derives from each source 
cannot be ascertained from the survey data, merely what share of the NGO population as a whole makes use 
of what kind of funders. Most NGOs (94%) derive at least some of their revenue from membership and 
service fees. This confirms arguments made in the literature. Jawad (2009:107) argues that service fees 
constitute a substantial source of major faith-based social welfare providers’ revenues. Ben Nefissa et al. 
(2005:9) concur that NGOs in the Middle East often raise funds by collecting payment for their services. 
                                                          
56 Local government here refers to municipalities. 
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Examples in Lebanon include religiously run schools that charge fees, though quite low ones, or mobile 
clinics.  
Figure V.1 shows that more than half (52%) of NGOs obtain funds from private individuals or 
organisations. Ben Nefissa et al (2005:9) point out that NGOs might have links to private businesses and 
engage in fundraising efforts such as donation boxes or fundraising events such as dinners or iftars A single 
Ramadan dinner hosted by Lebanese NGO al-Mabarrat, for instance, can raise as much as $2 million (Deeb 
2006:89). Islamic NGOs receive religious donations, such as khoms and zakat (obligatory religious 
contribution, taken as a percentage from income. 
One third (34%) of NGOs receive donations from central or local government sources. Abi Samra 
et al. (2009) report that interviewed NGOs which receive funds from the government, usually ran service 
centres on behalf of the government, echoing observations made in the previous chapter that NGOs in 
Lebanon work as subcontractors to the state for public services. As seen in the previous chapter, the 
Lebanese government is an important funding source for service delivery NGOs in particular. Only 14% of 
NGOs receive funds from the Lebanese third sector. 13% of NGOs receive funds from international donors. 
The previous chapter showed that NGO foundations increase in number with increased availability of 
overseas development aid.  
Figure V.1: Sources of funding used by Lebanese NGOs 
 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
These findings overlaps with observations made by Gauri and Galef (2005:2053) in Bangladesh, 
who found that the most common source of revenue for NGOs was from service and membership fees 
followed by local and central government contribution. Half of Bangladeshi NGOs surveyed had received a 
grant from bilateral, international or UN agencies, which is a higher share than found in the Lebanese NGO 
sector, even if one excludes activity fields not considered by Gauri and Galef (2005) (such as Youth, 
Membership, Family or Culture and Arts Associations). This may be explained by the authors’ sampling 
methodology, which was limited to NGOs that had at some point considered applying for a grant with an 
international donor.  
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Table V.1: Revenue structure of 130 Lebanese NGOs 
Funding Source percentage of cumulative total 
Government 8 
Foreign 18 
Service Fee 39 
Local Donation 17 
Other 13 
Total 100 
Source: Traboulsi (2000) 
 
Since the NGO survey lacks information on the magnitude of each funding source, one can 
presume that their share of total income was approximately that found by Traboulsi (2000) in a 1999 study of 
130 Lebanese NGOs (see Table V.1). Traboulsi found that membership and service fees are the largest 
source of NGO revenue, at 39%. The study also found that 17% from domestic donors, while 8% is given by 
the government and 13% from other sources (Traboulsi 2000:29). The proportion of revenue estimated by 
Traboulsi to come from overseas (18%) is less than that conjectured by Haddad (1995) who found that 70% 
($165 million) of Lebanese NGO funding is local and 30% is foreign ($71 million). 
2 NGO characteristics as predictors of funding source 
2.1 NGO activities 
Though service and membership fees are a source of revenue for nearly all Lebanese NGOs, 
funding structures differ across activities. Grassroots organisations such as culture and arts NGOs as well as 
youth and sports clubs, in addition to social development NGOs, follow the general funding structure 
outlined in Figure V.1. youth and sports clubs are, comparatively, the most likely of all types of NGOs to 
receive national  (30%) and local (40%) government support. Conversely these NGOs are least likely to 
receive national (10%) or international (8%) third sector support. This is in contrast to environmental NGOs, 
the youngest category, which are more likely than other NGO types to receive funds from abroad (20%) or 
from national (28%) and local (29%) government. Few membership and family NGOs obtain funding from 
institutional donors. Not more than 9% receive government support, not more than 8% receive support from 
the local third sector and not more than 7% from international donors.  
This echoes observations made in the previous chapter about the small budgets of these 
organisations and is likely tied to the organisational missions of lobbying and networking for the membership 
group’s benefit. Non-institutional donors are slightly more important to membership and family associations, 
with about a quarter of this group raising funds via service fees and about a fifth raising funds from private 
donors and individuals. Donations from private individuals are particularly important for family associations 
(31%). However, their key source of funding remains membership dues.  
Fees are also a critical income source for service provider such as schools and hospitals, as well as 
economic development NGOs, which include micro-finance associations and NGOs offering trainings for a 
participation fee or the use of facilities and equipment for rent. One third of economic development 
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organisations receive funds from local government. As for schools and hospitals, the Lebanese third sector is 
an important source of financing, with more than a fifth of surveyed schools and hospitals receiving funding 
from that source. 
Fewer religious associations receive government funds than other kinds of NGOs. Though religious 
organisations play an important role in politics and the private lives of Lebanese, this indicates that the 
majority are at least nominally financially independent from the government. Two-thirds of religious 
associations receive funds from private individuals, more than any other kind of NGO, while one-third of 
religious associations receive funds from private organisations.  These figures are comparable to charitable 
organisations, of which more than half receive donations from private individuals and a third from private 
organisations. The Lebanese third sector is also an important donor to religious organisations; a quarter 
receive funds from it, more than any other kind of NGO.  
In summary, religious, advocacy, and environmental NGOs are most likely to have foreign donors; 
religious NGOs are most likely to receive funds from the Lebanese third sector; and charitable, educational, 
health care, and religious NGOs are most likely to receive private donations. Schools, health care providers,, 
and economic development NGOs are most likely to receive service fees, while sports, social clubs, and 
service providing NGOs are most likely  to receive local and national government funds (see Table VIII.7 in 
the Appendix for a detailed breakdown and significance of predictors).  
2.2 Location 
The funding structure of NGOs located in some regions differs from that of NGOs located in 
others. NGOs located in the Bekaa valley are more likely than other NGOs to receive government funds; 
one-quarter of Bekaa-based NGOs receive national government funds and 43% receive local government 
funds, more than twice as many as the national average.  NGOs from Beirut and the Bekaa are the least likely 
to receive funds from service fees. NGOs located in Beirut are also the least likely to receive national (16%) 
or local, that is to say municipal, (6%) government funds. NGOs located in the North are less likely than 
average to receive funds from municipalities. Instead, NGOs located in the North (69%) are more likely to 
receive funds from private individuals than NGOs located elsewhere. The same holds for service fees, which 
nearly half of all NGOs located in the North receive (48%). A similar proportion of NGOs from Mount 
Lebanon also relies of service fees (46%). Private individuals (36%) and the Lebanese non-governmental 
sector (20%) are more likely to fund NGOs from Mount Lebanon than from any other region. NGOs from 
the North are the least likely to receive funds from private organisations. International donors prefer NGOs 
located in Beirut itself. NGOs from Nabatieh are the least likely to receive funds from both the Lebanese 
third sector (5%) and international donors (7%).  
Thus international donors as well as the Lebanese third sector have a perceptible bias against NGOs 
located in the periphery, namely the North, the Bekaa, the South and Nabatieh. This also holds to a lesser 
extent for private organisations. Donations by private organisations mirror patterns of economic activity in 
Lebanon, with the centre around Beirut and Mount Lebanon being more active than the peripheral regions. 
The periphery vs. centre relationship is less clear for government funding. While there is a bias against NGOs 
from Beirut, NGOs located in Mount Lebanon are more likely to receive government funds than NGOs 
located elsewhere. Private donations and service fees are comparatively more prevalent in the North, a region 
comparatively neglected by government and international donors alike. 
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International donors, the Lebanese third sector, and private companies are more likely to give to 
NGOs operating on a larger geographic scale. The likelihood of an NGO receiving funding increases 
monotonically with the size of the area covered by its operations; NGOs operating within one municipality 
are the least likely to receive funding from these sources, while nationally operating NGOs are most likely to 
receive such funding.  The relationship between geographic coverage and NGO funding from government 
sponsors or service fees or else private individual donors, is less strong and not monotonic. Predictably, 
municipal donors are significantly more likely to give to NGOs that operate on a municipal level than on a 
national or regional level. Private individuals are also more likely to donate to NGOs operating on a more 
regionalised scale, in this instance the caza level, rather than the national level (see Table VIII.8 in the 
Appendix for details). 
2.3 Institutional sophistication, budget size and inter-agency cooperation 
More institutionally sophisticated NGOs, that is to say those that have a bank account or 
commission external auditors, are more likely to receive funding from nearly all funding sources than 
unbanked or internally audited NGOs. Older NGOs are more likely to receive funding from all sources 
except international ones (see Table VIII.8 in the Appendix). NGOs with international donors are the most 
sophisticated in terms of having a bank account, using computers, hiring external auditors and hiring 
employees specifically to fundraising (see column percentages in Table VIII.9). This indicates that foreign 
donors are the most administratively demanding of all funding sources.  NGOs receiving funds from 
municipalities tend to be the least sophisticated in terms of computerisation, banking, fundraising and 
reporting. Non-institutional donors give to NGOs with varying degrees of institutional sophistication, 
suggesting more nuanced donor preferences. Generally, non-institutional donors give to NGOs with less 
emphasis on fundraising staff and external auditing.  
NGOs receiving funding from the Lebanese third sector as well as the national government rank 
second in terms of institutional sophistication. International donors, the Lebanese government as the 
Lebanese third sector are also the three institutional donors whose patronage has the greatest impact on 
NGO budgets (see Table VIII.9). NGOs with Lebanese third sector or foreign donors have, on average, 
budgets that are twice the size as those of NGOs without such donors. NGOs receiving service fees or 
government funds have an average budget four times the size of NGOs that do not. This may be linked to 
the fact that NGOs receiving service fees or government funds are often service providers (see Table VIII.7 
in the Appendix). It also suggests the importance of service fees and government patronage to many NGOs. 
NGOs with private sector organisations as patrons have budgets that are 50% higher than those that do not, 
while having private individuals as donors increases budget size by about a third. Conversely, NGOs 
receiving municipal funds or membership fees have smaller budgets than NGOs without such donors. Sports 
and Social Clubs, as well as Arts and Culture Organisations frequently receive municipal funds and 
membership fees. As discussed in the previous chapter, these NGOs are often smaller than other types of 
NGOs such as schools or hospitals. This size differential for organisations relying on membership fees has 
also been noted in a qualitative study (Abi Samra et al. 2009). 
NGOs that have more than one branch, or at least one paid employee or contribute to the national 
social security fund are more likely to receive financial contributions from all sources except municipalities 
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and membership fees (Table VIII.11). NGOs with more than one branch are twice as likely to receive grants 
from international donors, roughly 50% more likely to receive support from the central government or the 
Lebanese third sector, about one-third more likely to receive service fees, and one-quarter more likely to 
receive funds from private individuals.  
Similar observations can be made about NGOs with paid staff. Having paid staff doubles an 
organisation’s likelihood to receive funds from international donors, increases an organisation’s likelihood by 
50% to receive funds from the Lebanese third sector and increases an organisation’s likelihood by about a 
third receive funds from service fees and private contributions. Organisations with a larger staff are more 
likely to receive funds from these sources. This effect is particularly strong for organisation with funding 
from international donors, private organisations and service fees. Organisations that do receive funds from 
these sources have almost twice as many staff as organisations which do not. In addition, organisations with 
more staff members covered by social security are more likely to receive funds from private organisations, the 
Lebanese third sector and to lesser extent international donors.  Organisations with at least some employees 
covered by the NSSF versus none at all, are particularly more likely to receive of contributions from the 
central government or international donors.  
To briefly sum up NGO staffing conditions: Financial support from the central government, 
international donors or the Lebanese third sector is more likely to go to organisations which are larger, 
namely those that have more than one branch or paid staff, and of such NGOs which do have support from 
these sources, they also have a larger average number of employees and are more likely to pay NSSF 
contributions. Donations from private individuals and organisations, or funds from service fees, are also 
associated with larger NGOs, however their bias against smaller, less institutionalised NGOs is not quite as 
strong. Conversely, NGOs that rely chiefly on membership fees for their income are less likely to have paid 
staff. If such NGOs do have paid staff, they have much fewer, on average, than other organisations and their 
employees are less likely to be covered by national social security (NSSF) (see Table VIII.10 to Table VIII.12 
in the Appendix for detailed listings). These results corroborate qualitative findings from Lebanon (Abi Samra 
et al. 2009) as well as quantitative results from Uganda, where NGOs that do receive grants from 
international donors tend to be older, have more staff and manage bigger budgets (Fafchamps & Owens, 
2009). Siddique and Ahmad (2012) comment on the difference in size and organisational style between small 
and large NGOs in Pakistan. They found that small and regional NGOs, of which there are thousands, are 
much less likely to rent out expensive offices or lease costly SUVs. They also add that small NGOs are not 
under as much scrutiny. They add that job opportunities with large international NGOs are perceived as 
more desirable.  
Data show that organisations that cooperate with the government, with local NGOs, or with 
international organisations are also more likely to receive government, private sector, Lebanese third sector or 
international funding.57 NGOs cooperating with the government or other NGOs are approximately three 
times more likely to also receive funding from international sources. Similarly, NGOs cooperating with the 
government or contracting with international organisations are twice as likely to receive funds from the 
Lebanese third sector. NGOs that cooperate with either the government, other NGOs or have a contractual 
relationship with an international NGOs are about twice more likely to receive funds from private 
organisations than organisations which do not. NGOs with a contract with an international organisation or 
                                                          
57 This in an implicit validation of the survey. The association between receiving government funding and cooperating with it is 
highly significant, indicating that the survey is internally consistent.  
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cooperating with another NGO are 50% more likely to receive government funding (see Table VIII.13 and 
Table VIII.12 in the Appendix for details).  
2.4 Beneficiary committees and self-declared sectarian affiliation  
While NGOs already connected to the government, international donors or international donors are 
more likely to be more successful at fundraising from a variety of sources, a reverse relationship is found with 
respect to beneficiary participation committees. NGOs receiving funding from any source analysed in this 
chapter are also significantly less likely to have beneficiary committees than those without these funding 
sources. For example, NGOs with beneficiary committees are half as likely to receive international donations 
as NGOs without these committees. Organisations relying on membership fees are an important exception, 
for them having a beneficiary committee increases the likelihood of receiving membership fees. This is an 
intuitive result since members are also likely beneficiaries of the organisation (see Table VIII.15 in the 
Appendix for details). These results indicate that institutional donors, such as the government or international 
donors, in Lebanon may prefer organisations with comparatively less participatory practices. 
Another dimension of beneficiary-NGO relations is sectarianism, in particular in the Lebanese 
context. Sectarian affiliation of an NGO may increase or decrease the organisation’s attractiveness to a donor. 
The Lebanese third sector is the only donor category significantly more likely to give to an NGO with 
sectarian affiliation as opposed to without. Two variables were constructed assessing which NGOs serve only 
Christians or Muslims (see Table VIII.16 in the Appendix). In the sample, 9% of NGOs serve only Muslims 
and 6% only Christians. Christians here include Maronites, Catholics, Orthodox and Armenians, while 
Muslims include Sunni, Shi’a, Druze and Kurds58. As with self-declared sectarian affiliation, here too the 
Lebanese third sector is more likely to fund NGOs which serve only Christians or only Muslims. Municipal 
funds are more likely to go to NGOs which serve Muslims only. NGOs serving only Christians are 
significantly more likely to collect service fees than other NGOs, while NGOs only serving Muslims are 
significantly less likely to collect service fees.  This may be explained by Christians’ comparatively higher 
socio-economic status, being more able to pay for services. These results indicate that sectarianism in donor 
behaviour is largely limited to private donors, with the notable exception of municipal funding. This does not 
imply that sectarian patronage at the central government level does not exist, but rather that it may be more 
complex than can be captured by a survey instrument.. 
All NGOs admit to running into difficulty when attempting to achieve their objectives; this should 
not be mistaken for incompetence. Self-reported difficulties demonstrate awareness by the NGOs of 
potential problems and difficulty. Being self-aware about problems increased the likelihood of receiving 
funding from all sources except for donations from private individuals (see Table VIII.14 in the Appendix). 
In sum, uni-variate analysis of donors indicates that large institutional donors, such as the central 
government and international funding agencies, as well as to a lesser extent the Lebanese non-profit and 
private sectors, expect a higher degree of institutional sophistication, size and geographical scope from the 
NGOs they fund than local government donors or private individuals. In particular, membership fees are 
given irrespective of characteristics, such as size or reporting, that are important for institutional donors. The 
                                                          
58 They are considered separately in the survey because, while Sunni, Kurds do not identify as Arab 
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next section will combine the predictors described in this section in a multi-variate analysis to investigate the 
relationship between funding sources and NGO characteristics in more detail.  
3 Estimation of donor choice 
This section examines NGO characteristics that jointly predict which donor contributes to what 
type of Lebanese NGOs. A logistic regression model is used to assess how NGO characteristics affect the 
probability of an NGO receiving funds or not from one of eight funding sources, namely (1) central 
government funds, (2) municipal funds, (3) donations from private sector organisations, (4) donations from 
private individuals, (5) funds from the Lebanese third sector, (6) international agencies, (7) service fees, or (8) 
membership fees. NGOs can appeal to several funding sources at the same time and these eight funding 
sources are not mutually exclusive. Hence the likelihood of an NGO receiving funds from each of these 
sources, given the NGOs characteristics, will be estimated separately.  
3.1 The model 
The outcome variable in all eight cases is binary, namely to receive funding from the donor in 
question or not. 𝑌𝑖 is the binary variable representing donor choice, which takes the value one (“1”) if the 
NGO is receiving funds from the source under consideration and zero (“0”) otherwise. The expected value 
of e of an NGO receiving funding from a donor is equal to the probability 𝑝𝑖 . The actual probability of an 
NGO receiving funds from a certain donor is not observed, simply the actual outcome for each 𝑖𝑡ℎ NGO in 
the sample. The aggregated proportion of NGOs receiving funding from a specific source across the sample 
of NGOs is assumed to represent the actual likelihood across the Lebanese NGO population. The outcome 
is assumed to be conditional on explanatory variables, such as size, location or institutional sophistication; 
represented by the vector 𝒙𝒊. This can formally be written as: 
 
E[ 𝑌𝑖  |𝒙𝒊 ] =  𝑝𝑖     (1) 
 
The probability of an NGO receiving funds from a specific source can be written as: 
 
Pr[ 𝑌𝑖 = yi |𝒙𝒊 ] = {
𝑝𝑖              𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 = 1
1 − 𝑝𝑖      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 = 0
  (2) 
or in one line: 
 
Pr[ 𝑌𝑖 = yi |𝒙𝒊 ] = 𝑝𝑖
𝑦𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖)
(1−𝑦𝑖) (3) 
 
Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant (2013:6) point out that logistic regressions are frequently used to 
estimate dichotomous outcomes since the model coefficients, represented by vector 𝜷, give meaningful 
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estimates, namely odds ratios, of the effect a specific predictor has on the outcome probability. The 
exposition below follows their methodology. So as to be able to estimate the probability of an NGO 
receiving funds using linear predictors, the following model specification is used:  
 
E[ 𝑌𝑖  |𝒙𝒊 ] =  𝑝𝑖   =  
𝑒(𝜷 ∙ 𝒙𝒊)
1 + 𝑒(𝜷 ∙ 𝒙𝒊)
 (4) 
 
This is transformed using the logistic transformation, which involves taking the natural log of an 
odds ratio. 
logit (E[ 𝑌𝑖  |𝒙𝒊 ]) =  𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑖
)   (5) 
which simplifies to: 
logit (E[ 𝑌𝑖  |𝒙𝒊 ]) =  𝜷 ∙  𝒙𝒊 (6) 
 
This transformation allows specifying the probability of an NGO receiving funds from a specified 
source as a linear combination of NGO characteristics. The aim is to estimate the vector of coefficients 𝜷  in 
equation (4). This is done using the maximum likelihood approach, based on a maximum likelihood 
function. The underlying likelihood function is the product of the probability mass function (3) across 
observations. Due to mathematical convenience, it is the log of the likelihood function which is maximised 
subject to 𝜷. The vector of estimators obtained by maximising the log likelihood function denotes the 
maximum likelihood estimator 𝜷′, which will be the estimator interpreted below. 
3.2 Fitting the model 
The econometric methodology applied here merely evaluates correlations, not causation, hence if an 
NGO chooses a donor or vice versa is a matter of theoretical framework. In the present context it may be 
more apt to speak of donor-NGO matching. Donor characteristics are not considered in the following 
estimations and form an important omission, since they are likely to be a major factor in convincing an NGO 
to apply for funding with a certain organisation or not. However, data on donors is not included in the 
present dataset. 
A number of hypotheses with regards to implicit donor and NGO preferences have been elaborated 
in the previous section, and are re-stated below. 
 
1. Large institutional donors seem to prefer large, more institutionally sophisticated NGOs 
that are not participatory 
2. Membership fees and local government funds are preferred sources of finance for less 
institutionally sophisticated NGOs that are more participatory 
 
The survey data previously described will be used to analyse the model. The empirical model to be 
estimated is defined overleaf: 
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𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖
𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑉𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐼𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑃𝐵𝑖
+ 𝛽13𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  ,   
 
where FUND is the binary funding source dependent variable after the logit transformation  
and j refers to either of eight funding sources, namely: central government funds,  
municipal funds,  
donations from private sector organisations,  
donations from private individuals,  
funds from the Lebanese third sector,  
international agencies,  
service fees, or  
membership fees. 
 
As for the covariates, ACT is a five-level multinomial variable denoting NGO activity. The first, 
default, level are social service-providing NGOs, which include schools, hospitals, and charitable 
organisations. Religious associations are included in this group because many of them provide charitable 
services. Social service NGOs are compared to advocacy NGOs, the second level, which also includes 
environmental NGOs. The third level contains economic and social development NGOs; the fourth level is 
composed of grassroots NGOs, which include youth and social clubs, arts and culture organisations, and 
community or village associations. The fifth level is composed of membership and family NGOs.  
AGE is the age of NGOs in 2007 transformed by the natural logarithmic function to correct for 
skew. LOC is a multinomial variable referring to an NGOs’ location in one of the five governorates 
(muhafazat). SECT is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the NGO declared that it had a sectarian 
affiliation. GVTcoop, NGOcoop, and NGOcontract are three dummy variables equal to one if the organisation 
cooperates with the government, other NGOs, or has a contractual relationship with another NGO, 
respectively. INST is an index for institutional sophistication. The index is based on whether the organisation 
has a bank account, an employee dedicated specifically to fundraising, hires an external auditing firm, or uses 
computers. Rather than taking the uni-weighted sum of these four variables, which would imply that having a 
bank account has equal significance for the institutional sophistication of an organisation as hiring an external 
auditing firm, each element was weighted using their factor loading based on principal component analysis, 
following procedures proposed by Filmer and Pritchett (1999). Since the variables under consideration are 
dummies, tetrachoric correlation matrices were used a basis for the principal component analysis (Kolenikov 
& Angeles, 2009).59 High values of INST indicate more institutional sophistication.  
BENIF and STAFF are dummy variables that are equal to one if the organisation has a beneficiary 
participation committees or paid staff, respectively. STAFFNO refers to the number of paid staff employed 
in the NGO. To correct for skew it has been transformed using the natural logarithmic function, and to avoid 
undefined values, 1 was added to the variable prior to the transformation if the organisation does not have 
paid staff. The actual transformation reads: STAFFNO=ln(number of paid staff +1) (Bartlett, 1947; Osborne, 
2002). The interpretation of the coefficients attached to the two variables STAFF and STAFFNO differ. 
Coefficient 11 is an indicator of how donor choice responds to increases in staff, given that an organisation 
already has paid staff, while 10 refers to the two cases of an organisation having paid staff at all or not.  
                                                          
59 The single factor kept explains 63% of variation and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.73, which 
according to Kaiser (1974) is middling. 
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NSSF is an ordinal variable in four levels. If NSSF equals one, all employees of the organisation 
benefit from national social security; if NSSF equals four, none does. NSSF is treated as a continuous variable 
in the model. PB is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the organisation declared having difficulty in 
carrying out its mission. Tables of uni-variate analyses for each predictor can be found in the Appendix (see 
Figure VIII.3 in the Appendix) 
3.3 Sample size and internal validity 
The number of effective predictors is quite large, with 22 covariates, including all levels of 
multinomial variables. A number of predictors have a substantial proportion of missing values (see Tables 
VIII.8.-VIII.15. in the Appendix for a list of valid observations per predictor). Since missing values are 
excluded list-wise, this reduces the valid sample size to between 2104 and 2214 observations, depending on 
the funding source. Too many co-variates for a limited number of observations may lead to over-fitting of the 
models, making results applicable only to the present special case but not to other; similar samples (Cibulka & 
Harrell, 2010; Harrell, 2001). Peduzzi et al. (1996) suggest that the minimum sample size should be at least ten 
times larger than the ratio of the number of covariates divided by the smallest outcome proportion of the 
dependent variable. In the present case eight independent variables are examined, namely the eight different 
funding sources. Alternative to Peduzzi et al. (1996), Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) recommend that the lower 
number of observations in the outcome variable should be more than fifteen or twenty times larger than the 
number of covariates present in the model.  
Table V.2: Minimum required sample size  
Outcome variable 
smaller 
outcomea 
number 
of co-
variates 
propor 
tion 
 
Peduzzi et al. (1996)  Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) 
minimum N 
actual N of 
total sample 
 minimum N 
actual N in 
outcome 
central 
government funds 
positive 22 21%  1025 <2106  330-440 <452 
municipal funds positive 22 21%  1041 <2105  330-440 <445 
service fees positive 22 42%  519 <2106  330-440 <892 
individual private 
donors 
positive 22 43%  513 <2105  330-440 <902 
private sector 
organisations 
positive 22 27%  819 <2214  330-440 <595 
Lebanese third 
sector 
positive 22 14%  1613 <2104  330-440 >287 
International 
donor 
positive 22 12%  1781 <2105  330-440 >260 
membership fees negative 22 10%  2200 >2111  330-440 >211 
a Refers to the outcome variable occurring or not.  
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
Table V.2 shows that following Peduzzi et al. (1996) the minimum recommended sample size is 
given for all funding sources, except for membership fees. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) there is 
a risk in over-fitting the model for donor choice of the Lebanese third sector, international donors and 
membership fees. Harrel (2012) suggests that this is less of an issue if the main purpose of the model is not to 
report on its predictive accuracy but rather to assess the partial tests statistics of a set of pre-selected 
predictors. Indeed, in the present case the concern is less with predicting donor and NGO preferences than 
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analysing what motivates different choices, which is to say the sign and significance of the models’ 
coefficients are of interest when applied to different funding sources than with the predictive power of the 
models themselves. 
In the absence of a second dataset for external validation of the model, Harrel (2012) suggests 
carrying out an internal validation of the models at risk of over-fitting, to verify the robustness of obtained 
results.  In the present case bootstrapping is used for internal validation; it is a re-sampling method repeating 
the regression analysis for a number of samples drawn from the original number of observations. 500 
repeated samples were used.60 Results of the models estimated by bootstrapping show that measures of fit 
are virtually identical to those obtained through the standard estimation methods. Confidence intervals are 
marginally larger. Three odd ratios change significance after bootstrapping. Two become significant and one 
loses significance. One of these occurred in a model at risk of over-fitting as outlined by Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2006), namely the model examining NGO characteristics associated with funding from international 
donors. Two odds ratios changed significance in models with nominally enough observations according to 
both Peduzzi et al. (1996) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2006), namely the models examining central 
government funds and funds from private sector organisations (see Table V.3, odds ratios with superscripts a 
and b). The specific odds ratios are discussed in more detail in the results section. In all three cases, odds 
ratios’ p-values hover just around the 5% significance level. The maximum variation in p-values before and 
after bootstrapping is less than a hundredth of a percent (0.01%). These results indicate good internal validity 
of the eight models.  
3.4 Results 
Table V.3 presents the model’s estimation results. Since the same predictors are used to fit eight 
different choice models, the pre-defined set of predictors explains some of the eight choices available better 
than others. The varying degrees of fit are described in more detail in the following section, after an analysis 
of the results. Among the funding sources analysed are five institutional donors: (1) organisations from the 
Lebanese third sector, (2) international donors, (3) central and (4) municipal government sources, and (5) 
private sector organisations. In addition, three individual-based funding sources are analysed: contributions 
from (1) private individuals, (2) service fees, and (3) membership fees.  
NGO characteristics associated with increased likelihood of funding across donor types  
Though varying NGO characteristics are associated with different types of donors, a number of 
them are common predictors of funding across donor types. In particular in terms of activity, contributions 
from all five institutional donors as well as from private individuals or service fees are significantly less likely 
to go to membership NGOs, than to NGOs pursuing other activities. In addition, linkages or networks in the 
form of cooperation with the government or other NGOs, is an important predictor of nearly all funding 
sources, especially from institutional donors. An NGO with at least two of either (1) government 
cooperation, (2) NGO cooperation, or (3) a contract with another NGO, is significantly more likely to receive 
                                                          
60 In the case of membership fees a number of parameters could not be estimated for 54 out of the 500 bootstrap replicates. 
Hence the revised estimators and confidence intervals are based on 446 repeated samples. 
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funds from an institutional donor, such as the Lebanese third sector, an international agency, local or central 
government, or a private sector organisation. This indicates that there are strong network effects among 
Lebanese NGOs and that NGOs well connected in government are more likely to receive third or private 
sector funding and vice versa.  Fafchamps and Owens (2009) find similar results with respect to Ugandan 
NGOs, where success in attracting grants, from international donors in particular, depends mostly on 
network effects, defined as the NGO being part of an umbrella organisation, having a contractual relationship 
or affiliation with an international NGO, or a manager simultaneously working in another NGO. Note that 
the high odds ratios demonstrating that having a contract with an NGO increases the likelihood of receiving 
international funding ten-fold (OR 10.01, CI: 7.1-14.14), and the odds ratio showing that cooperating with 
the government increases the likelihood of funding from the government fourteen-fold (OR 14.34, CI: 10.32-
19.9), are internal validations of the study. They indicate consistency between questions asking about inter-
agency cooperation and funding sources.  
Awareness of problems in implementing NGO activities increased the likelihood of receiving 
funding from all sources, however the odds ratio coefficient does not reach statistical significance for funds 
from international donors, the central government or private individuals. 
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Table V.3: Regression results (Odds ratios with confidence intervals in parenthesis) 
 
 
Lebanese 
third sector 
Intl. donors 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
private 
sector org. 
private 
individuals 
service fees 
membershi
p fees 
 
         
A
C
TI
V
IT
Y
 
Social 
services 
default default default default default default default default 
Advocacy 
1.03 
(0.60-1.76) 
1.77 a 
(1.00-3.15) 
1.15 
(0.67-2.00) 
0.90 
(0.51-1.58) 
0.81 
(0.52-1.28) 
0.68 
(0.44-1.04) 
0.76 
(0.50-1.16) 
1.06 
(0.59-1.89) 
Develop
ment 
0.73 
(0.45-1.19) 
0.97 
(0.57-1.67) 
1.11 
(0.71-1.72) 
1.18 
(0.76-1.85) 
0.86 
(0.59-1.24) 
0.91 
(0.65-1.28) 
1.06 
(0.76-1.48) 
1.31 
(0.80-2.16) 
Grass-
roots 
0.77 
(0.54-1.09) 
0.91 
(0.60-1.38) 
1.38 a 
(1.00-1.92) 
2.12*** 
(1.55-2.88) 
0.85 
(0.65-1.11) 
0.88 
(0.69-1.13) 
1.01 
(0.79-1.30) 
2.94*** 
(1.90-4.56) 
Member-
ship 
0.36*** 
(0.22-0.58) 
0.36** 
(0.19-0.65) 
0.33*** 
(0.20-0.55) 
0.49** 
(0.32-0.75) 
0.78 
(0.57-1.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.32-0.57) 
0.69** 
(0.52-0.91) 
3.76*** 
(2.17-6.51) 
 
         
LO
C
A
TI
O
N
 
Beirut default default default default default default default default 
Mount 
Lebanon 
1.62** 
(1.13-2.33) 
0.52** 
(0.34-0.77) 
1.78** 
(1.20-2.65) 
5.15*** 
(3.25-8.15) 
1.94*** 
(1.45-2.60) 
1.09 
(0.83-1.43) 
1.84*** 
(1.39-2.42) 
0.64* 
(0.42-0.97) 
North 
0.45** 
(0.25-0.81) 
0.62 
(0.36-1.07) 
4.84*** 
(2.91-8.05) 
0.76 
(0.40-1.45) 
0.67* b 
(0.45-1.00) 
3.10*** 
(2.20-4.36) 
2.21*** 
(1.57-3.10) 
1.26 
(0.70-2.24) 
Bekaa 
0.79 
(0.48-1.31) 
0.42** 
(0.22-0.77) 
2.38*** 
(1.47-3.86) 
10.50*** 
(6.31-17.48) 
0.93 
(0.63-1.37) 
0.75 
(0.53-1.07) 
0.86 
(0.60-1.23) 
1.22 
(0.67-2.21) 
South 
0.40** 
(0.20-0.79) 
0.22*** 
(0.10-0.48) 
0.75 
(0.42-1.36) 
3.18*** 
(1.78-5.70) 
1.22 
(0.80-1.89) 
0.40*** 
(0.26-0.62) 
1.29 
(0.86-1.94) 
1.26 
(0.63-2.55) 
Nabatieh 
0.30** 
(0.12-0.75) 
0.61 
(0.28-1.33) 
1.04 
(0.54-2.01) 
3.90*** 
(2.09-7.27) 
0.77 
(0.45-1.32) 
0.61* 
(0.38-1.00) 
1.30 
(0.83-2.05) 
6.01* 
(1.38-26.1) 
AGE 
1.10 
(0.96-1.27) 
0.90 
(0.77-1.06) 
1.30*** 
(1.13-1.50) 
1.33*** 
(1.17-1.52) 
1.00 
(0.90-1.11) 
1.08 
(0.98-1.20) 
1.15** 
(1.04-1.26) 
1.08 
(0.93-1.27) 
INST  
1.06 
(0.94-1.21) 
1.33*** 
(1.16-1.53) 
1.26*** 
(1.13-1.41) 
1.00 
(0.89-1.13) 
1.10* 
(1.00-1.21) 
0.95 
(0.87-1.03) 
1.25*** 
(1.14-1.36) 
1.02 
(0.88-1.17) 
GVTcoop 1.90*** 
(1.41-2.56) 
1.90*** 
(1.33-2.70) 
14.34*** 
(10.32-19.9) 
2.0.3*** 
(1.56-2.65) 
1.33** 
(1.05-1.67) 
0.92 
(0.73-1.15) 
1.02 
(0.82-1.27) 
0.46*** 
(0.33-0.66) 
NGOcoop 
1.76*** 
(1.30-2.39) 
1.07 
(0.75-1.54) 
1.17 
(0.88-1.55) 
1.76*** 
(1.35-2.28) 
1.57*** 
(1.26-1.96) 
1.20 
(0.98-1.48) 
1.06 
(0.87-1.29) 
1.00 
(0.71-1.42) 
NGOcontract 
1.45* 
(1.03-2.06) 
10.01*** 
(7.1-14.14) 
1.43* b 
(1.00-2.02) 
0.85 
(0.59-1.21) 
1.42* 
(1.07-1.88) 
0.93 
(0.70-1.24) 
0.64** 
(0.48-0.86) 
0.45*** 
(0.31-0.67) 
SECT 1.42* 
(1.01-2.00) 
1.27 
(0.84-1.93) 
0.89 
(0.63-1.25) 
1.13 
(0.84-1.53) 
1.05 
(0.81-1.36) 
1.04 
(0.82-1.32) 
0.92 
(0.73-1.16) 
0.53** 
(0.37-0.76) 
BENIF 
1.33 
(0.98-1.80) 
1.08 
(0.77-1.52) 
1.38* 
(1.05-1.81) 
0.82 
(0.62-1.07) 
0.56*** 
(0.45-0.70) 
0.59*** 
(0.48-0.73) 
0.64*** 
(0.52-0.79) 
1.03 
(0.73-1.44) 
PB 
1.54* 
(1.03-2.32) 
1.25 
(0.81-1.92) 
1.04 
(0.74-1.46) 
1.49* 
(1.06-2.09) 
1.37* 
(1.04-1.80) 
1.15 
(0.90-1.47) 
1.64*** 
(1.29-2.09) 
2.25*** 
(1.55-3.27) 
STAFF 1.23 
(0.70-2.16) 
1.30 
(0.70-2.41) 
1.42 
(0.85-2.38) 
1.02 
(0.60-1.75) 
0.81 
(0.52-1.27) 
0.96 
(0.63-1.48) 
0.56** 
(0.36-0.86) 
0.80 
(0.44-1.46) 
STAFFNO 
0.99 
(0.82-1.21) 
1.07 
(0.87-1.32) 
0.97 
(0.81-1.17) 
1.14 
(0.94-1.37) 
1.06 
(0.91-1.24) 
1.16 
(0.99-1.36) 
1.31*** 
(1.12-1.54) 
0.89 
(0.73-1.08) 
NSSF 
0.82** 
(0.71-0.94) 
1.00 
(0.85-1.17) 
0.89 
(0.77-1.02) 
1.18* 
(1.02-1.37) 
0.88* 
(0.78-0.98) 
0.91 
(0.80-1.01) 
0.99 
(0.89-1.11) 
1.16 
(1.00-1.36) 
Constant 
0.08*** 
(0.03-0.19) 
0.08*** 
(0.03-0.22) 
0.02*** 
(0.01-0.04) 
0.01*** 
(0.00-0.02) 
0.41** 
(0.21-0.78) 
1.09 
(0.59-2.01) 
0.35*** 
(0.19-0.65) 
3.24* 
(1.3-8.13) 
N 2104 2105 2106 2105 2214 2105 2106 2111 
Significant coefficients are in bold: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
a becomes significant (p<0.05) after bootstrap, b loses significance after bootstrap (p>0.05) 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
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NGO characteristics associated with funding from institutional donors 
Despite these commonalities there are a number of NGO characteristics that are associated with the 
receipt of funds from specific donors. For instance, the receipt of funds from the Lebanese third sector is 
about two thirds more likely (OR 1.62, CI 1.13-2.33) for NGOs located in Mount Lebanon, the Beirut 
suburbs, than Beirut itself. NGOs located in the North, South and Nabatieh, are significantly less likely to 
receive Lebanese third sector funds than organisations located in Beirut. Hence, there is a significant bias 
towards the centre, interestingly though the Beiruti suburbs are preferred to location in Beirut itself. NGOs 
with a self-declared sectarian affiliation are also more likely to receive funds from the Lebanese third sector 
than NGOs that did not declare such affiliation (OR 1.42, CI: 10.1-2.00). This may be explained by the fact 
that, in terms of financial prowess, the Lebanese third sector is dominated by what Zurayk (2011: 178) calls 
‘ruling class NGOs’, organisations such as the Fares, Hariri, Moawad, and Safadi Foundations. These are 
comparable to what Clark and Michuki (2009) call ‘Royal NGOs’ in Jordan. While they are non-
governmental, they are closely allied to the ruling elite and wealthy politicians. Since politics in Lebanon often 
takes place along sectarian lines, Lebanese ruling class NGOs may preferably give to NGOs with sectarian 
affiliation in order to strengthen the donors’ role within his community. In terms of funding volume, the 
activities of these politically affiliated NGOs are likely to surpass those of any international or non-partisan 
NGOs (Abi Samra et al. 2009).  
Quilty (2006) states that during the post-2006 reconstruction effort many parties worked through 
their politically affiliated NGOs in order to reach their clients. They worked in parallel to each other, 
according to Quilty, competing for access to international relief coming into Lebanon via the Higher Relief 
Commission (HRC). Hizbullah relied on its own resources, cooperated little with the government and 
received little aid. On the other hand, the Future movement, though very wealthy, has excellent access to 
government and was competing for international funds. Throughout the distribution process, NGOs 
accused the HRC of a lack of transparency and accountability, arguing that aid was apportioned according to 
political divisions. Organisations not representing politically important constituents received less than the 
Amal or Future Movements. Occasionally, politically affiliated NGOs would re-label UN or HRC logos 
with own party emblems (Quilty 2006). Similarly, Makhoul and Harrison (2002:619-620) add that some 
NGOs serve particular confessional groups and have for their main objective gaining popularity and 
electoral advantage for their patron. Fawaz (2005:245) adds that with respect to Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs, 
potential recipients who are not potential clients are not targeted, and applicants for services are asked about 
their Islamic beliefs and practices. Fattouh and Kolb (2006) state that this applies to NGOs in general and 
that they are more often than not intent on serving the clients of their patrons, be they in the business 
sector, traditional political families or political parties.  
NGOs with staff members enrolled in the National Social Security Fund are less likely to receive 
funds from the Lebanese third sector (OR 0.82, CI: 0.71-0.94). An organisation’s age, institutional 
sophistication, staffing levels or whether it does have beneficiary committees are not significant predictors of 
Lebanese third sector funding.  
A slightly different set of predictors are associated with an organisation receiving funds from 
international donor agencies. In particular, they are more likely to make contributions to advocacy NGOs, 
than any other type of organisation (OR 1.77, CI: 1.00-3.15). Note that the odds ratio for advocacy 
organisations in the model becomes after bootstrapping only, but fails the significance test with p=0.051 
before. The drive for democratisation of the Middle East as well as funding available for environmental 
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projects following the Rio Conference, both reviewed previously, may explain foreign donors’ interest in 
advocacy in Lebanon. NGOs located in the capital Beirut are more likely to receive funding from 
international donors than organisations located in other governorates, since odds ratios for all other 
governorates are below one, though only those for Mount Lebanon (OR 0.52, CI: 0.34-0.77), the Bekaa (OR 
0.42, CI: 0.22-0.77) and the South (OR 0.22, CI: 0.10-0.48) are significant. In contrast to the Lebanese third 
sector, institutionally more sophisticated NGOs are more likely to receive funding from international donor 
agencies (OR 1.33, CI: 1.16-1.53). As will be discussed in the following chapter, onerous administrative and 
reporting requirements may lead international donor agencies to prefer NGOs that have a bank account, an 
employee dedicated specifically to fundraising, hire an external auditing firm, or use computers. Donors of 
‘difficult money’ use labour-intensive reporting practices and project-based funding, which strictly frame 
NGO spending and implementation schedules.  As for the impact of M&E accountability regimes on NGOs 
in Lebanon, little data exists. Abi Samra et al. (2009) suggest that international donors come with ready-made 
suggestions and target only larger NGOs. These international donors can often push their ideas into existence 
through project-based funding mechanisms.   
However, neither age, sectarian affiliation, the presence or absence of beneficiary committees nor 
staffing levels or protection are not significantly associated with an organisation receiving founding from 
international donor agencies.  
Receiving funds from the central government is associated with yet another set of NGO 
characteristics, in particular with respect to geographical location of organisations. NGOs that are located in 
the periphery namely in the North are more than four times as likely to receive government funds (OR 4.84, 
CI: 2.91-8.05) when compared to NGOs located in Beirut. Similarly, NGO located in the Bekaa are more 
than twice as likely to receive funds from government sources (OR 2.38, CI: 1.47-3.86) than their Beiruti 
counterparts. Organisations located in Mount Lebanon are also more likely to receive government funds (OR 
1.78, CI: 1.20-2.65). Older (OR 1.30, CI: 1.13-1.50) and institutionally more sophisticated (OR 1.26, CI: 1.13-
1.41) NGOs are also more likely to receive funding from the central government, as are NGOs with 
beneficiary committees (OR 1.38, CI: 1.05-1.81). In contrast an NGO’s sectarian affiliation, or staffing levels 
and protection, do not affect the likelihood of it receiving central government funds or not.  
Interestingly NGO characteristics associated with the receipt of central government funds differ 
from those associated with an NGO receiving municipal funds. Only three covariates are associated with 
central as well as municipal funds. Firstly, grassroots NGOs are significantly more likely to receive funding 
from both central (OR 1.38, CI: 1.00-1.92)61 and municipal (OR 2.12, CI: 1.55-2.88) government. Grassroots 
NGOs encompass youth and social clubs, as well as culture, arts and village organisations. They are the type 
of organisation Putnam (1993, 2000) considers vital for the building of Social Capital. Secondly NGOs 
located in Mount Lebanon (OR 5.15, 3.25-8.15) and the Bekaa (OR 10.50, 6.31-17.48) are more likely to 
receive funds from these sources than those located in Beirut, though effect is much stronger for municipal 
funds for both regions. Thirdly, older NGOs are also more likely to receive donations from both public 
sources (OR 1.33, CI: 1.17-1.52). However a number of NGO characteristics are more likely to be associated 
with municipal than central government funds, namely being located in the South (OR 3.18, CI: 1.78-5.70) or 
Nabatieh (OR 3.90, 2.09-7.27) is significantly associated with municipal funding but not with central 
government funding. In the same way staff enrolment in national social security is positively associated with 
receiving municipal funds. In contrast location in the North, institutional sophistication, and having 
beneficiary committees, which significantly predicted the receipt of central government funds, do not impact 
                                                          
61 The odds ratio becomes significant after bootstrapping only. 
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the likelihood to receive municipal funds, neither does the sectarian outlook of an organisation nor staffing 
levels.  
Private sector organisations tend to rate yet another set of NGO characteristics. NGOs which locate 
in Mount Lebanon (OR 1.94 CI: 1.45-2.60) are more likely to receive private organisation funds than those 
located in Beirut, while NGOs located in the North (OR 0.67, CI: 0.45-1.00)62 are significantly less likely to 
receive theses funds when compared to Beiruti NGOs. These geographical donor preferences are somewhat 
similar to those of the Lebanese third sector. In addition to geographical location institutional sophistication 
influences the likelihood to receive donations from private organisations; more institutionally sophisticated 
NGOs are significantly more likely to benefit from them (OR 1.10, CI: 1.00-1.21). NGOs with beneficiary 
committees (OR 0.56, CI: 0.45-0.70) however, or whose staff are covered by the NSSF (OR 0.88, CI: 0.78-
0.98), are significantly less likely to receive private sector funds. Age staffing levels or sectarian affiliation do 
not affect the likelihood of an NGO receiving private sector donations.  
NGO characteristics associated with funding from non-institutional, individual donations 
NGO characteristics that affect the likelihood of it receiving donations by private individuals are 
related to activity, location and beneficiary committees. In detail, NGOs located in the North (OR 3.10, CI: 
2.20-4.36) are more likely to receive donations from private individuals than NGOs located in any other 
region. Particularly NGOs located in the South (OR 0.40, CI: 0.26-0.62) or Nabatieh (OR 0.61, CI: 0.38-1.00) 
are significantly less likely to receive private individual’s donations than NGOs located in Beirut and the 
North. NGOs with beneficiary committees are also less likely to receive funds from private individuals (OR 
0.59, CI: 0.48-0.73). This negative association was also observed for donations from private organisations. 
Factors such as age, staffing levels or staff protection do not affect the likelihood of an organisation receiving 
donations by private individuals. 
NGOs likely to receive service fees differ in some characteristics from NGOs likely to receive 
private individual’s donations. They are more established as indicated by the positive association between 
receiving service fees and age, institutional sophistication as well as staffing numbers. Examining covariates in 
detail, NGOs located in Mount Lebanon (OR 1.84, CI: 1.39-2.42) and the North (OR 2.21, CI: 1.57-3.10) are 
more likely to receive funds from service fees than NGOs located in Beirut. Age (OR 1.15, CI: 1.04-1.26), 
institutional sophistication (OR 1.25, CI: 1.14-1.36) as well as higher staff numbers (OR 1.31, CI: 1.12-1.54) 
are associated with a higher likelihood to receive service fees. In contrast having a contract with another 
NGO (OR 0.64, CI: 0.48-0.86) decreases the likelihood of receiving service fees. In addition cooperation with 
another NGO or the government does not affect an NGO’s likelihood to collect service fee. This indicates 
that receiving service fees is not associated with an NGO being well connected to the government or other 
NGOs. This is in contrast to institutional donors reviewed above, where an NGO’s networks significantly 
affect the likelihood of it receiving funds.  Having a beneficiary committee (0.64, CI: 0.52-0.79) also decreases 
and NGOs likelihood of receiving service fees.  
Interestingly, while higher staff numbers increase the likelihood of receiving service fees, NGOs 
without paid staff are more likely to receive service fees (OR 0.56, CI: 0.36-0.86)63. This likely reflects a 
dichotomy of organisations relying on service fees. Those without staff are likely to be small local 
                                                          
62 Note that the statistical significance of this odds ratio is not robust to bootstrapping.  
63 Note that the odds ratio is less than 1, since the variable underlying it reflects the inverse statement, namely that an NGO does 
have paid staff. Hence, an NGOs with paid staff is less likely to receive service fees.  
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organisations, such as cooperatives or community associations, which charge fees for the use of equipment or 
facilities, such as an olive press, cold storage, or a village hall. Those with paid staff are likely to be service-
providing organisations, such as schools or hospitals, where increased staff and hence size increases the 
likelihood of receiving service fees. Thus while having a small corps of paid staff decreases the likelihood of 
collecting service fees; once an NGO does pay staff, having many employees increases an organisations 
likelihood to receive funds.  
Characteristics of NGOs receiving membership fees differ from NGO characteristics linked to all 
other types of donors, indicating that membership organisations are differently structured to NGOs relying 
on other funding sources. Unsurprisingly, membership activities are strongly associated with receiving 
membership fees (OR 3.76, CI: 2.17-6.51). In addition, in terms of geographical focus, NGOs located in 
Nabatieh (OR 6.01, CI: 1.38-26.1) are more likely to receive membership fees than NGOs locate in Beirut. 
Conversely NGOs located in Mount Lebanon (OR 0.64 CI: 0.42-0.97) are less likely to receive membership 
dues when compared to Beiruti NGOs. Similar to service fees, an NGO’s networks do not affect the 
likelihood of receiving membership fees. If anything, government cooperation (OR 0.46, CI: 0.33-0.66) or 
having a contract with another NGO (OR 0.45, CI: 0.31-0.67) decreases the likelihood of receiving 
membership fees. NGOs with sectarian affiliation are significantly less likely to receive membership fees (OR 
0.53, CI: 0.37-0.76), than those that do have such an affiliation,  Age, institutional sophistication, beneficiary 
involvement or staffing levels and staff protection do not affect an NGO’s likelihood of receiving 
membership fees.  
Though Abi Samra et al. (2009) argue that ‘easy money’ comes without accountability, in fact the 
nature of funds that constitute easy money, in particular membership and service fees, indicate that there is 
less of a feedback problem for ‘easy money’ as there is for ‘difficult’ or ‘partisan’ funds. While the latter two 
are intermediary funds, where donors do not directly benefit from contributions, the former funds are 
immediate, as members or service users are more directly able to assess the work of an NGO. Rather than 
there not being any accountability for ‘easy money’, members can easily withdraw their support if they feel no 
longer represented by their organisation. Members are at once donors and beneficiaries and there is less of a 
feedback problem than for services received by a third party. 
It is noteworthy that, despite calls for beneficiary participation (Daly and Brassard 2011, Edwards 
and Hulme 1995), the presence or absence of beneficiary participation committees has little influence on an 
NGOs likelihood to receive funding. Central government funds are a notable exception reviewed above. 
4 Concluding remarks and model fit 
Different NGO characteristics increase the likelihood of receiving funding from different donors. 
NGOs located in the centre, institutionally sophisticated, well-connected to other NGOs and government 
and with preferably a sectarian affiliation are more likely to receive funding from the Lebanese third sector. 
Foreign donors emphasise advocacy, a central location, institutional sophistication and government 
cooperation, while beneficiary participation or employee coverage in the NSSF are not significant in multi-
variate analysis. Local and central government agencies are more likely to fund older and grassroots NGOs as 
well as NGOs with connections to other organisations and the government. Central government funds are 
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more likely to go to NGOs located in the North, while municipal funds are more likely to go to all regions 
but the North and Beirut. Central government resources are also more likely to go to NGOs that are 
institutionally sophisticated and participatory, while municipal government sources are more likely to go to 
organisations which pay NSSF contributions. Funds from private sector organisations are more likely to go to 
centrally located and institutionally sophisticated organisations.  
As for funding from individual-based sources such as service and membership fees as well as 
contributions from private individuals, age and institutional sophistication increase the likelihood of receiving 
funds, though neither predictors are significant for service fees. Membership fees tend to go to institutionally 
more independent organisations, since government or NGO cooperation as well as sectarian affiliation 
decreases the likelihood of receiving membership fees. Membership fees are also more likely to go to 
peripheral regions than the centre.  
Abi Samra et al.’s (2009) categories of ‘easy’, ‘partisan’ and ‘difficult’ money are useful, though not 
mutually exclusive, in interpreting donor preferences. The authors argue that membership fees, which are 
‘easy money’, though limited in amount, are instrumental in guaranteeing an organisation’s independence 
since they do not have strings attached. Lebanese third sector funds may be classified as ‘partisan’ since 
sectarian affiliation increases the likelihood to receive funding, as may be funds from international donors 
since they value activism. Lebanese third sector, government as well as international funding sources may be 
all be classified as ‘difficult’ since all three donors prefer to support organisations with a certain capacity, 
expressed by institutional sophistication, age and connectedness. 
Logistic models are sensitive to misspecification in particular to omitting covariates, which may bias 
the remaining odds ratios (Begg and Lagakos, 1990). Table V.4 examines how well or how badly the eight 
models fit the present data. 
Table V.4: Model fit 
 
Lebanese 
third sector 
Intl. donors 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
Private 
sector org. 
private 
individuals 
service fees 
membership 
fees 
pseudo R2 0.15 0.31 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.17 
ROC 0.77 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.80 
link 
test 
hat p<0.001 P<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.001 
hatsqu P=0.155 P=0.370 p=0.763 p=0.446 P=0.879 p=0.006 p=0.194  P=0.081 
Hosmer-
Lemeshow GOF 
χ2=4.29 
p=0.830 
χ2=7.38 
p=0.496 
χ2=3.51 
p=0.899 
χ2=4.08 
p=0.850 
χ2=9.15 
p=0.330 
χ2=17.40 
p=0.026 
χ2=5.15 
p=0.742 
χ2=8.58 
p=0.379 
Positive 
predictive value 
65.3% 68.6% 64.7% 60.3% 61.9% 67.9% 59.9% 90.7% 
Negative 
predictive value 
87.6% 92.6% 87.9% 83.3% 76.8% 68.2% 65.6% 48.6% 
Correctly 
classified 
87.1% 90.6% 83.8% 81.0% 75.4% 68.1% 63.8% 90.0% 
Note: Bold entries are cause for concern. 
Source: NGO survey carried out in 2006, analysed by author (see p. 42 for a discussion). 
 
The present model is a decent fit for NGO choice of government and international funds and a 
moderately decent fit for municipal funds and membership fees. Though pseudo R2 cannot be interpreted 
independently or between datasets, they give a good indicator of comparable model fit within the same 
dataset. The ROC curve is an indicator how well the model discriminates between cases. Here, it indicates 
that the specified model fits the data best for donor choice of government and international agencies, 
followed by municipal funds and membership fees. The model is a borderline fit for private sector 
organisations, mainly due to the poor explanatory power of the model (as shown by the pseudo R2 and ROC 
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statistics). A similar argument applies to the Lebanese third sector. The model is a poor fit for service fees, 
due to the limited explanatory power and for the contributions of private individuals, where the link test is 
rejected. The link test measures if the model is accurately specified or if important predictors have been left 
out. The test refits a linear predictor ‘hat’ using the previously estimated model and should hence be 
significant (p<0.05), otherwise the model is mis-specified. The square of this predictor, ‘hatsq’ is also fitted 
but should not improve the fit of the model and should hence have no predictive power (p>0.05). If it is 
significant then a variable has been omitted. This is the case for contributions by private individuals. The 
Hosmer Lemeshov Goodnes of Fit test compares expected outcome frequencies from the model with 
observed ones; a good fit implies concordance of frequencies. Rejection of this hypothesis, as is the case for 
contributions by private individuals (see Table V.4) implies a bad fit (Vittinghoff et al., 2012). 
It is noteworthy that the present models, emphasising inter-institutional linkages, NGO activity, 
structure, and location, work well in predicting which NGO characteristics are associated with large 
institutional donors, most importantly the central government and international agencies, and to a lesser 
extent also municipalities and the Lebanese third sector. The models do less well in predicting characteristics 
associated with contributions from private organisations and individuals or service fees. This may be due to 
the predictors used in this model being unable to capture more subtle, interpersonal donor NGO 
relationships. 
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VI. Rural Development Projects: 
A Qualitative Assessment
Chapter four analysed how context, such as an historical event or the regulatory environment 
influence NGO operations, thereby addressing Proposition 1 of the first research question. The previous 
chapter addressed Proposition 2 by analysing what NGO characteristics are associated with funding from 
what type of donors. It showed how network effects are particularly important for international donors; how, 
in contrast to other donors, the Lebanese third sector values the sectarian affiliation of an NGO; that scale 
matters for donations from the central government; and that membership NGOs are the most independent 
in terms of third-party affiliations. Both chapters touched on the second research question’s corollary, namely 
the casualisation of NGO staff, by pointing out that many staff are not covered by national social security and 
that NSSF coverage is rarely associated with an increased likelihood of receiving funds. 
While the previous chapters addressed which factors structure NGO operations and characteristics, 
the present one focuses on how NGO operations are shaped, with a particular focus on donors.  A 
negotiation takes place between donors and NGOs. Donors stipulate project objectives and reporting 
requirements or mission and political affiliation. This attempt to control outcomes and targeting is mediated 
by implementing NGOs, who have their own interests and experience on the ground but require external 
funding. This negotiation process, between NGO commitment and agency and donor conditions, has been 
described by Ebrahim (2005), who points out that though donors are often the more powerful player, both 
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sides need each other. The structuring dynamics of donor obligations impact NGO operations and may affect 
their humanitarian objective. The question arises as to what extent the structuring dynamics of donor 
objectives and reporting requirements can influence project design and implementation. Do NGOs behave 
like professionalised sub-contracting partners fulfilling donor requirements or is there space for NGOs to 
have their own understanding of development? To discuss these questions, this chapter presents a qualitative 
analysis of rural development projects implemented by NGOs in Lebanon.  
4.1 Data sources and themes – an outline 
This section draws on two data sources, discussed at length in the methodology (see p. 48), (1) a 
small database of 197 agricultural development projects and (2) semi-structured interviews with 30 NGO and 
QUANGO staff as well as 45 respondents who are experts in rural development or former NGO staff. 
Thematic analysis has been used to analyse these data. Excerpts from interview transcripts have been collated 
into tables under a joint theme. Throughout this chapter, with the exception of Table VI.1., tables summarise 
interview responses. 
Two broad themes have been isolated that help address this question (see Table VI.1 reproduced 
from the methodology chapter). These themes also structure this chapter. The first theme addresses how 
donor funding frameworks and understanding of rural development challenges influence what kind of 
projects NGOs implement. Donors as well as NGOs are affected by contemporaneous development 
discourse, in this instance exemplified by the World Development Report for 2008 (World Bank 2007). This 
implies that a number of similarities exist across projects. This isomorphism affects how NGOs relate to each 
other, if cooperatively or competitively, which in turn may affect the NGO’s humanitarian goal. NGOs try to 
achieve project objectives agreed on with their donors. However, NGO operations are also shaped by 
context, which may prevent the NGO from achieving the project’s stated objectives. These limitations to 
project implementation form a sub-topic to the first theme. For instance, many projects aim at obtaining 
higher prices for small producer’s output, which succeeded in the rarest cases. Further, an export region 
suggested by a donor may not be one where Lebanese producers have an advantage. Another example 
discussed under this theme is that prevalent disadvantageous market structures make it difficult for small 
producers to assert themselves (see Table VI.1.). A second sub-topic addresses how NGOs attempt to 
address the problem of scale, at the producer as well as at the project level. The second theme analyses how 
donor geopolitical objectives and reporting requirements structure NGO operations. In particular how 
geopolitical objectives influence geographical targeting and how funding limitations and reporting 
requirements limit implementation timeframes and define how success is evaluated.  
A simple typology of NGOs will be used throughout this chapter to distinguish between NGOs. 
Three different types were identified in the methodology chapter (p. 48), international NGO, national NGO 
and ruling class NGO. More than donor nationality, affiliation of the NGO distinguishes how projects are 
implemented. Four distinctions can be made. Firstly and most commonly are NGOs that rely on international 
donor funding and have limited own resources, they will simply be referred to as ‘NGO’. Secondly, as alluded 
to in the previous chapter, ‘ruling class NGOs’ are those affiliated to a political elite and are often vehicles for 
that elite to distribute patronage. These ruling class NGOs may also be recipients of funding from 
international donors, but crucially have substantial funds of their own and do not rely on donor funding for 
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their day-to-day operation. Thirdly are what will be called QUANGOs, quasi-non-governmental-
organisations. While the term commonly refers to nominally independent organisations funded by the 
government, in the present case QUANGO refers to projects funded by international organisations but 
implemented through the government. Respondents from QUANGOs would hence be either civil servants 
or staff recruited by the government specifically for the implementation of a third party funded project. 
Lastly, activist NGOs will occasionally referred to. These distinguish themselves not so much by their donors 
but by their actively political outlook, even if that would be foregoing funding. 
Nationality of an NGO, Lebanese or international, is not always a distinguishing feature. Lebanese 
and international NGOs compete for funding from the same donors, with the same conditions. Hence 
distinction between the two will not always be made. However, what can be, but not always are, 
distinguishing features are donor nationality, be that USAID, or the Italian Cooperation, to cite a two. Donor 
nationality will be pointed out in the text when relevant. 
Table VI.1: Themes identified during qualitative interviews 
 Questions addressed by theme Data source 
Theme 1: Donor funding frameworks and conceptualisation of development puzzles shape NGO projects 
Topic 1: What projects does the 
NGO run 
How is funding obtained? Why does an NGO 
chose to work in rural development? What 
kind of projects are implemented by NGOs? 
Interviews, pamphlets 
published by donors, 
online project information 
Topic 2: Limits to project 
implementation 
iv. Limited ability to impose higher 
prices  
v. Misguided export focus 
vi. Small producers face 
disadvantageous market 
structures 
What are the NGOs’ most successful 
projects? What are the most unsuccessful 
ones? Why? 
Interviews 
Topic 3: Small scale 
iv. Forming cooperatives does 
not solve the scale problem 
v. Limits of NGO capacity 
vi. Jaded beneficiaries: project 
participation is work for the 
NGO 
What are the NGOs’ most successful 
projects? What are the most unsuccessful 
ones? Why?  
Interviews 
Theme 2: Structuring dynamics of donor requirements 
Topic 1: Geopolitical interests of 
donors influence project location 
Are there geographical donor preferences? 
Interviews, pamphlets 
published by donors, 
online project information 
Topic 2: Timeframe for project 
implementation is short 
What is the average project duration? Who 
sets project timeframe? 
Interviews, pamphlets 
published by donors, 
online project information 
Topic 3: Reporting and budgeting 
requirements 
How do NGOs describe results?  
Interviews and online 
project information 
Corollary: NGOs as employment 
opportunities 
(No direct question was asked investigating 
this.) 
Interviews 
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4.2 A focus on rural and agricultural development projects 
Agriculture in Lebanon contributes 7% to GDP and directly employs about 300,000 workers. 
Though up to a third of Lebanese are estimated to depend in one way or another on agriculture for their 
livelihood. It is also worth pointing out that Lebanon has, compared to its Arab neighbours, significant water 
supplies and an ideal climate and terrain for varied agriculture (Riachi & Chaaban, 2011). Government-led 
support during the period of this research, that is to say from 2007 until the cabinet reshuffle in 2011, was 
almost entirely absent and government interests focused instead on urban areas and the service sector. The 
Ministry of Agriculture itself remained cash-strapped and reliant on foreign donors to its finance projects, 
according to a government official interviewed for this study. Though the Ministry’s financial situation has 
improved slightly since 2011, the government official stated that at least half of all technical positions are 
vacant due to budget cuts. Much of new staff is financed by external donors and once their funding ends, the 
staff’s position is eliminated. A view supported by a US-funded NGO employee who argues that most 
projects run by the Ministry of Agriculture are foreign-funded and managed (see Table VI.2). Most 
respondents interviewed for this chapter are in agreement that NGOs play an important role in Lebanon and 
even at times replace or at least overshadow the government in agricultural service provision (see Table VI.2). 
NGOs and INGOs point to corruption on top of under-investment.  
Table VI.2: The role and capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture in rural development 
Comments on the role and capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture 
Internationally funded 
NGOs 
 
US funded:  
 Most projects at the Ministry of Agriculture are foreign funded 
 There are no policy strategies towards agriculture. When free vaccines are promised, they 
disappear with vets selling them.  
 The agriculture sector is important but politicians are not convinced of it. 
 
Spanish funded:  
 The Ministry of Agriculture does not care about farmers: no support to production, no 
protection, no training 
 The Ministry of Agriculture is not useful 
 
Italian funded:  
 The agriculture sector is living off NGOs, it needs them. 
 Extension services of the government are non-existent, so NGOs play a major role in agriculture 
ruling class NGOs 
 
 The reason the government does not give money to agriculture is a political question, most 
people who benefit from agriculture are supporters of the [than] opposition while the 
government thinks Lebanon is a tourist and finance centre. 
 There is no agriculture policy. Hence, no appropriate infrastructure, no extension services. 
 The Ministry of Agriculture is weak. Government services are weak. 
 The government is badly organised and has wrong priorities, there is no political will to support 
agriculture.  
 The Ministry of Agriculture is getting very little money because other ministries have priority. 
Due to the post Civil War reconstruction, Lebanon has a lot of debt, which prevents the 
government from increasing expenditure.  
Government/QUANGO 
officials 
 
 The Ministry of Agriculture depends on foreign donors for many projects..  
 It is a pity that the comparative advantage in Lebanon in terms of climate and water is not used.  
 It is not a priority for higher ranks of politics. 
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5 Theme 1: Donor funding frameworks and NGO projects  
5.1 Donors and their funding frameworks 
Multilateral as well as bilateral donors fund rural and agricultural development projects in Lebanon. 
In the period of analysis, the most active multi-lateral donors in terms of number of projects funded were the 
European Union (EU) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), followed by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). As for bilateral donors, the Italian (The Italian Cooperation), US American (USAID), 
Spanish (AECID), German (giz) and French (AFD) governmental development agencies are the most active 
(see Figure VI.1). Regions in France, Spain and Italy have their own development agencies funding overseas 
projects. They are grouped together as one national entity.  
Figure VI.1: Number of projects funded by each donor 
 
Source: Inventory of agricultural development projects between 2008 and 2009, compiled by author (see p.48 for details). 
 
Multilateral donors are more likely to work through the Lebanese government than bilateral donors, 
as discussed in section 6.3, chapter IV (p. 84). This is true in particular for the EU and the World Bank and to 
a lesser extent the UNDP and FAO. At least half of listed projects funded by either of these agencies were 
implemented by government institutions. The World Bank financed all its rural and agricultural development 
projects through the Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR), under the Community 
Development Projects (CDP) framework. World Bank funds were targeting and directly disbursed to 
municipalities. The European Union64 had two major programs targeting rural and agricultural development: 
Firstly, the Agricultural Development Project (ADP), which operated from the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
secondly, the Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD), attached to the Council of Development 
and Reconstruction. This project is similar to the World Bank’s Community Development Projects, both of 
                                                          
64 ECHO disbursed funds directly to NGOs, however, these were small when compared to the two EU programs discussed above. 
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which are targeted at municipalities.65 In contrast, bilateral donors funded rural development projects via the 
intermediary of NGOs. The only exception is a project implemented by the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture 
funded by the Spanish AECID. Figure VI.2 illustrates these main disbursement channels graphically.  
Figure VI.2: Main disbursement channels of bi- and multilateral aid 
 
Source: Author extrapolation from qualitative interviews (see p.48 for details). 
 
Bilateral donors may also give directly to a local NGO, bypassing international ones. But that is rare. 
In addition, as discussed in chapter 4 (p. 79) German bilateral aid is an exception an channelled through the 
government. Ruling class NGOs are not included in the figure. They are institutionally linked to a political 
patron as a key funding source. This does not exclude the western leaning ones from receiving funds from 
international donors. Their capacity and ability to implement make them attractive partners. 
Donors define funding strategies, which set out what kind of projects they are willing to fund. 
Projects proposed by NGOs hoping to raise funds from a specific donor have to fit into this strategy.  For 
instance, within ‘Economic Activities’, one of four funding sectors stipulated by the Italian Cooperation, it 
sets out to fund income generating activities in the private sector in regions that have been destroyed by 
conflict and that also address women’s empowerment and the environment (Italian Cooperation, 2006). 
Similarly, within its ‘Expanding Economic Opportunities’ program USAID suggested project activities such 
as supporting and initiating agribusiness and light agro-industries and proposes a focus on high value food 
stuffs and competitiveness in niche markets. The donor also suggested specific activities, namely extension 
services, microcredit, food processing or the creation of cooperatives to benefit from scale economies as well 
as the introduction of new crops. USAID also emphasised that gender should be a cross-cutting theme of all 
projects (USAID, 2002). The European Commission had a similar focus as the previous two examples with 
an emphasis on the upgrading of SMEs and the funding of projects that increase the competitiveness of the 
private sector (European Commission, 2006). 
The funding frameworks of donors reviewed are similar to policies recommended in the World 
Development Report 2008 (World Bank, 2007). It argues that farmers should join producer organizations and 
contact supermarkets and exporters to sell high value produce. The Bank advised to make affordable credit 
                                                          
65 The Fund was conceived to eventually become independent of the CDR. It never did, though, according to staff interviews, the 
day to day running of the ESFD is autonomous of the CDR. 
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available to enable farmers to make the necessary investments to scale up production. Civil Society in turn 
was urged to organise and empower producers, since effective producer organisations are seen as essential in 
allowing small holders to face the challenge of being able to export and supply supermarkets (World Bank, 
2007, pp. 21–24). This report has been heavily criticised for proposing technical fixes rather than structural 
solutions, for being skewed towards international trade arrangements, which render farmers unable to 
compete in their own country, as well as for lacking in evidence (McMichael 2009; Oya 2009; Woodhouse 
2009, Zurayk 2011). However, as will be seen below, policies proposed in the report are mirrored in projects 
implemented by Lebanese NGOs.  
In response to donor funding frameworks and international reports, NGOs design projects to meet 
donor guidelines. An outcome of this process is a pandering to development fashions. A Lebanese staff 
member at a US-based NGO with long-standing experience in Lebanon lists the ‘development fashions’ she 
has seen come and go. She states that in the late 1990s the fashion was integrated rural development projects, 
rural infrastructure, improving tap-water, irrigation channels and improving access to healthcare. In the early 
2000s it was stimulating markets and providing women with income (see Table VI.3). Currently her NGO 
frames its work in terms of food processing for high value niche markets. Appeal to international ‘best 
practice’ is a common feature in project proposals. The manager of one large NGO receiving funding from a 
European donor explains that development tools are built on international best practice, but none 
incorporate local research. An academic from the American University of Beirut added that he was asked to 
advise on the benefits of a grey water project only after the funding for it had already been won, despite the 
fact that he felt it would be unlikely to succeed. Lebanese staff from another US based NGO add that 
strategies proposed in its headquarter sometimes do not work in Lebanon but can be abandoned only with 
difficulty. The staff member of an Italian funded NGO states that NGOs largely seek to please donors, 
implementing projects that ‘look nice’ with funding agencies but have little long term value (see Table VI.3). 
Hence very little consultation with local stakeholders takes place at the project design stage. Projects mirror 
international best practice rather than suit the local context. 
Table VI.3: NGO comments on project strategies 
Comments on project strategy set by donor 
NGO 
 
 Strategies proposed in the headquarter in the US do not work in Lebanon 
 Very little can be done in the month of Ramadan so and entire project month is lost 
 Now the agro-industry if fashionable. Nine years ago it was integrated rural development 
projects, rural infrastructure, improving tap-water, irrigation channels, improving access to 
healthcare, training to produce healthy products, five years on it was ‘smart projects’ simulate 
markets, women provide income, demonstration plots… 
 Target women because it is appealing to western donors. 
 NGOs run projects that look nice to donors but have no long term value i.e. distribute cows, 
but to those who have no idea about cows, after one year they die or farmers sell them. 
 
QUANGO 
 
 The World Bank came with funds but also with a structure that was unfeasible in Lebanon. An 
American company won the bid for project coordination, but proved incompetent and was 
fired. 
 
 
These statements clearly illustrate the tension and even conflict between donor driven project design 
and NGO staff commitment. Wallace et al. (2007) similarly observed that donor demands usually supersede 
opinions of implementing NGOs on the ground.  
Chapter 6: Rural Development Projects 
 118 
5.2 Projects implemented by NGOs – the danger of isomorphism 
Consistent with donor funding frameworks, the large majority of rural development projects carried 
out in Lebanon – 105 according the small database– focus on extension services (see Figure VI.3). They 
introduce new, higher value crops such as safflower, avocado, or kiwis, and aim at improving animal 
husbandry by introducing new breeds or better fodder and launching vaccination campaigns. Extension 
projects include soil and water testing services, the running of nurseries and trial plots to test new plant 
varieties, farmers’ training workshops, organic or fair trade certification programmes, and irrigation and water 
management projects. NGOs usually provide inputs such as seeds or saplings, animal feed or feed mixers, 
starter kits for apiculture, or chicken coops free of charge or at low costs. The largest share of extension 
projects is aimed at a small number of rural sub-sectors, namely, in descending order: olives, animal 
husbandry, horticulture, water management, and apiculture. Other sectors include fishing, soap and essential 
oil production, and the growing and harvesting of medicinal and aromatic plants.  
Figure VI.3: Rural development projects by NGOs 
 
Base: 197 projects 
Note: Series labels refer to the number of projects implemented under the respective category.  
Source: Inventory of agricultural development projects between 2008 and 2009, compiled by author (see p.48 for details) 
 
As for war recovery projects, many involve the reconstruction of water management or irrigation 
systems using very short term emergency funds. In addition to water infrastructure rehabilitation, many war 
recovery projects consisted of distributing destroyed inputs, or the distribution of livestock. 
So as to add value to agricultural produce, a number of projects, 20 projects in the database, involve 
small food processing enterprises. They mainly consist of building small food processing workshops. A 
standard project would involve the purchasing of equipment, such as furnishing a small workshop, a training 
course in food hygiene, production quality, accounting and marketing, as well as branding the product. 
Equipment would include items such as an olive press, a distillery for essential oils, or professional kitchen 
facilities, as well as free or subsidised use of storage, packaging or processing facilities. Some projects involve 
quality testing by external laboratories. Examples of projects include tomato paste manufacturing managed by 
a USAID-funded NGO or dried tomato production, funded by the Italian cooperation. A number of Italian- 
and Spanish-funded NGOs are involved in soap production. In addition to food processing, some projects in 
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this category focus on post-harvest technologies, such as packaging or cooling, to increase the quality and 
value of produce. 
Marketing projects are very similar to the above, with the exception that no manufacturing stages 
are added. Typical marketing projects involve the creation of a brand and label for the output, as well as 
marketing and accounting training. A number of projects involve the extension of micro-credit to farmers or 
the set up of food processing facilities. 
Beneficiaries of development projects carried out by respondent implementing agents are, with one 
exception: small farmers, cooperatives of small farmers, or municipalities (see Figure VI.4).  
Figure VI.4: Beneficiary groups 
 
Source: Inventory of agricultural development projects between 2008 and 2009, compiled by author (see p.48 for details) 
 
One interviewed NGO has worked on IT, agriculture, health and education projects. When asked 
why his organization targets women in particular, a staff member at another NGO answered that his 
organisation focuses on women because the subject is appealing to Western donors (see Table VI.3). One 
US-funded NGO staff member criticises the donor-driven character of some NGOs in the post-2006 
conflict, stating that some NGOs came for war relief and then stayed since money for development projects 
was available. In order to secure funding, NGOs may twist their initial objectives to fit those of donors, 
potentially leading to mission drift on the side of NGOs. 
Donor funding strategies, in particular when very similar, lead NGOs to compete for funding with 
very similar project proposals and isomorphism of projects. Similarity of projects may lead to duplication and 
competitive rather than cooperative behaviour. Seven respondents called for more cooperation among 
NGOs, four relate cases where NGO work has been duplicated. One staff member at an Italian- and Swiss-
funded NGO stated that competition for funding led to a ‘you do your own business, you don’t share 
information’ attitude. The staff member of a Swiss-funded NGO relates that her NGO was working with a 
women’s cooperative and later found out that a second NGO was working with that same group of women. 
The NGO learned this by coincidence through a third party. She adds that many NGOs are raising funds for 
very similar projects. A staff member from a US-funded NGO states that a cooperative her organisation 
works with received the same set of equipment twice and sold one set. In a third case a Spanish-funded NGO 
complained that it was working with farmers in a specific village and that an Italian-funded NGO started 
working on similar projects in that same village. The staff member of a ministry-based QANGO relates how 
two olive presses were installed in the same area by two different NGOs and that now neither can operate at 
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full capacity. This duplication takes place on a much larger scale. The World Bank Community Development 
Project and the EU-funded Economic and Social Fund for Development projects are strikingly similar. Both 
target municipalities and both fund capital and infrastructure investments. Competition between NGOs 
implies that international NGOs may feel entitled to funding from their host country and resentful if it goes 
to NGOs of other nationalities. One Spanish, one Irish, and one Italian NGO staff asserted that 
development aid from their governments should be channelled through NGOs of the same nationality.  
Project based funding structures, which outline project goals and timeframe, may lead NGOs to 
behave like sub-contractors. In addition isomorphism and competition for funds may lead to competitive 
rather than cooperative behaviour among NGOs and lead to duplication.  
5.3 Limitations of implemented projects 
Irrespective of the dangers of isomorphism and competitive behaviour among NGOs, all implement 
their projects with humanitarian goals in mind. Self-sufficiency, or failing that, at least a significant 
supplement to rural households’ income, is the stated aim of all but two respondents’ NGOs. Asked about 
what they believe to be key challenges in rural development, many NGO staff’s responses mirror 
interpretations of the donor community and that of the World Development Report (2007). A quarter of 
respondents argued that inconsistency of quality produced is a major problem (see Table VI.4). Shortcomings 
in marketing were as frequently mentioned as quality inconsistencies. The lack of technical expertise was also 
mentioned, though less frequently. The projects discussed above tackle these challenged. Increasing price 
through increasing product quality, or capitalising on existing superior product quality by improving 
marketing, is one strategy. Targeting affluent consumers through exports and supermarkets is another related 
one. As is organising farmers to increase scale. However, these strategies face a number of challenges, not 
explicitly stated in funding frameworks, namely disadvantageous market structures and limits of NGO 
capacity in particular with respect to their ability to improve rural infrastructure. This section discusses 
NGOs’ ability to achieve their stated humanitarian objective in the framework of the projects they 
implement.  
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Table VI.4: NGO assessments of development challenges 
How are problems framed 
Small scale farmers cannot compete  
 high production cost: market price for a whole chicken is too low for small producers 
 very few large farms exist, majority of farmers are small, size is a big problem 
 it is difficult to work on only six apple trees 
 only large land owners can sell to supermarkets but farmers do not set up a network or combine their capacity 
 producers are not organised to bargain for better prices 
Lacking consistency in quality (with a view to export) 
 produce does not confirm to European standards 
 quality not fit for export: no certification of products 
 need for exports but the problem of quality has to be solved 
 small bananas can be exported only to Syria, problem is quality and quantity 
Lack of marketing 
 there is good quality produce but the problem is marketing 
 no product differentiation (find a high value niche) 
Power relations in the supply chain 
 retailers and wholesalers benefit from market exchanges not producers 
 input agents currently supply extension services, sell inputs (often on credit) 
 farmers take loans from input agents to purchase seeds, they also sell their crop to these agents 
  buyers do not  have the power to enforce prices even if they have superior quality 
 input costs receive too little attention, same across the world: producers are caught between input providers and large 
buyers. 
Knowledge and technology shortcomings 
 lack of expertise 
 improve post-harvest technology  
 problem of mentality of farmers 
Lacking demand 
 cost conscious consumers with little interest in quality 
Price information 
 lack of price information 
Increase value and price of agricultural output 
The number of extension services and marketing projects as well as those aiming to move products 
up the food products value chain by adding food processing stages are indicative of NGOs’ strategy to 
compete in niche markets and on quality. For instance, a staff member of a USAID-funded NGO stated that 
olive oil quality is low: acidity levels are high and pruning, olive harvesting, pressing, and olive oil storage 
needs to be improved. She adds that her NGO’s project aims to address these shortcomings.  
However, NGO staff openly admit the difficulties their projects face breaking even. The manager of 
a poultry cooperative project states with respect to broiler prices, that even when carving up the chickens and 
selling breasts and legs separately, the cooperative still only manages to sell one third of its meat production 
in the market. The remainder is sold locally at below production cost. The production costs for chicken meat 
and eggs are above the market retail prices for these products. He states that the largest Lebanese poultry and 
egg producer sells a pack of eggs at less than a quarter the price of the NGO. The project relies on donor 
funds for paying salaries. Similarly, the manager of a soap making project states that the project’s soap 
production costs are higher than the market retail price and that they face trouble selling their soap. The same 
NGO runs a bakery, the revenue from which covers production cost except salaries, which are paid by the 
NGO. Another example is an Italian funded dairy project which buys milk from beneficiary-farmers at the 
market price. Then the milk is tested, pasteurised, and processed into labneh or white cheese. The products is 
sold in local outlets but the retail price is so low that the NGO does not even recover the raw milk costs, not 
to mention the manufacturing and labour costs.  
It may be argued that desired price levels are not achieved since buyers hedge against the moral 
hazard problem of varying quality among producers. However, NGO staff stated that producers are unable 
to enforce higher prices, even if they offer quality certification. A USAID-financed dairy project tested and 
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certified milk quality before it being sold to middlemen or dairy processing facilities so as to offer a quality 
assurance and obtain higher prices. The project’s manager asserted that despite certified quality levels, dairy 
farmers could not obtain the target prices.  
None of the respondents interviewed could affirm that the advocated strategy to compete on quality 
or niche markets was sustainable and that production would continue beyond the involvement of the NGO. 
A number of NGO staff admit that local demand for high-end agricultural produce is lacking. An NGO 
employee states that in her experience one of the major problems in projects carried out by her organisation 
is that consumers are so far unwilling to pay more for high quality or certified products. Similarly, the 
manager of the poultry cooperative referred to before, argues that consumers do not care about the quality 
differential of the coop’s free range chickens versus the much cheaper battery chickens that dominate the 
Lebanese market.  
The purchasing manager of a large supermarket chain, interviewed for this study as an expert, 
confirms that in his chain’s outlets, the basic cheapest eggs sell best, while organic and small artisan ranges are 
in stock for the customer’s convenience, but that the supermarkets do not make much profit from them. This 
indicates that supermarket themselves only stock niche products if consumer demand for it is pre-existing, 
but that supermarkets do not make much profit off them. Many NGOs rely on infrequent and unreliable 
outlets such as annual producer fairs, gift hampers sold around holidays, or selling through small stores 
attached to the processing facilities. These are often themselves organised by NGOs. Three respondents 
initiated marketing initiatives. In two out of these three instances, this involved setting up farmers’ markets in 
urban areas on an annual or weekly basis. In all cases the NGOs cover the running costs of the market. 
Transport costs are usually at the expense of the producer. It is unclear if these markets would persist without 
the involvement of the NGOs, which coordinate and make the space available, though the latter is often 
offered for free by the municipality. These initiatives focus on local, affluent urban markets, rather than 
export markets.  
Production costs of small scale food production and processing initiated by NGOs, are much higher 
than those of large competitors. So as to sell at least some output, NGOs absorb salary and other costs and 
launch marketing initiatives. It is noteworthy that the way NGO staff frame development challenges and their 
solutions, overlaps strongly with how they are articulated in prevailing donor discourse. This may indicate 
that NGO agency is completely embedded in donor discourse and shaped by donor interpretations of 
development. However, there is some evidence of NGOs challenging this view. 
A misguided export focus  
In their search for affluent consumers, many NGOs focus on exports. Though nine respondents 
state that exporting is among the aims of their project, only two have actually exported goods produced in the 
framework of their projects, namely tomato paste to the UK and an assortment of preserves and olive oil to 
the United States. A trainer interviewed as an expert for this study relates that she once worked on a project, 
not included in this study, where processed foods were exported to Canada and Dubai. These are the only 
instances of exports found in the course of this research. It is noteworthy that NGO staff most frequently 
mention the EU as an export destination followed by the United States. An EU funded price dissemination 
project includes only information about European wholesale markets, not Arab ones. This is despite the fact 
that Riachi and Chaaban (2011) show that high-income Arab countries are the most important destinations of 
Lebanese food exports, with the United States and Australia being somewhat important export destinations, 
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especially for olive oil. The European market, however, is a source of imports rather than a significant export 
destination. One NGO staff, managing a Spanish funded project, criticises the export focus towards Europe. 
He states that instead, NGOs should look for alternative markets in the global South, mentioning Algeria or 
Africa. Otherwise, by attempting to sell to Europe, NGOs would be “selling fish to the sea” since European 
producers find it much easier to produce at qualities and for European tastes than their Lebanese 
counterparts.  
In sum, instances of NGO managed projects exporting foodstuff are very rare. NGOs’ focus on 
exports to the EU is misguided considering current trade relations. Despite the widespread focus on exports 
to the US or Europe, which is counter existing trade patterns in Lebanon, only on staff member interviewed 
found that strategy inappropriate for the Lebanese context. 
Markets are not a level playing field 
In addition to producing niche, high value produce and targeting solvent consumers abroad the 
World Development Report 2008 (World Bank 2007) also suggests to set up price dissemination programs. 
This would allow farmers to know what their wares fetch at various regional wholesale markets and allow 
them to better negotiate with middlemen. This suggestion was taken up by the EU in Lebanon. The EU-
sponsored ADP project collects and publishes wholesale prices from the largest five Lebanese wholesale 
markets as well as key European wholesale markets. Farmers can subscribe to a free email or text message 
service, containing weekly price updates. However, a survey of Lebanese fruit and vegetable farmers and 
wholesalers found that only a quarter of respondents were aware of the scheme. Among those who knew of 
it, only a third or less felt that the reported prices were accurate (Seyfert, Chaaban & Ghattas 2014). A large 
farmer, interviewed as an expert for this study, pointed out that the actual prices he receives are 25% - 50% 
lower than those reported to him by the price dissemination scheme. He adds that he has no power to 
enforce the stated price and complains that the export prices disseminated are for European countries, while 
Arab countries are the more significant export market. This is echoed by a staff member from a US funded 
project who questions the assumption that farmers do not know what their products are worth in the first 
place. She states that farmers know among each other how much their produce is worth but adds that they 
have no power to enforce these prices with middle men.  
The emphasis on price dissemination implicitly assumes that the only hindrance is imperfect 
information. Otherwise, all parties to an exchange, be they farmers, input salesmen, middlemen or 
supermarkets, are assumed to be equal. This is not the case in Lebanon. A quarter of respondents state that 
small producers are at a disadvantage in the agricultural supply chain. Sellers of agricultural inputs and buyers 
of output have more pricing power than small producers. One staff member of a USAID-funded NGO 
reports that buyers set prices. She continues that they are better educated and more organised and frequently 
exchange information about clients. She points out that farmers frequently take loans from the same agents 
who also buy their crop and or sell fertiliser and seeds. Producers are also the ones bearing the risk of a bad 
harvest, states the manager of a ruling class NGO. He adds that middlemen, purchasing produce at the farm 
gate, usually deduct a certain percentage for loss occurred during storage and transport.   
Unequal market power is aggravated by rising input prices. An official working on an EU funded 
project argued that, due to the continuous rise in oil prices, input prices increased. Similarly the manager of a 
USAID-funded poultry project states that feed prices nearly doubled between 2007 and 2008. Fertiliser prices 
doubled from 2007 to 2008 as asserted by a large farmer, interviewed as an expert for this study. Further, high 
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petrol prices make running refrigerated trucks for small dairies unaffordable, argues the manager of an 
USAID-funded agri-business project. However, the squeeze of profit margins has taken place entirely on the 
producer level. Despite a doubling on input costs discussed above, the poultry project was able to increase 
egg prices by only 20%. The manager of small ruminant projects notes that prices for meat and milk rose by a 
much smaller amount than input prices. In this case, improving farming techniques does not necessarily make 
farmers more competitive if, as pointed out by McMichael (2009) production is reliant on imports, as is the 
case for Lebanon. McMichael (2009:239) criticises that many new production technologies rely on 
internationally manufactured, petrochemical inputs. 
In addition, the market for agricultural inputs is highly concentrated. Imported products in Lebanon 
are brought into the country by designated agents who hold the license for specific brands or products. A 
report commissioned by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Consultation and Research Institute 2003) 
shows that a single company controls 95% of the market for liquid fuel. The top three companies dealing in 
agrochemicals control two-thirds of the market (64%).66 Frequently market concentration is higher than it 
appears to be. For instance, the five companies controlling more than 50% of the pharmaceuticals market, 
which also deals in pesticides, actually belong to only two families, and those families in turn are related by 
marriage (Zurayk 2008). This impacts the price and quality of agricultural inputs. For a Novartis-produced 
antifungal pesticide, a large-scale farmer reported that the Lebanese wholesale price is twice as high as the 
Cypriot retail price67, where he now sources the pesticide. Staff from an Italian-funded NGO tested the 
protein content of some animal feed sold on the Lebanese market and found it contained 12% protein, even 
though the stated minimum on the package was 16%. In response, the NGO initiated a feed mixer project. 
The start-up costs, that is to say the mixer, storage, and first batch of materials, were paid for by the NGO. 
The feed mixer is working without other subsidies from the NGO, and is managed by a group of 58 livestock 
farmers, eight or nine of which sit on the feed mixer’s managing committee. A USAID funded NGO working 
with a poultry cooperative also supports the mixing of feed from imported corn and soy. These are examples 
of NGOs setting up projects in response to context and a very country specific need. However, it is 
noteworthy that both of these projects were on the second wave of their funding cycle, that is to say they had 
a pre-existing relationship with their donor. This seems to indicate that, once an NGO is engaged with a 
donor, project design is carried out in a more participatory manner, where NGO staff can suggest project 
activities. Indeed, providing feed is not mentioned in any of the funding guidelines mentioned above, but has 
in both cases been suggested by NGO staff. 
Conclusion: NGOs negotiate between funding frameworks and contextual constraints 
The rural development projects outlined above are the outcome of the negotiation process between 
donors and NGOs hinted at by Ebrahim (2005). NGOs apply for funds adopting published fudging 
guidelines in their proposed project design. However, the stated aim of sustainably increasing rural 
households’ income has not been achieved by the vast majority of projects. Producing niche, high value 
products failed due to high costs of small scale food production and processing, where NGOs absorb 
                                                          
66 These figures are based on VAT data. Small companies with less than LL500million (approx. US$333,000) turnover do not have 
to register. The researchers estimate that about 25% of sales remain unreported. However, these sales will come from small 
companies.  
67 The farmer initially sourced the pesticide from a Cypriot wholesaler. But when he complained to his Lebanese wholesaler about 
the price difference, the Cypriot wholesaler was instructed not to sell to him anymore and the farmer now uses Cypriot retail 
outlets. 
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overhead costs, implying that the projects are not sustainable. Targeting solvent consumers abroad failed, also 
due to choosing the EU as key destination of exports, instead of rich Arab countries which currently are key 
recipients of Lebanese food exports. A price dissemination project aimed at improving farmers’ negotiation 
position, did not report correct prices and farmers were unable to enforce them.  
This evidence somewhat contradicts the assumption implicit in donor recommendations and the 
World Bank’s (2007) report, which posit that providing appropriate trading partners with price and quality 
information would solve the low pricing problem. These recommendations are inspired by New Institutional 
Economics, which posits that information asymmetry is a key problem in market exchanges. However, in the 
Lebanese case these strategies did not prove successful. Hence, information asymmetries as regards price and 
quality may not be the appropriate framework to think about the low price dilemma faced by small producers. 
Power relationships in market exchanges between middlemen and input merchants vis-à-vis farmers dwarf 
information asymmetries. In fact, successful projects, namely the one involving the feed mixer, directly tackle 
power inequalities and are set up not in response to donor frameworks but in response to context and 
beneficiary demands. However, these have only been funded once a relationship with a donor was pre-
existing. It appears that with progressing funding cycles, especially if the project implemented in the initial 
wave is facing problems, NGO staff have more wiggle room to push for project designs inspired by needs 
they meet on the ground. This implies that NGO agency vis-à-vis donors may increase with progressing 
funding cycles, as donors trust their implementers and become aware of the limitations of their approach. It 
might be that trust replaces the more technocratic processes donors use to control NGO activity. 
5.4 The scale problem 
One suggestion of the World Development Report does tackle power inequalities in market 
exchanges, namely the one to aggregate farmers into cooperatives so as to take advantage of scale economies 
as well as improve small producers bargaining position. The suggestion to organise farmers into cooperatives 
so as to alleviate the scale problem figures in donor frameworks as well as NGO staff propositions (see Table 
VI.4). A third of respondents mention small farm sizes as a challenge. The manager of a ruling class NGO 
considers land tenure and the fractionalisation of landholdings among siblings as a key challenge to 
agricultural productivity. “It is difficult to work on only six apple trees”, he says. So as to deal with small farm 
size and processing volume, a number of NGOs, have attempted to organise producers into cooperatives or 
to strengthen existing cooperatives. 
Organising farmers 
A fifth of rural development projects from the database compiled deal with cooperatives as main 
beneficiary group (see Figure VI.4). As for respondents to semi-structured interviews, six NGOs ran projects 
working with cooperatives and three were involved in setting cooperatives up. For example, one NGO works 
at aggregating farmers and building a network of cooperatives. Similarly, another works at setting up a 
network of women’s cooperatives, mainly focussed on food processing. Most cooperatives involve food 
processing projects, often women’s cooperatives. This is because much of the processing involves making 
preserves, such as pickled vegetables, stuffed olives, jams, tomato paste, etc. which is considered women’s 
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work in Lebanon. Five out of the six NGOs commented on how difficult setting up or working with 
cooperatives is. Two organisations, one US-funded and one French-funded, relate that it is difficult to 
convince farmers to invest in a cooperative, commensurate to the share of cooperative-capital they make use 
of, be that machinery or labour of cooperative staff. A trainer of cooperatives who has worked for a number 
of NGOs, interviewed as an expert for this study, states that in her experience cooperatives cease to operate 
as soon as the patron NGOs leave. She adds that often NGOs bring in machinery and funding, while 
cooperatives themselves ‘have nothing’. Many cooperatives cease to be active at the end of the project unless 
a new NGO can be recruited as a patron. Four respondents confirmed that they work with cooperatives 
which had previously been managed or set up by another NGO.  
Among the NGO staff interviewed, only two respondents stated that they coordinated the 
association of farmers which would remain active beyond the involvement of the NGO. One of them is the 
feed mixer described earlier and the second is a coordinated negotiation for vaccinations by a group of dairy 
farmers. The latter resulted in lower vaccine costs and accompanying vet fees. While the feed mixer project 
was proposed by dairy farmers rather than the NGO, the coordinated bid for vaccination was pushed for by 
an NGO. In fact, the manager of the project states that initially farmers had asked for the NGO to pay for 
the vaccines outright. The two examples were farmer cooperation persisted beyond the patronage of an 
NGO, are cases were scale either increased farmers bargaining power, enabling them to purchase vaccines at 
a lower cost; or allowed them to import soy and corn to run a feed mixer, a project too large for one single 
farmer. The lacking success of food processing cooperatives is likely due to the fact that even after grouping 
women into a cooperative to produce tomato paste, to cite one example, the joint production volume of a 
dozen women is still dwarfed by the output of their large industrialised competitors. Thus setting up 
cooperatives is not be a ‘one size fits all’ approach as has been advocated by donors and a fair number of 
NGO staff, but it is crucial to consider if the resulting increase in scale is large enough to have an impact.  
Unintended consequence: Work with NGOs leaves farmers jaded 
Four respondents dwell more extensively on the expectations of cooperatives and farmers towards 
NGOs. A staff member of a Spanish-funded NGO states that in his opinion nearly all (in his words: “99%”) 
of the cooperatives are established to attract funding and materials from NGOs. A staff member from 
another NGO added that cooperatives see NGOs as an income stream rather than a provider of start-up 
capital.  
This has been observed not just at the level of cooperatives. Two respondents lament the 
‘corruption’, as both call it, of farmers by NGOs. The manager of one US-funded NGO argues that the post 
2006-war period was a ‘gold rush’ for NGOs which has ‘corrupted the minds of beneficiaries’. The manager 
of an NGO, also US-funded, added that beneficiaries are getting used to NGOs coming and distributing cash 
and capital and do not take responsibility for their own fate. This is reflected in the political weakness of 
cooperatives. An official from the Ministry of Agriculture asserts that cooperatives do not have much, if any, 
lobbying power. None of the NGOs interviewed organises farmers with a view to lobby government.  
In addition, a staff member of a US-funded NGO states, farmers observe the salaries and overheads 
that go to NGOs. She adds that especially international NGOs spend a lot of money that does not necessarily 
go to farmers. She continued that beneficiaries feel that these funds are meant to go to them and feel NGOs 
are being fraudulent. The manager of the large-scale US-funded agricultural development scheme concurs 
that there is NGO fatigue, with beneficiaries thinking: ‘another NGO another meeting’. He added that 
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farmers wonder why so much money goes into overheads and staff salaries. A cooperatives trainer, 
interviewed as an expert, states that there is a widespread belief among beneficiaries that NGOs are pocketing 
money for themselves. Beneficiaries’ perception that their participation in development projects creates value 
not captured by them is not entirely mistaken since, as pointed out by Ebrahim (2005), beneficiaries supply 
the narrative that allows NGOs to claim due implementation of projects towards their donors, insuring future 
income streams. 
In this respect, NGOs may set precedents that weaken future activism, since the expectation of 
financial reward becomes a pre-condition for farmer involvement and may ‘commodify’ activism in the sense 
that farmers start conceiving of their activism as labour. In an interview with Naiman (2011), Dr. Zurayk 
relates that he was trying to organize  
 
“hundreds of farmers in order to pass a certain message. And then somebody, one of the farmers 
asked me - "Who's going to pay us for that?" I said, "What?" He said, "There are going to be 
expenses. We're going to have to come to Beirut, go, etcetera. Who's going to pay us for that? Can't 
you get some money from some NGO to pay for us for that?" 
 
He continues that farmers “automatically think, in terms of what they are going to get, in terms of 
aid”. This implies that beneficiaries believe or have experienced that their activism is labour, generating value 
for someone else, very often NGOs.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Many of the projects outlined above fail in their stated objective to sustainably increase farmers’ 
income because producers have virtually no pricing power. Not only are producers unable to pass on 
increases in input prices, or enforce what they believe to be accurate wholesale prices using price 
dissemination mechanisms, they are also unable to charge a sufficiently high premium for improvements in 
product quality or processed foods. Donor and NGO analyses argued that producers may be able to charge 
higher prices if they improve quality or move up the value chain by adding processing stages to the 
production of raw foods. However, the small scale processing costs of NGO run projects are similar or even 
much higher than the prevailing retail price, implying that producers are not even able to pay for their own 
labour, and cannot match prices of large capitalist competition. The Lebanese evidence in this respect is not 
unique, Oya (2009:232) criticises the focus on small scale productivity as a pathway to poverty reduction, put 
forward in the World Development Report (2007) as contradictory to evidence.  
Equally unacknowledged in donor frameworks are oligopolistic input markets and highly 
competitive output markets, though these are mentioned by a number of NGO staff. In fact, one of the only 
two project reviewed above that continued without donor funding is the feed mixer for dairy cows, which 
addressed a precise problem, namely low quality and expensive feed, by circumventing an oligopolistic market 
and directly importing and mixing feed. However, this was only possible due to repeated interaction between 
the beneficiaries, the NGO and the Italian donor over two cycles of the renewed ROSS framework. This 
exchange may have been facilitated by political affinity between donor and beneficiary, both of which have 
communist leanings. All members sitting on the feed mixer managing committee are communists in a 
Hizbullah dominated village. They have names such as Fidel and Che.  
Chapter 6: Rural Development Projects 
 128 
In general though, political affiliation or donor nationality do not to influence project design. If 
anything, there are striking similarities across the political and ideological spectrum. Hence, global 
development discourse is pervasive enough to shape NGO operations into similar designs irrespective of the 
implementers’ ideological or political outlook. Indeed, NGOs with the same donor can disagree in their 
interpretation why projects are not working as intended. While a USAID-funded NGO blamed the 
‘mentality’ of farmers for the slow adoption of new technologies, a staff member from a second USAID-
funded NGO disagreed, arguing that since farmers take all the risk of technological upgrading, any project 
involving the introduction of new techniques has to give farmers better insurances against catastrophic 
failure.. This indicates that, in terms of project design, NGOs have limited agency vis-à-vis donors. The 
incidences where NGOs were able to increase their influence over project design, took place during the 
second funding cycle, when a relationship between donor and NGO was established, indicating that for 
donors to leave NGOs influence in project design, there needs to be a pre-existing trust relationship. This 
section discussed how development discourse as articulated by donors shapes NGO operations. The next 
section will discuss how specific managerial and reporting requirements made by donors structure project 
implementation. 
6 Theme 2: Structuring dynamics of donor requirements 
Even before an NGO applies for project funding, donors will specify a number of project 
characteristics in their calls for proposals. Broad project goals set by donors have been discussed in the 
preceding section. In addition donors may have preferred target beneficiaries, linked to specific geopolitical 
interests, and are often setting project timeframes. Once an NGO wins a project, the donor will require the 
NGO to fulfil a number of reporting requirements. How these sets of donor requirements structure NGO 
project implementation will be the topic of this section.  
6.1 Geopolitical interests of donors and project location 
It has been argued at the international level that development aid funds are disbursed according to 
donors’ geopolitical interest rather than a recipient country’s need (Martens, 2002). Similar comments were 
made by two NGO staff respondents. One stated that ‘Donors have a political agenda’ or that ‘all money is 
tied to political agendas’. Both argued that US American as well as European68 aid goes to certain 
beneficiaries of the donor’s preference and is meant to advance foreign policy goals. One states that some 
donors in the North serve preferably Sunni villages while others prefer Christian ones. The second 
respondent outlines that in the South of Lebanon the ‘Italians are interested in the Shi’a to protect their 
troops’. Both respondents emphasised that their organisation does not accept funding from USAID or other 
large donors the NGOs’ staff politically disagree with. Both understood themselves as activists with a political 
                                                          
68 ‘European’ vs. ‘American’ are categories used by the respondents. 
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agenda. Their opinion implicitly concedes that who an NGO receives money from impacts on the 
organisation.  
The respondents’ differentiation between European and US policy interests is reflected in the 
donors funding guidelines. There are significant differences in the discourse used by USAID or European 
unilateral donors to justify their involvement in Lebanon. As hinted at by one of the respondents, the seminal 
event for European donors was the 2006 war and the subsequent increase in UNIFIL (United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon) soldiers deployed at the Lebanese-Israeli border. Indeed, following the 2006 war, 
and following the Stockholm donor conference, emergency aid to Lebanon increased significantly (Ministry 
of Finance Lebanon, 2006). The 2006 war also led to an increase in UNIFIL troops, where Italy, France, 
Indonesia and Spain had the largest contingents, with more than 1,000 soldiers each. In addition, since 
February 2007, UNIFIL has been under either French, Italian or Spanish command (Reigeluth, 2009). 
Protection of troops and winning the goodwill of the local population are part of the commanding countries’ 
donor strategy. For example, the Italian ROSS framework is a war relief program initiated in 2007 and 
renewed twice until 2010 with funding going largely to the south of Lebanon. The Spanish overseas 
development agency (AECID) has marked the area of Spanish UNIFIL troop deployment as a priority area 
for its development projects and in 2009 the country contributed ten times more ODA to Lebanon than to 
Syria (Reigeluth, 2009). An irrigation and dairy processing project are located in the vicinity of the Spanish 
UNIFIL headquarter in Marjeyoun. Similarly, the French AFD purchased and installed four olive presses in 
villages within the deployment zone of French UNIFIL troops. This is the only agricultural development 
project in Lebanon financed by the AFD.  
While war recovery was a stated objective in nearly a quarter of Italian-financed projects, only one 
out of the 44 projects funded by USAID was related to war recovery. The ‘Cedar Revolution’ and subsequent 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in March 2005 were important pivots motivating US support of 
liberal, pro-Western elements in Lebanon, in particular during the run-up to municipal elections in 2010. 
Indeed, staff from the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) states that its objective is to provide 
youth with alternatives to extremist politics and to mitigate conflict. In addition, USAID-financed NGOs are 
prohibited from cooperating with Hizbullah, classified by the US State Department as a terrorist organisation. 
This prohibition inevitably excludes certain governmental actors, notably Hizbullah-run municipalities. These 
restrictions did, until 2013, not apply to European donors.  
The German development agency is an exception, in that it manages all of its projects through the 
CDR and partners with ministries, universities and municipalities rather than other NGOs. In this preference 
for governmental partners, Germany acts more like a multi-lateral donor than a bilateral one. Germany only 
contributes at most 300 soldiers to UNIFIL, largely marines (Bundesregierung, 2013). In addition, the 
country’s foreign policy is strongly supportive of Israel as demonstrated by Merkel’s speech at the Knesset in 
2008 and may gain from sitting on the fence, as demonstrated by the country’s role in brokering prisoner 
exchanges between Israel and Hizbullah in 2004 and 2008 (Putz, 2008).  
One case was observed where, despite donor preferences, the NGO had some leverage in whom to 
target. The Lebanese NGO operating in the North of Lebanon, cited at the beginning of this section, 
convinced their Swiss donor to include a mix of Christian and Sunni villages as beneficiaries despite the 
donor’s initial reluctance to also include Christians. However, the NGO respondent states that the NGO was 
initially reluctant to do so and that changing the eligibility criteria required a significant amount of negotiation. 
Hence, in Lebanon, implementing NGOs have very little influence on determining target groups.   
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6.2 Project implementation timeframes 
In addition to project location, donors influence project duration through their funding frameworks. 
For instance, three NGOs discussed in this chapter received project funding from USAID within the 
‘Expanding Economic Opportunities Program II’. The total duration of any project funded within this 
particular program was limited, from the outset, to the duration from 2005-2007, with an option to extend by 
a year. Similarly, projects funded by the Italian Cooperation for Development within the ‘ROSS Emergency 
Program’ had a stipulated maximum duration of one year, from March 2007 until March 2008.  
Figure VI.5: Average project duration by donor 
 
N=110 
Confidence Intervals for the World Bank and AFD were very large due to the fact that these agencies only fund 3 and 2 projects 
respectively. Confidence intervals are omitted. Note that USAID/USDA and the UNDP have statistically significant longer project 
durations than other donors, differences among which are not statistically significant. 
Source: Inventory of agricultural development projects between 2008 and 2009, compiled by author (see p.48 for details) 
 
Average project duration, according to the small projects database, was two years (CI: 1.7-2.4)69 
though half of projects lasted 18 months or less. Figure VI.5 shows that the two-year average is due to 
USAID and the UNDP having longer average project durations of just over three years, while the majority of 
donors funding rural and agricultural development projects have project time-spans of about 18 months.70  
More than half of all respondents interviewed mentioned that funding cycles are too short. One of 
the most frequently criticised funding frameworks was the ROSS framework of the Italian Cooperation, 
which was intended as an emergency framework but funded development projects, albeit on an emergency 
schedule. Of the nine respondents who did not complain about the shortness of funding cycles, three 
benefited from comparatively longer term USAID-funding. Figure VI.5 shows that USAID funding cycles 
are the longest. Two further NGOs without timeframe concerns were implementing projects in coordination 
with the government. Projects implemented by the government, but funded by various donors, had longer 
average funding cycles (3.5 years, CI: 1.9-5.1) than projects implemented by NGOs. These QUANGOs 
complain about delays due to the slow working of government and a lack of official cooperation. This may be 
                                                          
69Confidence intervals are displayed to give an idea of the (very small) variance of project duration across projects. 
70 Note that if funding for projects was renewed for an additional cycle, this has been added up. 
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one factor in longer project duration. However, political power, size, and lacking budget constraints mean 
that governments are more powerful vis-à-vis donors than NGOs. One NGO not complaining about short 
timeframes was a Lebanese ruling class NGO with a wealthy political patron. According to two ruling class 
NGOs active in the South, extension services and the distribution of input such as tree saplings are very 
popular with beneficiaries. One of the two organisations continues to run these services even after the end of 
the foreign funded project, charging farmers only the input costs, excluding salaries. The continuation of this 
popular project is only possible due to the ample financial resources at the disposal of the NGO.  
For NGOs that rely on time-limited funding, a funding cycle regulates the beginning and end of a 
project as well the amount of staff employed, since NGOs are not allowed to retain unspent project funds. 
Of course, staff, aware of the fact that they will likely be unemployed once the project finishes have an 
interest in advocating longer project horizons. However, many respondents cited concerns unrelated to 
themselves as consequences of short funding horizons. One worker from an NGO points out that short 
timeframes lead NGOs to disappoint beneficiaries, since it put pressure on her NGO to finish the project 
quickly. She relates being told by beneficiaries that ‘You lied to us’ when the project closed. Similarly, at an 
organisational level, funding cycles imply that, in the case of one activist NGO, staff go unpaid between 
funding cycles or in most other cases are let go. The respondent from this activist NGO, points out that 
organisations need to be engaged in constant fundraising to maintain a regular income stream so as to avoid 
shedding staff and remain active with their beneficiaries. Though time consuming, this work is not rewarded. 
He continues that time committed to a cause, outside project deliverables, is an important element in NGO 
legitimacy and argues that his NGO gained credibility through their long presence in the area, irrespective of 
donor funding flows.  
Two NGO staff point out that the particularities of the agricultural sector may require longer 
funding horizons. To illustrate this, one of them noted that olive trees take 20 years to mature71, and another 
added that to observe results from changing production techniques one needs to wait at least a year to 
observe results during the following harvest. Occasionally even comparatively long term projects were 
criticised for being too short in the agricultural sector context. For instance, an ambitious USAID project 
aimed at the entire Lebanese dairy sector was criticised for being too short. Staff argued that it took two years 
alone to learn enough about the sector, and voiced frustration that the project finished too soon.  
Abiding to project schedules may take precedence over successful implementation. An NGO was 
compelled to hold a training session on the Adha holiday despite predictably low attendance rather than 
allowing the project to overrun for a few days. Similarly, staff from another NGO state that donors prefer 
incomplete rather than late projects. During armed clashes in 2008, farmers participating in an apiculture 
project could not reach their bees and many hives were spoilt. The NGO was forced to complete the project 
at the pre-determined timeframe, despite demands from the community to continue working on it after the 
clashes. Table VI.5, below displays NGO responses in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 In fact, olive trees generally reach maturity after about 10 years, but 20 year-old olive trees may produce better fruit than their 
teenage cousins. 
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Table VI.5: NGO assessment of project timeframe 
Comments on project timeframe set by donor 
USAID funded 
 Project horizons are between 1-4 years, an olive tree takes 20 years to reach maturity, 10 
years is not a lot in agriculture 
 Three years is too short term, it took two years to learn all there is about the sector and then 
the project had to close 
 10 years is maybe a sufficient project horizon 
 While a project is executed, we already fundraise for the next one so as to be able to retain 
staff 
EU funded 
 
NGO receives funds from several different EU county donors:  
 Either an NGO is project driven or it needs to constantly raise funds. Salaries were not paid for 
three months due to funding shortfalls. 
 Biggest hindrance is the short term nature of contracts (Italians give only 1-2 year contracts) 
 Short term time horizon puts pressure on NGOs to finish projects and beneficiaries say ‘you 
lied to us 
 Project cycles are 18 months, this is too short, the minimum should be 5 years. 
 QUANGO: Project horizons are two, sometimes three years; most things actually take twice 
that long (QUANGO respondent). 
 QUANGO: Political turmoil meant throughout the program there were seven ministers of 
agriculture. Getting the required signatures from official sources delayed things. Only 7 out of 
10 projects were completed. 
 Teacher training had to be held on Adha holiday so as not to delay the project despite likely 
poor attendance. 
 Clashes in 2008 meant that farmers could not get to their bees and died. Despite this the 
project was ended.  
 
Italian funded:   
 ROSS emergency programs have one year cycles. This is not enough, one needs at least 3-4 
months for an initial assessment 
 ROSS runs an emergency programme but in Lebanon there is no need for an emergency 
programme, so they run development projects in an emergency framework. 
 The funding horizon is only one year, which means the NGO expands a lot and then shrinks a 
lot 
 There is a need to spend all the money or lose it and reapply for a new project or an 
extension. This implies we were without funding for several months. 
 
Spanish funded:  
 We had a 20 months contract with four months extension. 24 months are not at all 
appropriate; results will only show the following year, when the crops planted with the new 
techniques are harvested. The donor sets the time limit. 
 
French funded:  
 It is a three year contract, but the work will actually take five years. 
 
Hence, projects less affected by funding constraints are firstly, those funded by a donor that has 
longer funding cycles, in this case, to a certain extent, USAID, secondly, organisations with their own 
endowments, such as ‘ruling class NGOs’ in Lebanon, and thirdly projects implemented through the 
government. On the other hand, NGO staff working on short project cycles reported that these prevent 
them from, firstly, learning enough about the context, secondly from building trust with beneficiaries, thirdly 
does not allow for unforeseeable events and fourthly, threatens organisational sustainability.  
NGOs receiving funds from international donors have no agency at all with regards to project 
duration, in the sense agency is used by Wallace at al. and refers to NGOs’ actual capacity to do things 
differently if they wanted to. Short time frames are a near universal complaint but no organisation interviewed 
was able to act counter donor set time constraints. The only exception are ruling class NGOs, in this specific 
case the project discussed involved the distribution in agricultural inputs. It may be argued that these fit neatly 
into the NGO funder’s patronage ambitions and hence funding continued. 
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6.3 Reporting and budgeting requirements  
Donors have requirements related on what project funds can or cannot be spent on. Staff from two 
NGOs point out that many donors only fund direct project costs, but no running costs, such as rent or 
utilities, nor staff salaries. Both relate experiences where donors were complicit in circumventing their own 
guidelines. When both NGOs argued that certain funding restrictions were infeasible for a small organisation 
such as theirs, instead of amending funding guidelines, local donor staff helped both NGOs to prepare 
falsified budgets that satisfied reporting requirements. Suggested amendments included making out fake 
receipts over hours worked as a contractor instead of declaring that a monthly salary has been paid. In 
consequence, NGO staff has become jaded as regards proposal writing and reporting requirements. Writing 
grant proposals is called by that one small NGO staff a mere ‘writing exercise’ unrelated to reality. A staff 
member from a USAID-funded NGO echoes this observation, suggesting that if the NGO’s head knows 
how to ‘talk the talk’ then her organisation can get as much funding as it wants (see Table VI.6). Hence, 
reporting requirements do not fulfil their intended function, that of holding NGOs’ accountable.  
Table VI.6: NGO comments on donor reporting guidelines and donor conceptualisation of success 
Comments on donor reporting guidelines and donor conceptualisation of success 
local NGO 
 Some donors only fund direct project costs, so there is money for activities but not for 
salaries. But staff are permanent not just project based. 
 Writing grant proposals is a writing exercise i.e. charming donors and knowing how to do that is 
more important than actual involvement in projects 
 If the NGO head knows how to talk the talk and has good contacts he can get as much money as 
he wants from the World Bank and USAID 
INGO 
 USAID requires labelling of output produced with project aid, making it is very difficult to sell in 
certain [US hostile] regions, hence they have to be shipped further distances, increasing costs. In 
times of unrest USAID stickers on cars are a liability. (Note: There is disagreement among 
respondents how strictly the ‘sticker rule’ is enforced.) 
 
In addition, some donors, most notably USAID, require that NGOs clearly signal that a certain 
project is financed by that donor agency. In regions hostile to US foreign policy, this impacts successful 
project implementation. USAID requires labelling of output produced, in the present case free range eggs and 
broilers, making it very difficult to sell them in certain regions. Hence they have to be shipped further afield 
to different regions, increasing costs. In times of unrest USAID stickers on cars is dangerous, with one NGO 
staff reporting attacks on the parked NGO vehicle.  
Donors require success narratives and measureable outcomes. Interviewed NGOs frequently 
articulated success in terms of how many beneficiaries are reached. NGOs seek to make this figure as large as 
possible by including individuals who only tangentially benefited from the project, such as dependents. In 
addition, drop-outs or late additions to existing programs are frequent, and even participants who did not 
complete the project may be counted. One NGO included labourers on its project as beneficiaries. Day 
labourers helping in the apple harvest, receiving LL24,000 per day, barely above the minimum wage, were 
counted as project beneficiaries along with the apple farmers. The rationale behind this being that, since 
Lebanon suffers high unemployment, any form of employment generation can be counted as a project 
benefit, even if the work is casual and badly paid. Similarly the EU-financed ‘Agricultural Development 
Project’ listed fruit and vegetable exporters, food processors, local distributors, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute and Federation of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and 
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Agriculture in Lebanon as secondary beneficiaries, since they all some way worked with the project. This is 
not to dispute who should or should not be included as a beneficiary, but rather to point out that the number 
of beneficiaries says little about project success. Even when NGO staff believe their project is worthwhile 
they may find themselves pressured to report beneficiary numbers, since they are easily understood and 
comparable. Eight respondents recited without prompting the number of beneficiaries or land surface 
affected by the project. A Spanish-funded Lebanese NGO declares that it currently reaches 150 beneficiaries. 
A Lebanese NGO ‘reaches’ 320 women and ‘supports’ 100 farmers, a EU funded INGO has 250 
beneficiaries, which includes three cooperatives. This is to satisfy donor requirements for measurable results 
within their reporting requirements. One interviewed NGO staff member expressed his dislike for this kind 
of evaluation since, as he argues, it is more about telling a success story for donors than about actual learning 
from project outcomes. 
A good illustration of the difference between a successful project and measureable outcomes are 
trainings. Nearly half of respondents stated that their projects involve the provision of training. Trainings 
could be on soil erosion, pesticide and fertiliser use, cooperatives management, financial management, 
marketing, apiculture, soap production, new high value crops (avocado, seedless grapes, kiwi, special kind of 
bananas), harvest techniques, packaging, quality standards, hygiene, nutrition, jam or pastes production, 
composting etc.  
As for beneficiary preferences, the manager of a Spanish NGO stated that trainings are unpopular. 
The manager of a large ruling class NGO in the South reported that bookkeeping and management courses 
were especially unpopular. However, the same NGO manager pointed out that trainings on specific topics 
with direct market relevance, i.e. how to make tomato paste, were very popular. This is echoed by the 
employee of an Italian funded NGO with respect to training on animal husbandry, as well as the manager of 
a US funded dairy project who said that the vaccination programmes for goats and sheep were popular 
because it offered a precise vaccination calendar and a follow-up training on how to avoid diseases. She also 
said that farmers generally do not like to sit in classrooms but prefer field visits or on-the-ground training. A 
cooperatives trainer, interviewed as an expert, suggested that many trainings are too broad and unspecific for 
farmers to easily perceive a benefit. A manager from the branch of a US funded NGO adds that farmers 
prefer interactive and individual attention, which is expensive. Many NGO staff (from, for instance, a large 
ruling class NGO, an Italian funded NGO, or a large USAID-funded one) point out that farmers like being 
able to call for advice or to make individual appointments to visit trial plots. However, individual attention is 
expensive. One NGO gives farmers the opportunity to have individual conversations with experts. This 
NGO’s trainings cost $700-$1000 per day, while another NGO proposes to run a classroom based week-long 
soap production course for only $500. A focus on beneficiary numbers may misrepresent the benefit of a 
project. A small and expensive but useful training may be valued less than a cheaper but less useful training 
course.  
6.4 Conclusion 
Donor requirements structure NGO project implementation in three respects. Donors influence 
beneficiary targeting (1), project timeframe (2) and how NGOs evaluate and hence think about, their projects 
(3).  Foreign policy objectives of donors do translate into NGO project location. However, there is evidence 
that NGOs are able to influence donor targeting. It is noteworthy that in the present case, activist NGOs in 
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particular attempted to influence donor targeting. Hence NGOs have some agency with respect to targeting, 
this is in contrast to project timeframes. Donors set funding timeframe. NGOs working on short funding 
cycles find that it limits their ability to learn from projects, build trust with beneficiaries or to react to 
unforeseeable events. Nearly all respondents mentioned short timeframes as a key constraint. QUANGOs, 
USAID funded NGOs and ruling class NGOs benefit from longer project timeframes. For QUANGOs this 
is likely due to the organisation’s association with the government, a comparatively powerful actor vis-à-vis 
donors. Ruling class NGOs benefit from budgets that are not bound by foreign funds but bound by the 
willingness and capacity of the NGO’s patron to continue funding a certain project. Lastly, reporting 
requirements of donors do not fulfil their intended function, that of holding NGOs’ accountable. NGOs feel 
that reporting is largely a writing exercise with little connection to the actually implemented project. Few even 
state that donor staff assists in breaching reporting regulations. In addition, donors’ focus on measureable 
outcomes leads to a focus on quantity rather than quality. Small and expensive but popular projects may be 
valued less than a cheaper but lower quality ones.  
7 Corollary: NGOs as job creators 
One theme permeated a large number of interviews (11 respondents) without prompting, namely 
NGOs employment of skilled Lebanese workers in rural areas. The large majority of NGO staff interviewed 
are agronomists, agricultural engineers, environmental engineers or agricultural economists. All had at least 
one university degree and about half were women. Employment for them is scarce in rural areas and NGOs 
offer welcome employment opportunities, allowing skilled Lebanese to stay in their villages.  
Table VI.7: NGOs as employment generators 
NGO 
 There are no companies in the region, no industry. There is a little tourism. Most people work in 
the army and as school teachers. Lots of people go to Beirut because there are no universities 
here. In the entire region, there is just this project, there is nothing else. I cannot take a wife, 
cannot marry because of insecurity. 
 Most agriculture graduates either work for NGOs or have left Lebanon. 
 Out of a dozen students many now work in landscaping, some in Dubai. Some work in marketing 
some in environmental engineering, one selling fertiliser, one is doing a PhD in Paris. One came 
from a farm and is still working on a farm. 
 The NGO received 60-70 CVs for 3-4 positions for a 3 year project. The initial contract is one year, 
which can be extended. 
 NGOs are becoming organisations for employment generation at the least. 
 One respondent states, her husband winning a UNDP contract and her job with the NGO were the 
reasons the two of them were able to locate back to their village. Of her siblings, all of whom have 
studied, only one is still in the village, the others are in Beirut or emigrated. 
 NGOs create work for agronomists; otherwise they would have to work for big agro-businesses. 
 At least NGOs offer employment to agriculture engineers; otherwise there is no work for them. 
ruling class NGO 
 Agriculture engineers are hired by fertiliser companies and work effectively as sales people and no 
longer as engineers. 
QUANGO  
 Agriculture is a nice study topic, but there are no job opportunities unless one inherits property. It 
is fun to work in the field, but very few stay. From the respondent’s cohort at university only one 
other woman and no man are still in Lebanon.  
 
The manager of a poultry coop states that he would not be living in his village without the NGO-
financed project. A similar statement is made by the employee of an Italian-funded NGO who was able to 
stay in her village due to the good fortune of both her and her husband finding employment financed by 
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international donors. Two respondents listed where their former university classmates are currently 
employed, and both stated that many emigrate and only a very small minority works in agriculture (see Table 
VI.7).  
The alternative to NGO employment seems to be work with seed and fertiliser companies, which 
the two respondents spoke about in disparaging terms, arguing that one would effectively become a ‘sales 
person’ and no longer work as engineers. However, work for an NGO does not offer much job security since 
it is limited to the project timeframe. The poultry cooperative manager points out that job insecurity prevents 
him from getting married. Still, demand for these NGO jobs is high, with the manager of a large USAID-
funded project stating that he received 60-70 CVs for three or four positions, all of which are initially limited 
to one year, with the possibility of an extension for a 3-year project. Employment with NGOs is limited to 
the duration of the project. As discussed previously, donors do not fund overheads. As can be seen from 
discussions in section 6.2 in this chapter and can be seen in Table VI.5 employment with NGOs is based on 
short term contracts. Chapters 4 and 5 discussed that most NGO staff do not benefit from insurance cover. 
In contrast, employees of ruling class NGOs benefit from permanent contracts as well as insurance cover. 
Still, despite these shortcomings, employment with an NGO reliant on international development fudning is 
considered attractive work.  
This is perhaps also testimony to the unattractiveness of work in agriculture; if the skilled and bright 
people in rural areas work for NGOs rather than in agricultural production, which many NGO projects 
promote. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) cite evidence that in a developing country context being an employee is 
preferred to small-scale entrepreneurship, which often involves hard work, is very risky and if successful may 
yield only little reward. In fact, one reason employment in the army is so attractive is that parents, children 
and spouse are covered by social security. Most rural families will have at least one family member employed 
in the armed forces for this very reason. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) argue that it is these benefits and 
reliability of income that make being an employee much more attractive than being an entrepreneur. The 
preponderance of rural employment in the army or in public services in Lebanon is indicative of the 
preference for being a rural employee as opposed to an entrepreneur.  
8 Conclusion 
This chapter tackled the research question of how NGO project implementation is shaped, with a 
particular focus on donors. Donors disburse funds according to funding frameworks which stipulate project 
aim, have preferred target beneficiaries and set project timeframes. NGOs have to follow specific reporting 
requirements which impact how they conceptualise success. However, within these restrictions, NGOs have 
some space to bring in their own ideas and agency of how and what kind of projects should be implemented.  
International donor funding frameworks call for NGOs to propose the implementation of projects 
the objectives of which fit into international development discourse and international best practice, largely 
without consulting beneficiaries or local experts. This funding process benefits NGOs without a clear 
mission, which can easily adapt their work to donor requirements, more than NGOs with longstanding 
missions and a commitment to a certain cause and community. Hence, conceptualisations of rural 
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development puzzles in Lebanon are similar across NGOs and reflect recommendations made in 
international development literature, particularly the 2008 World Development Report (World Bank, 2007). 
Many NGOs see key shortcomings in quality and marketing of Lebanese agricultural production. Many 
advocate export or selling high quality niche products to affluent consumers. If focussed on export, NGOs 
advocate exporting to the EU, despite Arab markets being a more important destinations for Lebanese 
agricultural exports. Projects tackling these problems offer solutions through, for example, extension services, 
in particular for olive orchards, animal husbandry, and fruit and vegetable cultivation. Alternatively, projects 
aim as moving farmers’ products up the value chain by setting up small scale processing cooperatives or 
improving marketing through better labelling and packaging.  
In order to secure funding NGOs may adapt their objectives to fit those of their donors, leading to 
mission drift on the side of NGOs. Similarity of donor objectives leads to isomorphism of projects across 
NGOs. The competition for funding and similarities of project objectives have led to several cases of 
duplication in Lebanon, with NGOs running very similar projects consecutively or simultaneously.  
However, few NGOs manage to achieve their stated goal of sustainably increasing rural households’ 
income with the projects they initiated. Farmers have difficulty obtaining higher prices for their produce even 
if they increase quality and produce for niche and high value markets. Production costs of small scale facilities 
remain very high and NGOs absorb most overhead costs, implying that the projects are not sustainable. 
Small scale production for a high value niche market is not a successful strategy in Lebanon. Some NGOs 
identify concentrated input and wholesale markets as impediments to small farmers’ profitability, though 
these do not figure in donor frameworks. In fact producers can neither negotiate wholesale prices obtained 
from a price dissemination program, nor pass on increases in input costs. Rather that informational 
asymmetries linked to price or quality, power relationships between middle men and input merchants vis-à-vis 
farmers affect their ability to set prices. In fact, successful projects directly tackle and circumvent these power 
inequalities. They are set up not in response to donor frameworks but in response to context and beneficiary 
demands. 
Small production scale is a challenge acknowledged by both donors and NGOs, in response to 
which producer cooperatives were set up. However, organising famers into cooperatives should not be a 
universally applied solution. In the Lebanese case cooperatives were successful only if the resulting increase in 
scale has an impact on prevailing market structures and hence price, such as lowering vaccination or feed 
costs. Otherwise, cooperatives tend to be vehicles for aid distribution rather than genuine organisations that 
would increase farmers’ economic and political power. Scale is not just a problem for producers; the coverage 
of NGOs themselves is minimal. The staff member of a QUANGO believes that NGO projects are minor 
‘drops in a bucket’ since the 54 projects his organisation runs reach only 142 families. NGOs themselves 
rationalise this lack of coverage by seeing themselves as a ‘catalyst’. However, this lack of scale affects what 
kind of development challenges NGOs are able to take on. A Lebanese staff member of an Italian-funded 
NGO argues that the most important problem facing agriculture in Lebanon is the unfulfilled demand for 
irrigation. Some water harvesting projects are carried out by NGOs but they are small-scale. Infrastructure 
investments on a large scale are too expensive for NGOs. However, Woodhouse (2009:273) believes that 
investments in public goods, especially water infrastructure, are a better policy to increase agricultural 
productivity than, for instance, extension services or marketing.  
Donors’ geopolitical interests influence beneficiary targeting. This chapter showed that in rural and 
agricultural development, the most important donors are the EU and affiliated organisations, UNDP, the 
World Bank, FAO, Italy and its regional agencies, USAID, Spain and regional agencies, Germany and France. 
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Multilateral donors and Germany prefer the Lebanese government as implementing agency while bi-lateral 
donors work primarily through NGOs, frequently those of their own nationality. There is a political 
dimension to bilateral grants to rural and agricultural development projects. For European donors with 
increased UNIFIL contingents following the July 2006 war, notably the Italian, Spanish and French 
governments, winning the goodwill of populations living in proximity to UNIFIL forces is a motivating 
factor for aid disbursements. Projects are frequently located in the Bekaa and the South and non-US NGOs 
may cooperate with Hizbullah in project implementation. As for USAID, strengthening local, pro-Western 
allies, in particular as alternatives to Hizbullah and Islamists is a factor motivating disbursements. 
Donors set project timeframes. The timeframe of foreign funded rural development projects is very 
short. In particular European donors have project lengths averaging 18 months. Some projects were initiated 
as post-war emergency projects but are now effectively carrying out development work. US-funded projects 
are not emergency programs and last longer, on average three years. Lebanese ruling class NGOs do not face 
the problem of short timeframes. While finance by international donors to NGOs is typically project-based 
with limited timeframes, ruling class NGOs are able to extend successful projects beyond the original funding 
horizon thanks to the financial resources of its political patrons, if they so choose.  
A number of donor requirements, in addition to the limited timeframe, constrain NGO work, 
namely that only direct project costs are covered by grants, and that all funds need to be spent before the end 
of the project. In addition, fundraising and reporting are not covered by the grant. This has a number of 
negative impacts on NGO work, since fundraising and reporting are not remunerated. Stringent reporting 
requirements are labour intensive and have little bearing on what is actually being implemented. Many NGOs 
consider these a pro forma writing exercise without any real relevance to their day to day operations. 
Emphasis on tangible and reportable results may privilege cheaper per-beneficiary activities over more 
expensive but more effective ones.  
Hence, donor obligations, such as a focus on international best practice and discourse, geopolitical 
interest, time and reporting considerations impact NGO operations and humanitarian outcomes. A focus on 
international best practice led to mission drift, isomorphism and duplication in Lebanon. Short timeframes 
hinder NGOs’ ability to build trust with beneficiary and donor reporting requirements lead NGOs to focus 
on measurable rather than high quality outputs. However, NGOs do not all behave like professionalised sub-
contracting partners fulfilling donor requirements. A negotiation takes place between donors and NGOs. 
This chapter reviewed evidence that NGOs can affect in particular beneficiary targeting and project design, 
though donor timeframe and reporting requirements are not negotiable.   
An interesting corollary to this discussion is that NGOs increasingly function as employment 
generators for rural graduates. However, it is noteworthy that employment with NGOs is a more attractive 
option for Lebanese agricultural engineers that becoming producers themselves. This could also be seen as 
buttressing criticisms of the projects run by NGOs, attempting to create livelihoods that many NGO 
employees would not chose themselves. 
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VII. Conclusion
With more than 6,000 organisations registered, Lebanon has a very active NGO landscape. This 
thesis estimates that the non-profit sector in Lebanon has a budget of $421 million and employs about 5% of 
the economically active population. Local NGOs outnumber international ones and the country has a long 
history of charity and philanthropy, often with religious histories. International NGOs and development 
finance are considerably more recent. Lebanon has a weak central government, hostage to elite interests. The 
regulatory environment governing NGOs is liberal, due to the government’s inability to enact stronger 
regulation, and because it suits elite interests. Reporting required by the government of NGOs is 
straightforward.  Submitted documents are often a mere formality rather than a useful collection of 
information about NGO institutions and procedure. Foreign NGOs, which include Palestinian organizations, 
are an exception and subject to stricter oversight. The lax regulatory environment contributes to the vibrancy, 
at least in terms of numbers, of the Lebanese NGO sector. This study is based on quantitative data collected 
in early 2006 from more than 3000 organisations and qualitative data collected between 2008 and 2011 on 
rural development projects.  
Research Question1 - Proposition 1: Context shapes NGOs 
NGOs are commonly distinguished into organisations where members organise to defend their own 
interests, called membership or grassroots organisations; and intermediary NGOs, which raise funds for 
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third-party beneficiaries. In Lebanon, NGOs are split almost equally between grassroots (54%) and 
intermediary NGOs (46%). Levels of volunteering are relatively higher among intermediary than grassroots 
NGOs. As has been the case globally (Clark and Michuki 2009; Tvedt 1998) the number of NGOs operating 
in Lebanon has increased exponentially throughout the 20th and 21st century, though NGO registrations 
slowed during the Civil War. The oldest NGOs, dating from the 18th and 19th centuries, are family, religious 
and charitable organisations. During the mid-20th century the foundation of arts and culture associations as 
well as youth and social clubs increased, fostered by a climate of social reform and increased political 
activism. Policies aimed at developing the periphery played a role in the increased formation of village and 
community organisations. The formation of social service-delivery NGOs declined during the mid-20th 
century, only to rebound during the Civil War in the second half of the 20th century, when NGOs took on 
emergency service provision and service-delivery roles. In the post-Civil War era, international funding geared 
at reconstruction became an important funding source for Lebanese NGOs alongside domestic sources. This 
was simultaneous to the global emergence of NGOs as implementers of development projects. The number 
of development advocacy NGOs increased. Professional, alumni and other membership organisations are 
comparatively more recent than family or religious charitable organisations, indicating a shift, however partial, 
in social organisation from one based on kinship and religious affiliation to one based on shared material 
experiences, such as education or profession.  
The majority of NGOs operating in Lebanon are very small. Only a quarter of NGO respondents 
had paid staff, and half indicated annual budgets below $10,000. Social service-providing NGOs have, on 
average, larger staff and budgets than grassroots organisations such as Culture and Arts or Community 
Associations. Organisations such as Civic and Advocacy and Environmental and Animal Welfare 
Associations have large budgets compared to their staff numbers. Conversely, membership associations and 
social clubs have many staff but low budgets.  
Evidence is contradictory as to NGO’s ability to identify the neediest beneficiaries when compared 
to the government. The literature debates whether, due to their close links to beneficiaries, NGOs are better 
at identifying and targeting the poor when compared to the government or, if instead, NGOs locate close to 
political and economic centres (see discussion p. 12 and Brass 2012, Edwards and Hulme 1996, Barr et al. 
2005, Gauri and Galef 2005, Bebbington 2004). In Lebanon, little evidence exists that NGOs have an 
information advantage or are better at identifying needy beneficiaries than the government. NGOs eschew 
the poorest regions and fewer locate in remote regions. Service-delivery NGOs frequently operate as 
government sub-contractors and their location significantly correlates with locations of government spending. 
In Lebanon, rather than replacing the government as service providers, NGO provision is reinforced by 
government spending. In addition to government funding, Lebanese NGOs also respond to increases in 
international development finance. However, while government donors prefer service-delivery NGOs, 
international development aid primarily goes to advocacy and development NGOs, a reflection of the US-led 
drive for democracy in the Middle East and attempts to promote secular political organisation.  
Geopolitical interests of international donors impacts NGO targeting (see discussions on p.70, p.84 
or p.128 as well as Tvedt 1998, Abdelrahman 2004). Indeed, in Lebanon USAID aims at strengthening local, 
pro-Western organisations. It directly funds pro-Western ‘ruling class’ NGOs; organisations such as the 
Hariri, Issam Fares, Makhzoumi or Mowad Foundations. In contrast, European donors, in particular the 
Italian, Spanish and French development aid agencies target the south of Lebanon since they have been 
furnishing, until very recently the largest share of UNIFIL soldiers. Financing development projects in 
regions of UNIFIL deployment is aimed at winning the goodwill of neighbouring communities. This impacts 
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NGO registrations. NGOs registered in the South of Lebanon are the youngest of any region, reflecting the 
influx of development aid following the July 2006 war, which most heavily affected this border region. 
However, within the broader targeting regions, such as the North or the South, NGOs have some 
opportunity to influence the choice of beneficiaries. For example, one NGO convinced its donor to work in 
Christian as well as Sunni villages.  
So as to address the research questions a few concepts already discussed will be reviewed again 
briefly. Throughout this thesis, NGO agency has been conceptualised following Wallace at al. (2007) who, 
referring to Giddens, specify that NGO’s agency can be conceptualised as their the capacity to do something 
rather than something else (see p. 16). The authors also called this commitment. This is in contrast to mere 
intention which may not necessarily translate into action. Some authors reviewed (Besley 2006, Besley and 
Ghatak 2001) conceptualise NGO agency as autonomous, that is to say constituted independently of social 
context, while others (Ebrahim 2009, Wallace et al. 2007) argued it is embedded  in political, historical and 
sociological context.  
Proposition one of the first research question, addressing the importance of context, can now be 
addressed: lax regulation of domestic NGOs in Lebanon leads to a vibrant NGO landscape. NGO activities 
reflect historical context. More social service organisations are set up in wartimes while culture and arts 
predominate in peacetime. Organisations respond to increases in domestic and international funding, 
frequently acting as sub-contractors of social service to the Lebanese government and implementing 
advocacy or development projects for international donors.  NGOs’ location decisions and geographical 
targeting are influenced by geopolitical preferences of their donors, be they national or international. NGOs 
do not seem to be better at targeting needy beneficiaries than the government. In fact, needs assessments are 
rarely carried out.  
Research Question 1 – Proposition 2: Donor preferences and NGO characteristics 
In view of donors’ position, as sources of funds, they are particularly powerful in shaping NGO 
operations and characteristics (Ebrahim 2009, Jad 2004). This is raised in proposition two of the first research 
question, namely to what extent observed NGO characteristics differ across donors and, by implication, what 
kind of NGOs are preferred by what kind of donors. The model fitted to analyse what NGO characteristics 
are matched to which kind of donors uses predictors such as NGO activity, location, age, institutional 
sophistication, cooperation with the government or other NGOs, sectarian affiliation, beneficiary committees 
and awareness of implementation difficulties, as well as staff volume and membership in National Social 
Security. Though of varying fit, the model is appropriate to assess the receipt of governmental, international 
membership fees donations from private sector organisations. The model is a poor fit for service fees and 
contributions of private individuals, which are omitted in this conclusion. There are notable differences in 
what characteristics various donors value in an NGO. 
International donors are more likely to make contributions to advocacy NGOs than to organisations 
pursuing other activities, while membership organisations are less likely to receive these funds. NGOs located 
in Beirut are more likely to receive international donor funds, as are organisations cooperating with the 
government or having a contractual relationship with another NGO. Internal characteristics such as 
beneficiary participation or employee coverage in the NSSF are not significant predictors for funding by 
international donors.  
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Membership organisations are the least likely to be funded by the Lebanese third sector. Donors 
from the Lebanese third sector are more likely to make contributions to NGOs located in Beirut’s suburbs 
and to a lesser extent in Beirut itself, compared to the periphery. Older organisations that are institutionally 
more sophisticated, that is to say have a bank account or hire external auditors, are more likely to receive 
funds from the Lebanese third sector. As was the case for international donors, network effects are important 
for donors from the Lebanese third sector and NGOs with government or NGO cooperation are more likely 
to receive funding. Donors from the Lebanese third sector are the only donor group more likely to contribute 
to an NGO with sectarian affiliation than without. The importance of sectarian affiliation of an NGO for the 
Lebanese third sector may be due to the heavy influence of ruling class NGOs which are implementing 
projects as well as disbursing funds. Since politics in Lebanon often takes place along sectarian lines, 
Lebanese ruling class NGOs may prefer giving to NGOs with the sectarian affiliation of the donor, so as to 
strengthen the donors’ role within his religious community.  
Central and municipal government funds are more likely to go to grassroots NGOs, such as social 
clubs and community organisations, and least likely to membership organisations. In contrast to international 
and local third sector funds, central government funds are more likely to go to NGOs located in the North, 
the Bekaa and to a lesser extent Mount Lebanon than NGOs located in other regions. Interestingly, 
government funds are split with regards to the North, with central government funds most likely directed to 
the North while municipal government likely to go to any region but the North and Beirut. Central 
government funds are also more likely to go to NGOs that are institutionally sophisticated, have a contract 
with another NGO and hold participatory beneficiary committees. Local government funds are more likely to 
go to older organisations that cooperate with another non-profit. Of all donors, municipal government funds 
are the only ones more likely to go to NGOs whose staff are enrolled in the NSSF.  
Private sector organisations are more likely to make contributions to NGOs located in Beirut’s 
suburbs than other regions. Private sector donors also prefer well-connected NGOs which cooperate with 
the government or another non-profit, and organisations that show awareness of difficulties faced during 
implementation. However, organisations with participatory beneficiary committees, or whose staff are 
enrolled in national social security, are less likely to receive funds.  
Membership fees are more likely to be given to membership or grassroots NGOs located in 
peripheral regions, in particular Nabatieh. Membership fees are also more likely to be given to older and 
institutionally sophisticated NGOs. In contrast to all funders discussed previously, cooperating with the 
government or another non-profit actually decreases the the likelihood that the NGO collects membership 
fees; having a sectarian affiliation is also negatively correlated with the collection of membership fees. This 
suggests that membership fees tend to go to institutionally more independent organisations. Indeed, a 
qualitative report argues that membership fees, though limited in amount, are instrumental in safeguarding an 
organisation’s independence (Abi Samra et al. 2009). Acknowledging difficulties experienced in project 
implementation increases the likelihood of collecting membership fees. With the exception of membership 
fees, there are strong network effects among Lebanese NGOs, with well-connected NGOs more likely to 
receive funding. This corroborates with results from Fafchamps and Owens (2009) in Uganda, where success 
in attracting grants from international donors depends mostly on network effects. 
The discussion of donor preferences above indicates that observed NGO characteristics differ 
across donors. Having examined what NGO characteristics are preferred by what donor groups, the second 
research question analyses in more detail how donors achieve influence over NGOs.  
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Research Question 2: How donors shape NGOs 
In Lebanon, NGOs bid for funding from international donors using project proposals that match 
donor-defined funding limits and time frames, and which are tailored to topics identified by donors. These 
topics frequently fit into international development discourse. In the domain of rural development, 
conceptualisation of development problems and their proposed solutions are remarkably similar across 
NGOs. NGO staff interviewed for this thesis, describe development challenges faced by Lebanese small 
farmers in ways that mirror international development discourse. Solutions to these challenges are equally 
very similar to suggestions made globally, reference to ‘international best practice’ is often made. At the same 
time, NGO staff underline their commitment to the humanitarian objective of the organisation they work for. 
Hence, international discourse has to a certain extent been internalised and NGO agency become embedded 
in that discourse. 
For instance, reflecting international discourse, many NGOs see key short-comings in the quality 
and marketing of Lebanese agricultural produce and advocate the selling of high quality niche products to 
affluent consumers in Lebanon and abroad. To improve agricultural product quality, proposed development 
projects frequently offer extension services or involve setting up small scale processing cooperatives to move 
up the value chain, or marketing initiatives consisting of better labelling and packaging. This adherence to 
development fashions may lead to isomorphism and duplication of projects implemented in Lebanon, with 
NGOs running very similar projects consecutively or simultaneously. For instance, several NGOs installed 
olive presses in the Lebanese South, with the effect that most presses operate below capacity.  
Some NGOs are conscious of the problems in international donor discourse. Frustration is 
expressed with respect to the fact that preferred export destinations prescribed by donors are the EU or US, 
even though Arab markets are presently the more important export destinations. However this did not 
influence project design. Hence, awareness of design shortcomings does not necessarily translate into agency, 
or the ability to change them.  
Producing niche, high value products failed due to high costs of small scale food production and 
processing, where NGOs absorb overhead costs, implying that the projects are not sustainable. This evidence 
somewhat contradicts the assumption implicit in donor recommendations and the World Bank’s (2007) 
report, which posit that providing appropriate trading partners with price and quality information would solve 
the low pricing problem. These recommendations are inspired by New Institutional Economics, which posits 
that information asymmetry is a key problem in market exchanges. Concentrated market structures in input 
and wholesale markets put downward pressures on product prices and even if output quality improves, 
producers are unable to pass on costs incurred. Power relationships in market exchanges between middle 
men and input merchants vis-à-vis farmers dwarf information asymmetries. These are unacknowledged in 
donor frameworks. 
While small production scale is a challenge frequently acknowledged by both donors and NGOs, 
organising famers into cooperatives does not necessarily increase production scale to a necessary level. In the 
Lebanese case cooperatives were successful only if the resulting increase in scale had an impact on prevailing 
input costs. Otherwise, cooperatives set up by NGOs tend to cease operations after the end of a project, 
becoming vehicles for aid distribution rather than producer organisation. Successful examples of farmer 
cooperation include coordinating farmers to jointly purchase cow vaccines. 
There are few instances where NGOs could influence project design to adapt to a specific context 
and deal with idiosyncratic problems. For instance, a small feed mixing plant was set up to circumvent 
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concentrated input markets offering low quality feed. However, this took place only during the second 
funding cycle. Rural development projects are the outcome of the negotiation process between donors and 
NGOs. Donor influence on project design benefits NGOs without a clear mission that operate as quasi-
subcontractors, able to adapt to donor demands. NGOs with longstanding mission and commitment to a 
certain cause, on the other hand, are often forced to twist their initial objectives to secure funding. Ebrahim 
(2009) and Wallace et al. (2007) note that international best practice pushed by donors does not necessarily 
lead to learning.  
In addition to project design, donors set project timeframes. Foreign funded rural development 
projects run on a short timeframe. European funded projects average 18 months, substantially shorter than 
US funded ones, which run for on average 3 years. Though projects may be extended for an additional 
funding cycle, no NGO consulted for this thesis was able to change project timelines, even if this resulted in 
worse outcomes. An important exception are projects run by ruling class NGOs. If the ruling class NGO 
won project funding from a foreign donor agency to start a project, the ruling class NGO will often continue 
funding the project indefinitely if it was deemed successful. NGO timeframe is an important factor because 
the longer a project runs, if run well, the more credible the NGO becomes with beneficiaries and the more 
effort they are likely to invest in a project. NGO. This implies that longer-term funding may be more 
effective. Hence, in terms of project duration, NGOs reliant on international donors have no agency at all.  
Donors distributing project-based development finance frequently require NGOs to submit detailed 
reports using the same templates used by the donor for the donor’s own reporting. Reporting requirements 
often stipulate the usage of comparable metrics to measure and evaluate a project. These requirements do not 
always fit the project’s context and reports to donors may become a writing exercise, the content of which 
has little relation to the NGOs work. Emphasis on tangible and reportable results may privilege cheaper per-
beneficiary activities over more expensive but more effective ones. In addition, NGOs may be reluctant to 
disclose mistakes for fear of losing funding. Accountability strategies based on monitoring and evaluation 
produce multiple reports but do not encourage critical reflection on a project’s outcome. Respondents 
complain that fundraising and reporting costs are not covered by projects funds. Frequently, only direct 
project costs are covered by grants. This is especially difficult for small organisations with few resources. 
While NGO agency is bound by reporting requirements, there is some evidence of subversion. Several 
respondents stated that reporting was a mere writing exercise which had little to do with actual 
implementation on the ground.  
NGOs commitment is embedded in historical, political and social context, as well as international 
development discourse and donor preferences, NGO agency is expressed more strongly in certain project 
aspects compared to others. For instance, NGOs have little influence on regional targeting but have some 
opportunity to fine-tune who is an eligible beneficiary within a target region. As for project design, NGOs 
have some agency to design projects in response to specific local problems, especially if interaction with a 
donor stretches over more than one funding cycle. As for timeframe and reporting requirements, NGO 
agency is extremely limited or non-existent and most have to abide by donor set timeframes and reporting 
requirements. An important exception are ruling class NGOs which do not depend on international 
development finance. 
Donor frameworks affect the capacity of NGOs to offer alternative forms of development. NGOs 
can become unresponsive to local needs by donors’ pre-occupation with the geographic targeting of 
politically important areas, as well as donors’ pre-occupation with international development discourse. 
Meanwhile, the focus on international practice may overlook local opportunities and lead to duplication and 
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isomorphism. Pre-defined reporting metrics, the threat of losing funding, and short project time horizons 
impede learning and lead NGOs to lose legitimacy and beneficiary trust in the long run. Project funding 
inadvertently discourages commitment to a mission and the building of context-specific expertise. Hence, the 
stated aim of sustainably increasing rural households’ income has not been achieved by the vast majority of 
projects. 
Throughout this thesis repeated reference has been made to the working conditions of NGO staff. 
NGO staff in Lebanon have education levels above the national average. Most proxy-respondents to the large 
scale survey completed high school and two-thirds have a university or college degree. The majority of NGO 
employees are male, senior positions in particular tend to be filled by men rather than women. In NGOs with 
mixed staff, women make up about a third of NGO staff. In Lebanon, advocacy NGOs are most likely to 
employ women while religious and family associations are least likely to do so. However, though prestigious, 
employment in NGOs is insecure since the duration of appointments is tied to project timeframes, which 
frequently does not exceed 18 months. Only a minority of Lebanese NGOs enrol their staff in National 
Social Security. A notable exception are employees of ruling class NGOs whose employees benefit from 
permanent contracts as well as insurance. It is also illustrative that many NGO staff with training in 
agriculture, prefer not to work in production but for an NGO. Hence NGOs work on creating livelihoods 
that many NGO employees would not chose for themselves.  
Recommendations 
This is a very critical appraisal of NGO and donor work in Lebanon. NGOs have been criticised as 
donor driven, without much leeway in shaping their own projects and goals. However, there is some evidence 
that NGOs can influence donors. One NGO discussed convinced a donor to include Christian and well as 
Sunni villages in a project. Two others proposed projects that did not figure explicitly in donor frameworks 
by proposing to set up feed mixers. For NGOs to be able to pro-actively engage with donors they have to be 
knowledgeable and experienced in the field they operate in. From these observations stems the first 
recommendation to NGOs, to not accept funding frameworks prima facie but to suggest alternative project 
designs.  
Donors seek to, as much as possible, control project design, targeting and implementation. Through 
reporting requirements they also control the narratives that are told about implemented projects. That is to 
say, donors are risk averse to public failure to the extent that they shy away from innovative projects. Their 
influence on NGO operations and project implementation may limit NGO effectiveness and stifle their 
capacity to offer alternative forms of development. In particular technocratic accountability regimes described 
by Ebrahim (2009) and Wallace at al. (2007), who use the term rational management, impede learning and 
limit NGO agency since they centre on monitoring and evaluation of indicators selected and defined 
irrespective of context, on quantifying performance so as to demonstrate success rather than learn from 
failure.  
One way to alleviate this problem, while still maintaining control, would to allow for and fund an 
inception phase for each project. The term come from Rational Unified Process used in software 
development, where it forms the first phase (Kroll & Kruchten 2003). The key objective of this phase is to 
achieve an agreement among all stakeholders on what the objectives and scope of the project are and if it is 
feasible. In the present case this inception phase could be an opportunity for both NGO staff and donor to 
discuss key project design elements. Field visits to potential beneficiaries could be included. All stakeholders 
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could discuss how performance should be measured and what indicators would be most appropriate to 
measure success. In addition to agreement on indicators, NGO staff could relate specific and idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the beneficiary population and insist on more complex forms of reporting that go beyond 
logframes. Ideally beneficiaries themselves would be involved in this design stage.  
Recommendations that could be made to donors could involve the increase of funding time 
horizons. However, these are unlikely to be achieved. Donors report to their governments or members who 
themselves are bound by terms, which impacts project timeframe, and are keen to demonstrate 
straightforward successes to their constituents. Still, reporting requirements could be amended to overlap 
with NGO internal reporting.  The inception phase could be part of the project itself and planned for as an 
activity. This is already practice especially in external project evaluations, where the implementer and 
evaluator both agree on the terms of the evaluation.  
Limitations 
At the time of research new funding frameworks gained traction among international donors. These 
have not been touched on in this thesis. The shift from large infrastructure programs to project funding has 
been outlined (see p. 18) however, the shift, during the early 2000s of development funding back to the state 
(Mitlin et al., 2007; Wallace et al., 2007) has been omitted. This shift is not a return to large infrastructure 
projects but rather one that involves larger projects channelled through developing country’s governments or 
large NGOs, capable of handling large sums of money. This has led to a concentration of NGOs, with 
smaller organisations struggling to raise funds.  
In Lebanon, this funding shift has been muted. This is likely due to the fact that access to 
government is highly political and politicians in office may or may not have the support of the international 
community and hence the aid system (see p. 30). Channelling funds through the Lebanese government may 
mean that donors may end up funding political figures they do not support. Indeed, the only examples that 
could fall under this new funding framework are funded by multi-lateral donors. They include the CDP 
funded by the World Bank as well as the ESFD and ADP, both funded by the European Union However, all 
three involve further sub-contracting and not direct implementation. They have been discussed in this thesis 
as QUANGOs to highlight their different characteristics. Looking further into the effects of these new 
funding frameworks on NGOs would be an avenue for further research. 
A related shortcoming is the fact that Lebanon is not a classic MENA case study. NGO regulation 
is significantly more liberal than in any other MENA country, more liberal probably than even in many 
European countries, considering the lack of oversight by the government. This does not invalidate the wider 
aims of the thesis, which is to analyse how context and donor preferences shape NGO operations. In fact it 
illustrates what could happen to the sector in a liberal legal context. Since donor frameworks are defined 
irrespective of country context, the fact that this is a Lebanon case study is likely to affect the approach of 
donors to Lebanon only in terms of politics, not in terms of technical program design. Still, this study is  not 
illustrative of what happens elsewhere in the region. 
In terms of methodology, a key shortcoming of this thesis is that it relies on a single observation per 
NGO, that is to say represents a cross section of NGO data, rather than being based on several interviews 
with the same organisation across the project implementation cycle. Hence, no project life cycle narratives 
have been collected. Instead, accounts from NGO staff about temporal processes have been taken at face 
value. This is despite the fact that embedding of NGO agency in context and donor preferences is likely a 
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process that takes place over time. In particular questions of attribution, to for instance donor discourse or 
NGO agency, are more difficult to address without more time series type data.  
Secondly, more importantly, this thesis is guilty of the same criticism it levies against NGOs, namely 
that of excluding beneficiaries from the narrative. This would have provided valuable insights on what 
beneficiaries feel about the projects NGOs implement. In particular it would have been possible to analyse if 
beneficiaries see a difference between donors and NGOs or if they are seen as a single organisation. For 
reasons of time and scope beneficiary accounts or time series data have not been collected. Both of these 
limitations offer avenues for future research. 
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VIII. Appendices
1 Appendix to Chapter 2 
1.1 Important political families 
Rieger  (2003:90) distinguishes between four generations of Lebanese zu’ama, as Lebanese leaders or 
patrons are called. The first generation held aristocratic positions in the Ottoman administration and owned 
large estates which gave them a rural base. Among them are for instance the Druze Arslan and Jumblat 
families. Another example are the Shi’a Assad, Hamadeh and Ossayran families72 or the Maronite Boulos, 
Franjieh, Moawad, Duwaihi and Khazen families. All still have large landholdings and have diversified into 
business ventures. They are involved in politics, and held or do hold ministerial portfolios, parliamentary seats 
or other high-ranking positions in public administration. This group of zu’ama was especially susceptible to 
social downward mobility if they did not diversify their agrarian economic basis. Not all of these families 
remained as influential; the Shi’a families especially lost their position to the Amal movement and Hizbullah. 
Rieger’s (ibid) second generation of zu’ama includes career officials in the Ottoman or French administration, 
                                                          
72 Hamadeh is an absentee landlord from Baalbek who had a virtual monopoly over the post of speaker of the chamber of deputies, 
during the remaining sessions before the Civil War. This post rotated to Assads and Ossayrans from the South (Khalaf 1977)  
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namely families such as Edde, al Solh, Salam, Karame or Khalil. Her third generation includes leaders of 
political movements during the years following independence, namely Najah Wakim, Maarouf Saad, or 
Gemayel, and include those who rose thanks to their personal wealth, like Emile Boustany.  An influential 
group she does not mention, which overlaps with her second and third generation is the Beirut elite of traders 
and bankers.  The Sursock,  Asfar,  Fayad,  Jubayl,  Naccache and Pharaon families greatly benefited from the 
prospering silk trade (Traboulsi 2007:22) and set up banks and holding companies and gained access to 
government. Rieger’s last generationincludes zu’ama who gained prominence either as militia leaders, such as 
Geagea or Berri, or who could translate fortunes made abroad into political capital, such as former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri or Issam Fares.  
In terms of personnel, elites move between positions in the private sector and government. For 
instance: an architect of the constitution, Michel Chiha was a banker. His sister was married to president 
Beschara el Khouri, whose administration dismantled French industrial policies. Her son Michel el Khouri, 
also a banker, became governor of the central bank. Similarly, Prime Minister Salim el Hoss was a banker and 
chairman of the government banking control commission. Farid Roufal, the founder of the Banque Libano 
Française, became minister of Finance. High-ranking government officials such as Najib Salha and Rafic Naja 
who left government, found a place in banking. Dib (2004) argues that as early as 1960s at least a quarter of 
Lebanese politicians had a head start in banking.  
MPs and officials are often connected to powerful families that control large parts of the private 
sector, heavily influence government and frequently provide candidates for powerful posts. Prime Minister 
Sanyioura was made Finance Minister by the late Rafiq Hariri, who had also hired him as Chairman and 
Managing Director of his Groupe Mediterranee, which encompasses four Hariri-owned banks. Political 
parties are weak and often overshadowed by one individual. Makdisi (2004) points out that though this 
arrangement affords unequal rights to the different sects and introduces an element of constant instability, 
each communities’ vigilance to see its rights protected, produces a certain measure of political and economic 
freedom 
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2 Appendix to Chapter 3 
2.1 First Questionnaire 
 
(Translation) 
 
A - Name and address of the NGO 
 
A01 – Official name of the NGO in Arabic as it appears in the founding document 
A02 – Official name of the NGO in the foreign language if existent 
A03 – acronym of the NGO 
A04 – Is the current location of the NGO: 
1. private? 
A05 – The Muhafaza: 
1. Beirut 
2. Mount Lebanon 
3. North  
4. Bekaa  
5. South 
6. Nabatieh 
A06 – The Qaza or district 
 __ (consult the symbol booklet) 
A07 – The town or municipality 
A08 – The area or quarter 
A09 – Street 
A10 – Landline number 
A11– Mobile phone number 
A12 – Fax number 
A13 – Name of person interviewedA16 – His position 
A17 – Name of  last NGO head 
A18 – His telephone number 
 
B General Information 
 
B01 – Year of establishment 
B02 – Year the NGO actually started operation 
B03 – King of founding document 
1. Ilm wa khabr 
2. Marsoum 
3. Qirar 
4. other, specify  
B04 – Date of founding document 
B05 – number of founding document 
B06 – Does the NGO have the Public Utility function  
B07 – Date of obtaining the Public Utility Function 
 
B08 – Nationality of the NGO 
1. Lebanese NGO 
2. Arab NGO 
3. Foreign NGO 
4. International NGO 
5. Branch of Arab NGO 
6. Branch of foreign NGO 
7. Branch of international NGO 
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B09 – Kind of the NGO 
1. Club 
2. NGO  
3. Scout  
4. Alumni association 
5. Economic association 
6. Friendship association 
7. Professional association 
8. Scientific NGO or  research centre 
9. Other 
 
B10 – Form of the NGO 
1. Individual NGO 
2. Union, network, umbrella 
 
B11 – General character of the NGO 
1. general (they translated: Civil Society) 
2. religious  
3. local (they translated community) 
4. family 
5. other, specify 
 
B12 – Number of members of the NGO, if existent. 
 
B13 – The geographic area where the programs and activities of the NGO cover 
1. the entire nation 
2. Specific muhafazat 
3. specific cazas 
4. Specific municipalities (local) 
 
B14 – The target group of the NGO (several answers possible) 
1. various groups 
2. children 
3. youth 
4. women 
5. elderly 
6. orphans 
7. Disabled 
8. other, specify 
 
B1501 – Objectives of the organisation (five lines: 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, but only 1501 coded) 
 
B16  Information about workers and volunteers in all branches and establishments of the NGO 
B1601 – Total number of employees with wages at all branches and establishments of the NGO 
B1602 – Total number of contractors with wages at all branches and establishments of the NGO 
B1603 – total number of volunteers with wages at all branches and establishments of the NGO 
 
B17 (not delivered by Pedco) last budget year and amount 
B1701 – year 
B1702 – Budget amount in LBP 
 
C Actual Activities and Services performed by the NGO  
 
(in SPSS the suffix .av means ‘service available’ and the suffix .pe means budget percentage) 
 
C000 – Social Services 
 C001 –Social Care services for children 
 C002 – Social Care services for youth 
 C003 – social Care services for the elderly 
 C004 – Social Care services for the disabled 
 C005 – Social Care services for families 
 C006 – sponsoring orphans 
 C007 – social housing 
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 C008 – other, specify 
 
C010 – Health Services  
 C011 – Reproductive  health and family planning 
 C012 –Public health services  
 C013 – primary health services (what is the difference to C0102?) 
 C014 – emergency services 
 C015 – others, specify 
 
C020 – Aid and Relief activities (the layout from the questionnaire differs from what has been entered) 
C021 – In kind or cash support to poor families (C021) 
C022 – in kind or cash support to disabled  
 
C023 – In kind or cash support to elderly  
C0247 – In kind or cash support during  disaster (C024) 
 
C025 – scholarship (C025) 
C0226 – others, specify (C026) 
 
C030 – Empowerment activities (tamkeen) 
 C031 – Development of local communities: micro-credit 
 C032 – Development of local communities: small reproductive projects  
 C033 – Other, specify 
 
C040 – Capacity Building activities 
 C041 – development and empowerment of families 
C042 – development and empowerment of women 
 C043 – development and empowerment of youth 
 C044 – illiteracy and adult education projects 
 C045 – vocational training activities  
 C046 – other, specify 
 
C050 – Environmental protection and awareness projects  
 C051 – Environment protection activities 
 C052 – raising awareness for protection of the environment  
 C053 – working for legal change to promote the protection of the environment 
 C054 – activities on  to rationalize water usage 
 C055 – activities on recycling and garbage 
 C056 – cleaning campaigns  
 C057 – others, specify 
 
C060 – Awareness-raising in various fields  
 C061 – health 
 C062 – religion 
 C063 – legal (law) 
 C064 – political 
 C065 – consumers 
 C066 – others, specify 
 
C070 – Activities for the protection of rights 
 C071 – human rights 
 C072 – women’s rights 
 C073 – children’s rights 
 C074 – fighting violence 
 C075 – consumer awareness 
 C076 – others, specify 
 
C080 –scientific and cultural activities  
 C081 – Conducting researches, studies, and statistical surveys 
 C082 – Establish databases /databanks  
 C083 – publishing books and magazines 
 C084 – holding conferences, seminars, workshops, lectures 
 C085 – other, specify 
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C090 – Art and recreational activities 
 C091 – Printing and sculpture 
 C092 – music and Singing  
 C093 – theatre and cinema 
 C094 – outings and camping 
 C095 – clubs, social and sports activities 
 C096 – Other, specify 
 
C097 – Activities outside Lebanon 
 C100 – participating in conferences and seminars 
 C101 – participation in training programs 
 C102 – others, specify 
 
D Information about branches of the NGO and affiliated establishments 
 
D01- Does the NGO have branches and/or centres 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
The remainder of D was not delivered by the consultancy. 
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2.2 Second Questionnaire 
(Translation) 
 
SA12 – Total surface of the NGO’s head office 
SA13 – What is the annual rent in LL, if it exists? 
SA14 – Are the NGO’s premises accessible for the disabled? 
1. yes all of them 
2. yes, most of them 
3. yes, some of them 
4. no, none of  them 
SA15 – Number of  branches of the NGO, including the head office 
SA16 –centres or establishments affiliated to the NGO 
 
SB Organisational structure of the NGO 
 
SB01 – Boards  and departments of the NGO and how often they are convened 
 Boards or committee of the NGO Non-
existent 
Weekly Monthly Quarterly  Annually  
01 General Assembly of the NGO  1 2 3 4 5 
02 Council of Reps  1 2 3 4 5 
03 Supervisory board or committees 1 2 3 4 5 
04 Board of trustees  1 2 3 4 5 
05 Board of directors (executive?) 1 2 3 4 5 
06 Board of founders (for NGOs in process of 
establishing) 
1 2 3 4 5 
07 specialised boards 1 2 3 4 5 
 
SB02 – The elections, or renewals or uncontested return of the executive board that took place within the 
organisation throughout the following years: 
 year uncontested/unanimous election renewal 
01 2000 1 2 3 
02 2001 1 2 3 
03 2002 1 2 3 
04 2003 1 2 3 
05 2004 1 2 3 
 
SB03 – number of executive boards of the NGO since 1980 
SB04 – number of presidents since 1980 
SB05 – number of meetings of the executive board of the NGO since 2005 
SB06 – number of meetings of the general board since 2005 
SB07 – number of members of the current executive board of the NGO 
1. male 
2. female 
3. total 
SB08 – way of choosing members of the executive board  
1. election 
2. appointment  
SB09 – governing time of the current executive board 
B0901 – from   B0902 – to   
SB10 – Does the NGO follow an annual plan in its operations? 
1. yes 
2. no 
SB11 – Does the NGO have difficulties with its annual plan? 
1. yes 
2. no 
SB12 – What are these difficulties? 
1. financial 
2. internal/administrative 
3. external/administrative 
4. lack of necessary experience 
5. other 
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SB13 – Does the NGO prepare periodical follow up report on its activities? 
1. yes, with monthly reports 
2. quarterly  
3. annually 
4. no 
SB14 – Does the NGO use the following records? 
 Kind of records No Yes 
SB1401 Record of employees/working hours  1 2 
SB1402 Asset record 1 2 
SB1403 Meeting minutes records 1 2 
SB1404 Financial records 1 2 
SB1405 Beneficiary records 1 2 
 
SB15 – Are there any special administrative and financial regulations in the centres and establishments of the 
NGO? 
1 . No 
2. Yes 
SB16 – Specify the kind of these regulations 
  No yes 
SB1601 Financial regulations 1 2 
SB1602 Employee regulations 1 2 
SB1603 Specific Administrative regulation 1 2 
SB17 – Are employees in the NGO and its centres and establishments included in National Social Security 
Fund? 
1. yes, all of them 
2. yes most of them 
3. yes, some of them 
4. none 
 
SB18 – Does the NGO have an employee that specifically prepares funding files? 
1. no 
2. yes 
SB19 – Does the NGO appeal to outside experience to prepare financial files? 
1. no 
2. yes 
SB20 – Does the NGO have committees in which the beneficiaries of activities, projects, and programmes 
can participate? 
1. no 
2. yes 
SB21 – Does the NGO use external experts for managing its activities, programs and projects? 
1. no 
2. yes 
SB22 – Information on the tools used to prepare the annual plan 
 SB2201 – the committee that prepares the plan 
 SB2202 – the committee that approves it 
 SB2203 – time in weeks it usually takes to prepare that plan 
 
SB23 – information on the sections of the annual working plan of the NGO in 2005 
 Sections of the 
working plan 
Percentage 
of spending  
completed Partially 
implemente
d 
Not 
implemente
d 
Reasons for partial 
or no 
implementation 
SB2301 Seminars and 
conferences 
% 1 2 3  
SB2302 Training and 
Rehabilitation 
% 1 2 3  
SB2303 awareness % 1 2 3  
SB2304 Fundraising  % 1 2 3  
SB23-05 Other, specify % 1 2 3  
SB2306 Other, specify % 1 2 3  
  
SC01 – Does the organisation derives from, belong to, is affiliated to, linked to, an association or 
organisation? 
1. no 
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2. yes 
SC02 – What kind of association or organisation? 
 Sections of the working plan Derives from Associated/follow Linked to/ related to  
SC0201 Political or party-affiliation, 
specify 
1 2 3 
SC0202 Religious, specify 1 2 3 
SC0203 Syndicate, specify 1 2 3 
SC0204 Scientific, specify 1 2 3 
SC0205 Other, specify    
 
SC03 – sectarian/confessional affiliation of the NGO if existing 
1. non-sectarian/confessional 
2. Sunni 
3. Shi’a 
4. Druze 
5. Kurdish 
6. Maronite 
7. Catholic 
8. Orthodox 
9. Armenian 
10. other, specify 
 
SC04 – Groups benefiting from the programs and activities of the NGO. 
      No Yes 
SC0401. NGO members only   1 2 
SC0402. a specific family   1 2 
SC0403. a specific municipality  1 2 
SC0404. a specific area   1 2 
SC0405. a specific profession  1 2 
SC0406. Sunni    1 2 
SC0407. Shi’a    1 2 
SC0408. Druze    1 2 
SC0409. Kurdish    1 2 
SC0410. Muslims in general  1 2 
SC0411. Maronites   1 2 
SC0412. Catholics   1 2 
SC0413. Orthodox   1 2 
SC0414. Armenian   1 2 
SC0415. Christians in general  1 2 
SC0416. other, specify 
 
SD Human Resources of the NGO 
 
SD01 – number of current members in the NGO 
SD0101. male 
SD0102. female 
SD0103. total 
 
SD02 – Are there special conditions on membership with the NGO? 
1. no 
2. yes 
SD03 – mention the conditions 
SD0301. familial (related to a family) 
SD0302. age 
SD0303. gender 
SD0304. Religion 
SD0305. sect 
SD0306. profession 
SD0307. sport 
SD0308. political 
SD0309. certain disability 
SD0310. a certain illness 
SD0311. a certain area 
SD0312. income 
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SD0313. other, specify 
 
SD04 Total number of paid employees in all branches and establishments of the NGO, as follows: 
SD0401. total number of employees who are paid  from the NGO budget 
SD0402. total number of employees who are paid from outside the budget of the NGO 
SD0403. Total number of technical employees  
SD0404. Total number of administrative employees 
SD0405. total number of employees who work in support (cleaning, security…) 
SD05 Number of contractors paid in all branches and establishments of the NGO, as follows: 
SD0501. total number of contractors who receive their salary from the budget of the NGO 
SD0502. total number of contractors that receive their salary from outside the budget of the NGO 
SD0503. Total number of technical contractors  
SD0504. Total number of administrative contractors 
SD0505. total number of contractors who work in support (cleaning, security…) 
 
No  Yes 
SD0601. Does the NGO have volunteers    1 2 
SD0602. approximate number of male volunteers 
SD0603. approximate number of female volunteers 
SD0604. Approximate total number of volunteers 
 
No  Yes 
SD0701. Does the NGO have disabled volunteers   1 2 
SD0702. approximate number of male disabled volunteers  1 2 
SD0703. approximate number of female disabled volunteers  1 2 
SD0704. Approximate total number of disabled volunteers  1 2 
No Yes 
SD0801. Does the NGO lack volunteers      1 2 
Reasons for lack of volunteers: 
SD0802. volunteers are short on time      1 2 
SD0803. general economic situation       1 2 
SD0804. Shortage in understanding the NGOs goals and the importance of its role  1 2 
SD0805. shortage in information for motivating volunteering in NGOs   1 2 
SD0806. bad social attitudes towards the work of the NGO    1 2 
SD0807. other, mention it        
 
How does the lack of volunteers influence the work of the NGO   No Yes 
SD0808. inability to complete all the NGOs activities     1 2 
SD0809. necessity to have an employment policy (to employ someone) even if it is usually  
SD0810. not necessary        1 2 
SD0811. lack of communication with the local community     1 2 
SD0812. other, specify 
 
Proposition of the NGO to solve the problem of lacking volunteers   No Yes 
SD0813. awareness raising on the importance of volunteering    1 2 
SD0814. contact youth who are the main resource for volunteering   1 2 
SD0815. give a bonus to volunteers       1 2 
SD0816. other, specify        1 2 
 
SE training and educational activities at the NGO 
 
Kind of training activities the NGO’s employees participated in during 2005.   
 No Yes 
SE0101. training modernising/updating administration and institutional building 1 2 
SE0102. training financial management      1 2 
SE0103. training democratic practice and teamwork participation   1 2 
SE0104. volunteer mobilization       1 2 
SE0105. assessing needs of local communities      1 2 
SE0106. evaluating the NGO performance     1 2 
SE0107. change  strategy of the NGO      1` 2 
SE0108. principles and ethics of civil work     1 2 
SE0109. information and communication technology     1 2 
SE0110. networking        1 2 
SE0111. managing productive projects       1 2 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
 158 
SE0112. Other, specify 
 
SE02 – number of trainees from NGO members, employees or volunteers 
SE0201. Approximate number of males trainees 
SE0202. Approximate  number of female trainees 
SE0203. Approximate  total 
 
SF relationship between the NGO and the government 
 
SF01 – is there any kind of cooperation between the NGO and the government?  1 No  2 Yes 
What kind of cooperation between the NGO and the government: 
SF0101. financial support/fundraising      1 2 
SF0102. joint projects with the government      1 2 
SF0103. technical support, training       1 2 
SF0104. supervision and follow up by the government of NGO projects   1 2 
SF0105. other specify         1 2 
 
SF02 – Does the NGO have a contractual relationship with a ministry or any part of the official 
administration?         1 No 2 Yes 
Give the name (5 names SF0201-SF0205) 
 
SF03 – how do you describe the cooperation with the government? 
1. very positive 
2. quite positive 
3. acceptable 
4. negative 
5. very negative 
 
G NGO relationships with other organisations and associations 
 
SG01 – Does the NGO cooperate with other NGOs?    1 No 2 Yes 
Give the names (5 spaces SG0101-SG0105) 
SG02 – Does the NGO have a contractual relationship with another national or international NGO,  
association, organisation? Give the names (5 spaces G02-01 – G02-03)  1 No 2 Yes 
SG03 – Does the organisation belong to an international, regional or specialised union or network or 
umbrella         1 No  2 Yes 
Give names (5 spaces to SG0305) 
SG04 – If the NGO does not belong to any network or umbrella, would it like to join one or more? 
 1 No 2 Yes 
SG05 – Does the NGO wish to collaborate or develop contacts with other NGOs? 1 No 2 Yes 
What type of collaboration would you propose?     1 2 
SG0501. exchange of experience      1 2 
SG0502. joint conferences and workshops     1 2 
SG0503. entering a common fund      1 2 
SG0504. other, specify        1 2 
 
H Private financial leadership in the organisation  
 
SH01 – is there among the NGO’s staff:      No Yes 
SH0101. Treasurer responsible for the NGOs funds only  1 2 
SH0102. an accountant responsible for accounting  only   1 2 
SH0103. a treasurer who is also responsible for the accounting  1 2 
 
SH02 – Does the NGO have a bank account or accounts?    1 No 2 Yes 
Who has access to these bank accounts?  
SH0201. the president of the NGO     1 2 
SH0202. the treasurer       1 2 
SH0203. the accountant       1 2 
SH0204. other, specify 
 
SH03 – Does the organisation use the following financial records:     No 
 Yes 
SH0301. Books of Account      1 2 
SH0302. expenses and payment orders     1 2 
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SH0303. Receipts        1 2 
SH0304. other, specify 
 
SH04 – Information on budgetary tools    
SH0401. which department prepares the budget 
SH0402. which party approves the budget 
SH0403. Duration to prepare the budget (In weeks) 
 
SH05 – Information on the close of books of the NGO(?) 
SH0501. which department prepares it 
SH0502. which party approves it 
SH0503. how long does it to prepare it? In weeks 
 
SH06 – Information on the process preparating for financial reports at the NGO 
SH0601. which department prepares them 
SH0602. which party approves them 
SH0603. Duration to prepare them(In weeks) 
 
SH07 Last budget of the NGO 
SH0701 – year 
SH0702 – amount in LL 
SH08 – Does the NGO usually publish its budget? 
How is it published?       No Yes 
SH0801. media        1 2 
SH0802. distribute copies to NGO members     1 2 
SH0803. publish on the boards at the NGOs premises    1 2 
 
SH09 – Mention sources of fundraising  No Yes 
SH0901. member subscriptions fees   1 2 
SH0902. government aid     1 2 
SH0903. international aid     1 2 
SH0904. aid from Arab or international  
sources     1 2 
SH0905. aid from Lebanese organizations  
(implied individuals, foundations)     1 2 
SH0906. municipality aid     1 2 
SH0907. donations from  
individuals in the private sector    1 2 
SH0908. Donations from private sector organisation  1 2 
SH0909. from sales or services provided by  
the NGO      1 2 
SH0910. Other, specify 
SH10 – share of the budget  
SH1001.  
SH1002.  
SH1003.  
SH1004.  
 
SH1005.  
 
SH1006.  
SH1007.  
 
SH1008.  
SH1009.  
 
SH1010.  
 
 
SH11 – Does NGO receive aid from the private sector  No Yes 
SH1101 to Sh1103 Specify the sectors that the NGO receives aid from, space for three names 
 
SH12 – annual subscription fees in LL 
SH13 – determine annual membership fees in LL 
Please answer the following questions  
1. No 
2. Yes 
SH14 – Does the NGO have a contract with a financial auditing company? 
SH15 – Does NGO have its own financial system?  
SH16 – Does the NGO use a computer  
SH17 – Does the NGO use electronic accounting softwares 
 
SH1801 – Does the NGO have financial committees  yes no 
 
What are the means for publishing the budget 
SH1802 – financial auditing commission   1 2 
SH1203 – fundraising committee    1 2 
SH1804- others, specify 
SH1805- others, specify 
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SI - difficulties NGO faces in practicing its activities 
 
SI0101. NGO have difficulties in carrying out its activities   yes no 
Specify these difficulties 
SI0102. Inadequate in human technical abilities     1 2 
(implied little technical skills, accounting computing etc)  1 2 
SI0103. Lack of funding       1 2 
SI0104. Lack of equipment      1 2 
SI0105. hardship in dealing with the government  
(implied no political back-up, no wasta)    1 2 
SI0106. Inability to satisfy needs of target beneficiary group  1 2 
SI0107. Difficulty  in reaching the target groups that the NGO  
addresses in its activities      1 2 
SI0108. other, specify 
SI0109. other, specify 
 
SJ - NGO Position regarding  NGO law in Lebanon 
 
SJ01 – how much are you aware of this law 
01. in detail and in depth 
02. have a general idea about it 
03. not aware 
SJ02 – if you are informed about this law, do you consider it: 
01. provides independence and freedom in NGO work 
02. restricts the work of NGOs 
03. no opinion 
SJ03 – Do you think this law should be amended? 
01. Yes  
02. no,  
03. no opinion,  
 
SJ04 – What amendments do you suggest? 
SJ0401-J0405 suggestions 
 
K - NGO future vision 
 
SK01 - What are the fields that the NGO wishes to play a bigger role in the future? 
SK0101-SK0105 fields 
SK02 – what are the new fields that the NGO wishes to practice activities in? 
SK0201-SK0205 fields 
 
L – statements on important activities and projects, implemented/in the process of being 
implemented by the NGO in the last three years 
 
SL0101 – the name of the project 
SL0102 – partners 
SL0103 – project’s budget 
SL0104 – funders 
SL0105 – amount of funding 
SL0106 – target groups 
SL0107 – year the project started 
SL0108 – duration of the project 
SL0109 – project outcomes 
 
SL0201 – the name of the project 
SL0202 – partners 
SL0203 – project’s budget 
SL0204 – funders 
SL0205 – amount of funding 
SL0206 – target groups 
SL0207 – year the project started 
SL0208 – duration of the project 
SL0209 – project outcomes 
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SL0301 –name of the project 
SL0302 – partners 
SL0303 – project’s budget 
SL0304 – funders 
SL0305 – amount of funding 
SL0306 – target groups 
SL0307 – year the project started 
SL0308 – duration  of the project 
SL0309 – project outcomes 
 
SL0401 – the name of the project 
SL0402 – partners 
SL0403 – project’s budget 
SL0404 – funders 
SL0405 – amount of funding 
SL0406 – target groups 
SL0407 – year the project started 
SL0408 – duration of the project 
SL0409 – project outcomes 
 
 
M appendices related to the NGO 
 
SN:  personal information about executive director, president and government contact person: sex, date of 
birth, nationality, place of registration (for Lebanese NGOs), marital status, educational level, speciality of 
education, participation as a trainee in session on social work. 
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2.3 Comparing NGO response across cazas 
Table VIII.1: Expected and Observed Responses across cazas 
  Sample Frame Observed Responses Expected Responses 
Akkar 172 99 107 
Aley 234 159 146 
Baabda 630 412 392 
Baalbek 217 168 135 
Batroun 138 75s 86 
Beirut 1,520 809 947 
Bint Jbeil 55 42 34 
Bsharre 42 27 26 
Chouf 297 214 185 
Hasbaya 56 49 35 
Hermel 23 14 14 
Jbeil 201 126 125 
Jezzine 66 46 41 
Kesrouan 243 131 151 
Koura 86 59 54 
Marjeyoun 52 47 32 
Matn 493 258 307 
Minnieh-Dunnieh 69 56 43 
Nabatieh 156 128 97 
Rashaya 31 25 19 
Saida 240 177 150 
Sour 157 107 98 
Tripoli 390 225 243 
West Bekaa 81 69 50 
Zahle 263 206 164 
Zghorta 72 30 45 
not specified 48     
Lebanon 6,032 3,758   
 
Dissimilarity Index 
The dissimilarity index describes the difference or lack of fit between observed frequencies, n, and 
expected frequencies, ê.  
𝐷 = ∑
|𝑛𝑖 − ê𝑖|
2𝑁
𝐾
𝑖=1
 
The index varies between 0 and 1, where smaller values imply a closer fit. The dissimilarity index is 
often used in assessments of geographical inequality and is interpreted as the number of people that would 
have to move for the index to become 0. In this context it can be interpreted as the share of NGOs that 
would have to move between cells for the Index to become 0. 
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2.4 NGO registrations in the sample frame and survey 
Figure VIII.1 shows that NGO registrations in the sample frame are more variable than those of the 
sample frame. The sample frame only includes NGOs that survived until 2004;In times of NGO booms a 
number of NGOs may be set up that are unable to sustain activities over a prolonged period of time. In 
addition, during the early 1980s registrations in the sample frame declined further than those covered by the 
survey. During this period hostilities intensified and it is likely that, though NGOs deposed registration 
documents with the relevant ministry and took up operations, public institutions were unable to officially 
register them. Thus data gathered from public records for the sample frame may not overlap with NGO 
records.  
Figure VIII.1: Comparison of NGO registrations in the sample frame and survey 
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2.5 Respondent details for qualitative interviews 
Table VIII.2: Detailed break-down of NGO and donor respondents 
List of organisations interviewed categorisation 
Cooperative Housing Foundation now Global Communities (CHF) international NGO 
Institute for University Cooperation (ICU) international NGO 
Group Christian Volunteers (GVC) international NGO 
Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement (IECD) international NGO 
Movimondo international NGO 
UCODEP, now Oxfam Italy international NGO 
ACDI/VOCA international NGO 
Relief International international NGO 
World Rehabilitation Fund WRF  international NGO 
  Association for the Development of Rural capacities local NGO receiving international funding 
Baldati local NGO receiving international funding 
Ard wa Nas local NGO receiving international funding 
Arc en Ciel local NGO receiving international funding 
Social and Cultural Development Association INMA local NGO receiving international funding 
Jezzine coop local NGO receiving international funding 
Agripole local NGO receiving international funding 
Arsal RIFI local NGO receiving international funding 
Mada local NGO receiving international funding 
Heliopolis coop local NGO receiving international funding 
CTRDA local NGO receiving international funding 
  St Vincent de Paul local NGO receiving little international funding 
  
Amel 
local NGO receiving international funding but with a strong 
local donor base 
  René Moawad Foundation (RMF) ruling class NGO 
Jihad el Bina ruling class NGO 
Hariri Foundation ruling class NGO 
  Save the Children no rural development projects 
MercyCorp (email exchange) no rural development projects 
Catholic Relief (email exchange) no rural development projects 
International Medical Corps no rural development projects 
Nahwa al Muwataniya no rural development projects 
  Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD) hosted by CDR 
financed by European Union QUANGO  rural development projects 
Agriculture development project (ADP) housed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture financed by EU QUANGO  rural development projects 
Community Development Project (CDP) at the CDR financed by 
the World Bank QUANGO  rural development projects 
  Office of Transition Initiative (OTI) USAID bilateral donor no rural development projects 
  UNDP multilateral donor rural development projects 
European Commission multilateral donor rural development projects 
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Table VIII.3: Detailed break-down of respondents to expert interviews 
NGOs and donors not working in rural development  6 
 
Bilateral donor no rural development projects 1 
 
 
NGOs without no rural development projects 5 
 
Former staff and relevant practitioners in the sector 11 
 
Board member if rural development NGO 1 
 
 
Former civil servant now NGO staff 1 
 
 
Former NGO staff 4 
 
 
NGO network staff 2 
 
 
NGO staff with donor insights 2 
 
 
Expert on cooperatives for Amel and CTRDA 1 
 
Public servants 10 
 
Ministry of Cooperatives 1 
 
 
Litani Water Authority 1 
 
 
Ministry of Social Affairs 1 
 
 
Ministry of Energy and Water 1 
 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 3 
 
 
Local government (mayor or head of municipality) 3 
 
Private sector professionals 5 
 
Head of Beirut fruit and vegetable wholesale market Bir Hassan 1 
 
 
Large farmer 1 
 
 
Head of purchasing for large supermarket 1 
 
 
Vet 1 
 
 
Environmental entrepreneur 1 
 
Academics, Journalists & researchers 13 
 
Lebanese academic 5 
 
 
International academic 4 
 
 
Lebanese researcher 3 
 
 
Lebanese journalist 1 
 
Field notes 
   
 
Trade Fairs 
  
 
Hippodrome Green Fair, Beirut 
 
Ardi Trade Fair in Dahiye, Beirut 
 
Nowara Launch, women in agriculture, Beirut  
 
Village visits 
  
 
Froun, Nabatieh (post 2006 reconstruction) 
 
Hermel, North (Illicit crops, ruminants in dry-land) 
 
Arsal, Bekaa (smuggling, women’s coop) 
 
Aytaroun, Nabatieh (women’s coop workshop) 
 
Nabi Sheet, Bekaa (Farmer focus group/interviews ) 
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3 Appendix to Chapter 4 
3.1 NGO activities in detail 
NGOs in the survey were classified by area of activity following the International Classification of 
Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO), a classification system recommended in the UN Handbook on Non-Profit 
Institutions in the System of National Accounts (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2003). It 
groups organisations into 12 major activity groups, which are further divided into sub-groups. This 
classification system has been slightly amended, that is to say some categories have been compressed and 
others expanded so as to be still broadly comparable internationally while bringing out Lebanese peculiarities.  
Table VIII.4: NGO classification in detail 
Present Classification System ICNPO Group Sub-Code Description of Sub-Group 
Culture & Arts Organisations 
1. Culture and 
Recreation 
1100 Culture and Arts 
Youth, Sports, Social & Recreational 
Clubs  
1200 Sports 
1300 Other Recreation and Social Clubs (i.e. Lions) 
1400 Youth, Scouts 
Education, Health Care & Research 
2. Education and 
Research 
2100 Primary, intermediary and secondary education 
2200 Higher education 
2300 Other education (vocational, adult learning) 
2400 Research 
3. Health 
3100 Hospitals and rehabilitation 
3200 Nursing homes 
3300 Mental health and crisis intervention 
3400 Other health services (incl. education, awareness) 
Social & Charitable Services (includes 
also 6200) 
4. Social services 
4100 Social services (ةيريخلا لامعلأا). 
4200 Disaster and emergency 
4300 Income support and maintenance 
Environment & Animal Welfare 5. Environment 
5100 Environment 
5200 Animal welfare 
Community & Village Organisations 
6. Development and 
Housing 
6110 
Community (ةدلب, ةعيضلا ) development, village and 
neighbourhood organisations 
Economic Development (includes also 
6300) 6120 
Economic development: savings associations, micro-
finance, small business, agriculture, handicrafts 
Social Development & Awareness Raising 
6130 
Social development, improve capacity and 
awareness and public well-being 
within: Social Services 6200 Housing 
within: Econ. Development  6300 Employment, career advice, training 
Civic & Advocacy Associations 
 
7. Law, Advocacy 
and Politics 
7100 
Civic and advocacy organisations, protection of 
rights 
7200 
Law and legal services: crime prevention, 
delinquency support, consumer protection 
7300 Political organisations 
None in sample 8. Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion 
None in sample 9. International  
Religious Assoc. 
 
10 
10100 Religious associations,  
Membership Associations 
 
11.  Business and 
Professional 
Associations 
11100 Business associations 
11200 Professional associations 
11300 Labour unions 
11400 Alumni and veteran organisations 
Family Associations 
11500 
Family associations if for the benefit of family 
members only 
Unclassified 12 12000 Unclassified 
Note: Sub-categories in italic do not figure in the ICNPO classification but have been added to suit the Lebanese case.  
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Table VIII.5: Detailed NGO activities 
ICNPO Codes   
Number of 
NGOs 
Per cent 
1 
Culture and arts 381 11.4 
Sports 290 8.7 
Other recreational and social clubs 41 1.2 
Youth, Scouts, YMCA 138 4.1 
2 
Primary, intermediary & secondary education 41 1.2 
Other education 66 2.0 
Research 24 0.7 
3 
Hospitals and rehabilitation 47 1.4 
Nursing homes 18 0.5 
Mental health and crisis intervention 11 0.3 
Other health services 102 3.0 
4 
Social and charitable services 486 14.5 
Disaster and emergency 17 0.5 
Income support and maintenance 67 2.0 
5 
Environment 85 2.5 
Animal welfare 10 0.3 
6 
Community development 231 6.9 
Economic development 245 7.3 
Social development, improve capacity 73 2.2 
Housing 28 0.8 
Employment, career advice, training 9 0.3 
7 
Civic and advocacy organizations 110 3.3 
Law and legal services 9 0.3 
10 Religious associations 57 1.7 
11 
Business associations 88 2.6 
Professional associations 79 2.4 
Alumni and veteran associations 158 4.7 
Family associations 410 12.2 
12 Unclassified 29 0.9 
 NGO networks 3 0.1 
  Total 3,353 100 
 
3.2 Lebanese government expenditure 
Due to the prolonged period of civil war, time series data on Lebanese government expenditures are 
hard to come by and the current series has been pieced together from various sources. Helbling (1999) 
compiles government expenditure data as percentage of GDP for 1972, 1974-1976, 1980, 1985, 1988-1997. I 
multiplied this with GDP data at current market prices from Gaspard (2004). Makdisi (2004) compiles data 
for 1974,1980, 1982-1990 at current prices. The Lebanese Ministry of Finance (2009) keeps a time series for 
the post-war period from 1992-2008, also at current prices. I deflated these three series using a consumer 
price index from Gaspard (2004). Unfortunately this time series only lasts until 2002, since the Ministry of 
Finance does not publish CPI or GDP deflator data, I used Gaspard’s deflator for 2002 for the years 2003-
2008. Since inflation has been comparatively low in Lebanon during this period this will only slightly 
overestimate government expenditure. 
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Figure VIII.2: Lebanese government expenditure (in constant 1972 prices) 
 
 
For consistency’s sake, I gave preference to data by Makdisi (2004) and the Ministry of Finance 
(2009), since they have longer time series data. I used Helbling (1999) data whenever it was the only data-
point available.  
3.3 Share of NGOs hiring paid employees 
Table VIII.6:Share of NGOs hiring paid employees 
 % 
Family assoc. 6.3 
Youth, Sports & Social Clubs 16.6 
Membership assoc. 18.0 
Community &  village assoc. 19.8 
Environment & animal welfare 20.3 
Culture & arts org. 21.7 
Economic dev. 33.9 
Social dev. & capacity bldg. 38.8 
Social & charitable services 38.9 
Religious assoc. 43.6 
Civic & advocacy assoc. 44.3 
Education & Health Care 53.5 
   
N  2,353 
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4 Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table VIII.7: NGO activities by funding source 
Activity unit 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
          
significance 
level 
 
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Sports, Soc. 
Clubs 
row % 30.1 40.3 42.6 48.4 26.7 10.3 8.3 94.0 
Schools 
&hospit. 
row % 27.7 18.8 49.2 48.6 32.3 22.4 18.4 78.9 
Economic dev. row % 28.8 34.9 51.5 42.4 25.4 16.7 18.2 84.9 
Env. & animal row % 27.5 28.8 36.3 36.3 28.6 16.3 20.0 86.3 
Culture and arts  row % 21.7 27.6 44.1 46.3 28.6 16.2 14.0 93.5 
Soc.  Dev. row % 23.8 15.4 43.6 46.5 28.4 14.4 14.4 88.1 
Commun. 
village  
row % 21.1 22.7 37.6 45.4 21.4 10.3 7.2 96.4 
Civic, advocacy row % 25.6 7.8 36.7 47.8 33.7 16.7 39.0 83.3 
Soc. & 
charitable 
row % 23.2 20.1 44.8 53.8 36.3 18.7 17.0 84.6 
Religious  row % 12.8 8.5 42.6 61.7 35.3 27.7 21.3 78.7 
Membership row % 8.8 8.4 27.7 19.3 23.1 7.7 6.6 94.2 
Family  row % 2.0 7.5 26.6 31.2 15.5 4.1 0.3 98.3 
          
N NGOs 2,754 2,753 2,754 2,753 2,897 2,752 2,753 2,760 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences significance level: *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05  
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Table VIII.8: NGO age, geographic location, and targeted area by funding source 
Variable unit  
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
Founding year 
difference in 
percentage 
changea 
*** *** *** *** ** *** NS * 
 difference in 
absolute 
amountsb 
*** *** *** *** * ** NS NS 
no funds 
Mean 
(95% CI) c 
 
1986 
(1986-1987) 
1986 
(1985-1987) 
1986 
(1986-1987) 
1986  
(1985-1987) 
1985  
(1985-1986) 
1986 
(1985-1986) 
1985 
(1984-1986) 
1981 
(1977-1983) 
yes, receives funds 
Mean 
(95% CI)c 
1979 
(1977-1981) 
1982 
(1980-1984) 
1983 
(1981-1984) 
1984 
(1982-1985) 
1983  
(1981-1984) 
1981 
(1976-1984) 
1984 
(1981-1986) 
1985 
(1984-1986) 
           
N NGOs  2720 2719 2720 2719 2862 2718 2719 2726 
           
Geographic locationd  ** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
 
Beirut row %  15.5 6.1 29.2 40.4 26.5 15.0 20.8 89.2 
Mount Lebanon row %  22.6 28.1 46.0 40.6 36.3 20.2 12.5 87.3 
North row %  20.0 6.3 48.4 68.7 17.5 5.9 9.5 91.9 
Bekaa row %  26.0 42.5 28.8 33.2 24.3 13.1 8.1 91.9 
South row %  16.9 23.0 39.4 30.1 26.1 6.1 8.0 92.5 
Nabatieh row %  16.5 23.2 35.4 33.5 18.6 4.9 7.3 98.2 
           
N NGOs  2781 2780 2781 2780 2925 2779 2780 2787 
           
Covered geographic aread 
 
 
NS * * NS ** ** *** *** 
countrywide row %  21.9 18.4 36.4 44.2 31.2 16.9 19.1 86.9 
Governorate 
(Muhafaza) 
row %  19.4 20.0 41.4 50.5 28.5 13.7 10.5 94.8 
Sub-governorate 
(Caza) 
row %  20.5 18.8 45.9 45.2 25.8 13.2 8.9 
 
90.5 
Municipality row %  18.8 23.60 40.1 41.7 24.7 11.3 7.5 93.0 
           
N NGOs  2627 2626 2627 2626 2761 2625 2626 2632 
           
a Using t-tests of the natural log transformation. The variable is trimmed to exclude outliers.  
b Using the two sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
c Bias adjusted confidence interval obtained through bootstrapping using 50 replications. Increasing the number of replications did affect results.  
d Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables 
*** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
  
Appendix to Chapter 5 
 171 
Table VIII.9: NGO institutional sophistication by funding source 
Variable unit 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
         
Bank Account *** NS *** ** *** *** *** ** 
No row % 10.1 17.7 27.1 39.8 16.1 6.5 3.9 93.5 
Yes row % 23.5 20.6 44.8 45.5 31.1 15.9 15.9 89.2 
N NGOs 2,693 2,585 2,587 2,586 2,713 2,585 2,585 2,592 
          
Employees specifically for 
fundraising 
*** NS *** NS *** *** *** *** 
No row % 15.6 20.1 36.7 42.1 24.3 10.8 8.3 92.9 
Yes row % 35.7 22.2 50.0 45.9 37.0 23.0 25.6 81.3 
N NGOs 2,693 2,692 2,93 2,692 2,828 2,692 2,692 2,698 
          
Auditing firm *** NS *** *** *** *** *** *** 
No row % 17.5 21.2 38.42 43.2 25.3 12.1 8.7 92.6 
Yes row % 33.4 19.3 52.81 51.3 41.2 21.3 29.5 80.6 
N NGOs 2,559 2,560 2,560 2,560 2,674 2,559 2,559 2,565 
          
Computers *** ** *** NS *** *** *** ** 
No row % 14.6 18.6 35.9 43.6 21.9 9.7 6.5 92.1 
Yes row % 27.0 23.3 47.4 45.5 35.3 18.3 19.1 88.8 
N NGOs 2,541 2,542 2,542 2,542 2,657 2,541 2,541 2,546 
         
Column Percent Total         
          
Bank Account *** NS *** ** *** *** *** ** 
Yes col % 73.4 87.1 77.2 82.8 76.9 84.2 87.6 92.2 73.4 
         
Employees specifically for 
fundraising 
*** NS *** NS *** *** *** 
*** 
Yes col % 23.8 41.2 25.3 29.4 25.0 32.0 39.5 48.4 21.1 
         
Auditing firm *** NS *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Yes col % 18.5 29.6 16.7 23.4 20.7 26.9 27.9 42.8 16.1 
         
Computers *** ** *** NS *** *** *** ** 
Yes col % 46.4 61.8 51.9 53.2 84.2 58.2 61.8 71.6 45.4 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences significance level: *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
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Table VIII.10: NGO budget by funding source 
Variable unit  
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
          
Budget 
(US$) 
difference in 
percentage changea 
*** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
         
difference in 
absolute amountsb 
*** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
          
no funds 
from 
source in 
question 
Mean 
(95% CI) c 
80,210 
63,65-
114,249 
136,169 
88,884-
247,337 
56,723 
43,041-
80,891 
112,878 
51,024-
319,922 
125,081 
68,754-
228,646 
117,708 
66,330-
194,129 
116,547 
73,910-
192,208 
653,870 
221,413-
1,552,186 
          
yes, 
receives 
funds from 
source in 
question 
Mean 
(95% CI)c 
315,192 
190,184-
664,133 
109,537 
64,153-
176,419 
240,314 
132,519-
349,848 
147,407 
111,488-
188,932 
185,401 
140,250-
278,214 
220,606 
150,370-
350,706 
237,770 
166,459-
334,793 
86,849 
59,232-
122,906 
           
N NGOs  1633 1632 1634 1633 1633 1632 1632 1636 
a Using t-tests of the natural log transformation. The variable is trimmed to exclude outliers.  
b Using the two sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
c Bias adjusted confidence interval obtained through bootstrapping using 50 replications. Increasing the number of replications did affect results.  
*** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
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Table VIII.11: Paid staff and NSSF contributions by funding source 
Variable unit  
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
         
has paid staff (employees or 
contractor)a 
*** NS *** *** *** *** *** *** 
No  17.2 20.8 37.8 40.5 26.0 12.4 10.0 92.3 
Yes  33.3 21.3 47.4 55.3 34.5 19.3 22.8 81.0 
N  2781 2780 2781 2780 2925 2779 2780 2787 
          
number of 
paid staffe 
difference in 
percentage changeb 
*** NS *** *** *** *** *** *** 
difference in 
absolute amountsc 
 
** NS *** ** *** ** ** *** 
no funds 
mean 
(95% CI)d 
 
31 
(22-41) 
35 
(22-53) 
18 
(14-26) 
37 
(20-58) 
30 
(22-46) 
34 
(23-54) 
28 
(21-42) 
82 
(46-154) 
yes, receives 
funds 
mean 
(95% CI)d 
 
42 
(20-64) 
33 
(25-43) 
53 
(34-93) 
33 
(25-41) 
55 
(28-92) 
35 
(26-48) 
57 
(30-83) 
23 
(19-29) 
N  540 539 540 539 574 539 539 541 
         
employees in NSSFa *** NS *** ** *** *** *** *** 
           
all % row  38.4 19.2 49.6 49.6 47.4 29.9 28.0 74.6 
most % row  42.7 18.3 59.2 51.5 42.1 27.2 28.2 80.6 
some % row  43.1 29.3 48.8 47.2 30.3 17.9 20.3 90.3 
none % row  16.6 21.7 38.4 40.4 24.6 11.3 9.7 92.2 
           
all % col  19.5 9.6 13.2 12.8 18.3 22.7 23.4 9.0 
most % col  8.2 3.5 6.0 5.0 6.5 7.8 8.9 3.7 
some % col  9.9 6.7 5.9 5.5 5.4 6.2 7.7 5.0 
none % col  62.4 80.2 75.1 76.7 69.8 63.3 60.0 82.3 
           
N NGOs  2,501 2,500 2,501 2,500 2,638 2,499 2,500 2,506 
a Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables;  
b Using t-tests of the natural log transformation. The variable is trimmed to exclude outliers.  
c Using the two sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
d Bias adjusted confidence interval obtained through bootstrapping using 50 replications. Increasing the number of replications did affect results.  
e These averages exclude NGOs which indicated that they do not have employees or contractors on their payroll. 
*** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
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Table VIII.12: NGO branches by funding source 
Variable Unit  
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
         
has branches *** NS *** ** *** ** *** NS 
no % row 20.2 23.8 36.1 40.0 28.5 15.8 11.8 90.2 
yes % row 30.0 24.9 49.3 50.5 38.8 22.9 26.3 88.5 
N NGOs 1770 1769 1769 1769 1863 1769 1770 1774 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables; *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
Table VIII.13: Cooperation with the government and other NGOs by funding source 
Variable unit  
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
           
Cooperation with the 
government  
 *** *** *** NS *** *** *** 
 
*** 
no row %  6.8 14.1 37.5 43.7 21.6 8.9 7.7 93.3 
yes row %  48.4 34.6 44.8 43.2 40.1 23.7 22.2 83.9 
N NGOs  2721 2,720 2,721 2,720 2,858 2,719 2,720 2,727 
           
Cooperation with other NGOs  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
** 
no row %  13.1 12.8 36.1 38.9 19.2 8.0 6.4 91.9 
yes row %  26.9 27.8 43.5 47.5 35.3 18.7 17.8 88.7 
N NGOs  2,681 2,680 2,681 2,680 2,821 2,679 2,680 2,687 
           
Contract with international 
NGO/organisation 
 *** NS NS NS *** *** *** 
 
*** 
no row %  17.3 20.2 39.3 42.7 24.0 11.1 5.6 92.3 
yes row %  35.0 22.9 41.2 44.9 43.6 26.5 47.5 79.3 
N NGOs  2,673 2,672 2,673 2,672 2,810 2,671 2,672 2,679 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables; *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
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Table VIII.14: NGO funders and problems in performing key activities 
Variable unit 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private 
sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
Difficulties in performing its 
activities 
** *** *** NS *** *** * * 
No row % 16.0 12.2 30.8 41.8 18.5 7.2 10.2 87.6 
Yes row % 21.5 23.1 42.6 43.9 30.3 15.4 13.2 90.9 
N NGOs 2735 2734 2735 2734 2871 2733 2734 2741 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables; *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
Table VIII.15: NGO funder and beneficiary committees 
Variable unit 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
Beneficiary committee *** ** *** *** *** ** *** ** 
no row % 26.4 24.2 51.9 54.7 38.4 16.2 18.04 87.3 
yes row % 17.3 18.9 33.9 37.3 21.9 12.5 9.4 91.6 
N NGOs 2,706 2,705 2,706 2,705 2,846 2,704 2,705 2,711 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables; *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05 
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Table VIII.16: Sectarian affiliation by funder 
Variable unit 
government 
funds 
municipal 
funds 
service 
fees 
private 
individual 
private sector 
organisations 
Lebanese 
third 
sector/NGOs 
International 
donor (bi- or 
multi-lateral) 
membership 
fees 
          
self-declared sectarian 
affiliation 
NS NS NS NS NS * NS *** 
w/o  affiliation row % 21.3 20.3 40.7 44.1 27.4 12.9 12.7 91.2 
with  affiliation row % 18.7 24.0 39.9 43.8 28.4 17.1 11.2 85.2 
 NGOs 2,637 2,636 2,637 2,636 2,767 2,635 2,636 2,643 
          
benefits Muslims only NS *** * NS NS * NS NS 
no row % 19.5 19.5 41.8 44.4 26.3 12.0 11.5 91.1 
yes row % 16.5 30.6 33.0 51.0 26.6 17.0 8.7 92.8 
N NGOs 2,406 2,406 2,407 2,406 2,511 2,405 2,405 2,410 
          
benefits Christians only NS NS * NS NS ** NS *** 
no row % 19.5 20.2 40.5 45.2 26.1 11.9 11.3 91.8 
yes row % 14.4 24.5 50.4 40.3 29.8 20.9 10.1 81.3 
N NGOs 2,406 2,406 2,407 2,406 2,511 2,405 2,405 2,410 
Pearson’s χ2 to test differences between categorical variables; *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, *p<0.05, NS p>0.05
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Figure VIII.3: Uni-variate Analysis of predictors 
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